SDF integration is turning into a regional headache

Integrating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into Syria’s state institutions, particularly a reconstituted national army, has proven far more complex than the language of the 10 March Agreement suggests. Although the deal was signed by the transitional government and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi amid considerable publicity, it was effectively stillborn. Its vague provisions lacked the detail required for implementation, making it more a political holding gesture than a workable integration framework. Moreover, the issue extends well beyond these two parties, intersecting directly with Turkey’s security concerns and the strategic calculations of both the United States and Israel.

Following recent statements by Turkey’s foreign minister, Hakan Fidan – who described Israeli coordination with the SDF as a key factor obstructing progress on implementing the agreement – the file has become even more thorny. Israel’s explicit insertion into the equation has given the issue considerable implications for Turkey’s national security, as well as for Syria’s sovereignty and territorial unity.

Any move towards integrating the SDF or confronting it militarily now carries exceptionally high risks. As long as the possibility of Israeli logistical support exists, any escalation could open parallel fronts in coastal regions and in Suwayda, areas the SDF has previously sought to stir.

In effect, the paralysis surrounding the March agreement has narrowed Syria’s options for dealing with the SDF. One path points to a revised agreement producing genuine integration, an outcome unlikely without sustained US pressure. The other leads towards a military scenario, potentially driven by Turkey at the Syrian government’s request. Any military solution would create problems far greater than those it claims to solve. Even if tactically decisive, it would do little over time to prevent the entrenchment of a Syrian analogue of the PKK, especially if claims of ongoing Israeli support are correct.

Previous Turkish operations pushed the SDF west of the Euphrates and curbed its expansion. Replicating this today would imply dismantling the SDF’s military capabilities altogether, requiring a prolonged campaign that would further strain Syria’s fragile stability. While a large-scale operation has not been ruled out, it remains undesirable for both Syria and Turkey. More likely are limited operations, probably focused on Raqqa and Deir Ezzor rather than Qamishli or Hasakah, serving primarily as pressure tactics and tests of US and Israeli responses.

When it comes to integrating the SDF into the Syrian army, the devil is in the details. The central challenge is how disarmament and incorporation would work in practice: on what basis, through which mechanisms, and under whose authority. Turkey insists on individual-based integration, absorbing fighters case by case rather than transferring intact units into state structures. The SDF, by contrast, seeks entry as organised formations with defined roles. Recent reports suggest it has made headway on that demand.

Yet the standoff is not only between Ankara, Damascus, and the SDF leadership. Deep divisions exist within the SDF itself, where integration on the government’s terms faces significant resistance. A heterogeneous force of varied formations, ideologies, external ties, and highly institutionalised units, it cannot be absorbed wholesale without risking the emergence of informal armed groups beyond state control.

Turkey’s defence minister, Yaşar Güler, has reiterated the demand that the SDF be “cleansed” of elements linked to the PKK before any integration can occur. This would exclude not only recent recruits but also veteran cadres with long-standing organisational ties beyond Syria. As the circle of exclusion widens, it remains unclear how such a process would be implemented or by whom. Excluding large numbers of fighters risks pushing them into organised armed groupings outside state authority, recreating pockets of instability. Beyond this lie the familiar challenges of merging former adversaries into a single force, particularly questions of doctrine and loyalty. Careful planning for disarmament, demobilisation, and phased integration will therefore be essential if Damascus’s preferred solution is to succeed.

The broader political context also matters. Completing the formation of a new parliament and guaranteeing equal rights for Kurds would go a long way towards lending credibility to any integration process. Equally uncertain is whether the United States and Israel are genuinely prepared to scale back their sponsorship of the SDF.

The question of how to deal with the Syrian Democratic Forces is not a short-term crisis. Any chosen path represents a long-term test of Syria’s state-rebuilding project. It could yet become a notable success story. If it doesn’t, it will become a chronic headache, for Syria and the wider region.