2254’s successor
International community considers new Security Council resolution

Syria’s transition from Bashar al-Assad’s rule to a pluralistic future is in danger. Contrary to public messaging, the caretaker government led by HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa appears to be monopolising the process, raising real concerns that the transitional government, slated for March, will claim inclusivity while concentrating power in al-Sharaa’s hands. This risks turning the transitional government into a tool for consolidating power. In response, there is growing consensus within the international community that a new Security Council resolution is needed that clearly defines the expectations placed on the caretaker authorities to deliver on  a credible and inclusive transition.

Over the past month al-Sharaa has embarked on an impressively orchestrated outreach campaign, engaging various segments of Syrian society, including Alawite and Christian communities. There is a stark difference, however, between outreach and genuine inclusiveness. Al-Sharaa is dictating the terms of engagement, refusing to interact with individuals as representatives of parties or institutions and insisting on meeting them in their individual capacities. That makes sense for the leader of a party that considers escaping its terrorist designation by dissolving itself; but it hinders Syrians from organising themselves and establishing a pluralistic multi-party political system.

The caretaker government has already made decisions that are beyond caretaking and will have a long term impact on the nature of the Syrian state. It has appointed longstanding jihadists, including foreigners, to senior positions within the military. Its General Security has superseded the old police force. It has announced changes in school textbooks in line with Islamic education. It is forging alliances with rebel leaders—many better described as warlords—and retaining the services of high-level diplomats and bureaucrats that were committed servants of the Assadist state. This suggests that agreements are in place with former regime elites as a price for a swift and so far largely peaceful takeover of Damascus. 

Al-Sharaa’s current position of power is not a result of HTS’s intrinsic strength but of the support of external powers, notably Turkey. During the 27 November HTS-led offensive Ankara’s explicit warnings against external intervention and its implied guarantees played a major role in enabling the takeover of Damascus; and Turkey’s stance was tacitly endorsed by Western and Arab intelligence chiefs. Since al-Sharaa moved into the Presidential Palace, he has capitalised on regional and international engagement to bolster his image as a legitimate leader. The delegations that rushed to Damascus to meet the new strongman brought with them demands and expectations, but were uncoordinated and al-Sharaa was granted considerable “benefit of the doubt." 

The question of what it means to act on behalf of all Syrians under current circumstances is complex. A reasonable baseline for legitimacy is a transition towards a pluralistic state adhering to international standards of human rights, judicial independence, government accountability and the rule of law, while protecting civic space and delivering comprehensive transitional justice. All this was enshrined in the Geneva Communiqué of 2012, which forms the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, adopted in December 2015, that provides a roadmap for Syria’s transition. Al-Sharaa deserves credit for how he executed the relatively bloodless toppling of Assad; but it would be naïve to expect the HTS-led caretaker government to voluntarily deliver on these UN-endorsed principles. Credible pressure is required, and this ultimately can come only from externals, as Syrians themselves have relatively limited influence over their new rulers. 

Throughout December 2024, the international appetite for a structured political transition in line with UNSCR 2254 appeared minimal. After more than a decade of frustration, including with the UN, many governments saw international Syria diplomacy as a quagmire they would rather avoid. It is therefore no surprise that immediately after the December 14 Aqaba Conference, where Western, Arab, and Turkish governments reiterated their lip support for UNSCR 2254 and the UN Special Envoy’s mandate, delegations that met al-Sharaa did not mention UNSCR 2254, either in their private meetings or publicly. 

Syrians, meanwhile, have grown deeply skeptical of international initiatives – evidenced by the harsh criticism of the Aqaba Conference from political and civil society groups. For many Syrians, “international diplomacy” has become synonymous with broken promises and complicity in sustaining dictatorship.

The lack of appetite for an internationally facilitated political process has weakened the already fragile position of UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, whose 15 December visit to Damascus and meeting with al-Sharaa highlighted the UN’s precarious situation. In a closed Security Council session on December 27, Pedersen acknowledged that his attempts to establish dialogue had been unsuccessful and that al-Sharaa had yet to respond to his invitation to engage with him, a Western diplomat told Syria in Transition. Many UN member states and Syrian actors argue that UNSCR 2254 is not applicable post-Assad and seem ready to accept vague references to its principles. Concerningly, even the UN Special Envoy had adopted this position in his office’s policy of “realism” that has shaped the last five years of his so far unsuccessful term. This view, however, ignores the resolution’s foundational principle: UN facilitation as a guarantee of inclusiveness and credibility of both the process and the outcome. Dismissing this as undue foreign interference would be a grave mistake.

Calls to let Syrians to “sort things out themselves” risk abandoning a framework that could minimise the elite bargaining and foreign interference that will inevitably shape Syria’s transition. Just as Assad’s rule was sustained by foreign powers, so too is al-Sharaa’s. Syria has not become sovereign overnight. The “struggle for Syria” has merely entered a new phase.

At the January 12 Riyadh Conference, a follow-up to the Aqaba Conference, a notable shift in perspective among UN member states emerged. Many now see renewed potential for an internationally sponsored process to support Syria's transition. While there is readiness to assist Syria, there is growing concern that al-Sharaa may not follow through on his numerous positive commitments. UNSCR 2254, designed for negotiations between the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime is no longer viewed as a suitable basis for forward movement, and its credibility has anyway been tarnished by the years of failed diplomacy. There are indications, however, that UNSCR 2254's principles may form the foundation of a new resolution that clearly defines international expectations for Syria's transitional government and deals with HTS’s terrorist designation. Such a resolution could also be expected to establish the UN's future coordination role - likely transforming into an integrated mission led by an empowered Special Representative. 

If effected thoughtfully and avoiding past mistakes, a revamped UN role has the potential to bring much-needed structure and normative soft power into what is otherwise an unrestrained scramble for influence over Syria.

Achieving consensus on a new Security Council resolution for Syria, however, is a herculean task and can materialise only if member states see it as aligning with their national interests. The renewed interest in a UN-facilitated process may reflect a desire by more powerful states to legitimise their positions through UN endorsement; and a desire by less influential states not to be left behind. Ideally, a new resolution would result from a realisation among member states that a credible and inclusive transition towards a unified Syria would be in everyone's – including al-Sharaa’s – best interest. 

While Assad is gone, the Syrian conflict remains unresolved and the risk of a return to civil war is real. Fundamental issues of identity, representation, resource sharing, and distributive justice still divide society, and the need for truth, accountability, and reconciliation looms large. If these issues are not addressed comprehensively and credibly, lasting stability will remain out of reach.