Aleppo here we come
Rebels mull options for new offensive

There has been much speculation in recent weeks about a large-scale offensive by armed opposition groups in northern Syria. Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the ex-jihadi group that controls Idlib, has contacted commanders in the rival Syrian National Army (SNA) to see whether they would join in an assault on Aleppo city. 

An indication that things might be tilting towards a military escalation came in the shape of a curious warning by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. “After Lebanon, the next place [Israel] will set its eyes on, I tell you clearly, will be our homeland... [Prime Minister Benjamin] Netanyahu's dreams include Anatolia," he said in an address to parliament. This raised eyebrows in Western capitals, and genuine fear among Turkish citizens, many of whom are now convinced that Israel seeks to annex southern Turkey. This is rather useful for Erdogan, because it psyches up his people for a new military incursion into northern Syria under the pretext of standing up to Zionism.  

Inspections by senior Turkish generals of the frontlines in Afrin have heightened speculation even further. Informed sources in Ankara believe that a Turkish-backed military operation would aim to create a large “safe zone” for returning refugees that stretches from eastern Idlib to the south eastern Aleppo countryside. This would encircle Aleppo city and place it under de facto Turkish control. 

From the rebels’ perspective, however, the strategic calculus for such an operation remains fraught with uncertainty, from Turkey’s ambiguous position, to the regime’s new Arab patrons, to Israel’s war in Gaza and Lebanon that’s rapidly shifting the regional balance of power. It also depends on whether the rebel factions that Turkey would rely on to do the fighting are up to the job. 

Readiness and uncertainty
The rebel factions that are actively preparing for an offensive are a mix of groups that includes HTS, the National Liberation Front (NLF), and some factions affiliated to the Turkish-backed SNA. They have managed to mobilise an impressive array of combat-ready units but significant internal divisions persist, particularly over strategic control of the operation and resource allocation. Key rebel groups like Jabha Shamia, well-placed to strike at Aleppo’s northern flank, have yet to commit. 

The HTS leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, is positioning himself to be the Conqueror of Aleppo. To this end, he has sought to absorb elite forces from allied factions while seeking to monopolise operational command. The rebels fear that he will use them as cannon fodder while keeping his own units in reserve. They also fear that Jolani might be exaggerating the level of external support he claims to have for the offensive, at times referencing an understanding with the Turks, and at others claiming to have a green light from the US. Although coordination efforts like the HTS-run Al-Fateh al-Mubeen operations room have yielded some results, long-standing factional grievances remain an issue. Interestingly, Jolani has tied the timing of the operation to developments on Syria’s southern border, where Israel is said to be planning an Iran-free buffer zone that would extend to the southern edges of Damascus. 

Concurrent with HTS beating the drums of war, the SNA has established military operations rooms for each of the four Turkish military zones in Syria: Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch, Peace Spring, and Idlib. It is too early to tell whether this new coordination mechanism will work alongside that of the HTS-run one or in competition with it; but the fact that it has been set up suggests a level of intent. 

Logistics, logistics 
Evidence is abundant of rebel military preparations for a battle, such as movement of heavy weapons and the evacuation of civilians from frontline villages. Activity is particularly heavy on the Saraqib-Kafar Naha frontline, suggesting that this might be one of the main axes of advance. Another that has been suggested is the Ma’arat al-Nu’man-Khan Shaykhun axis towards Hama. An advance on either axis would mean rebel control of the vital M5 highway that links Damascus and Aleppo. An additional target may be the Raqqa-Aleppo highway somewhere along Lake Assad.  

Logistical limitations, however, continue to pose challenges to any ambitious rebel offensive. Despite HTS and other groups having substantial arsenals, they are unlikely to last them beyond four months of heavy fighting. Reports suggest that medical and logistical preparations are far from sufficient. Field hospitals, emergency shelters and evacuation plans remain inadequate, potentially setting the stage for a humanitarian disaster should the offensive encounter significant resistance, or if regime forces retaliate with heavy bombardment of civilian areas. 

Moreover, extended supply lines and insufficient reinforcements could leave advancing forces vulnerable, especially if the regime managed to regroup and counterattack. There is particular fear of a potential regime advance from the 46th Regiment HQ, located near the HTS-held town of Al-Atarib in western Aleppo, toward the city of Sarmada – a distance of only nine kilometres – which would threaten to split northern Aleppo from Idlib and place the vital Bab al-Hawa border crossing at grave risk.

The enemy prepares 
The Assad regime, meanwhile, has spent the past four years re-organising and re-equipping. With talk of a rebel offensive, all leave has been cancelled and frontline fortifications have been strengthened. Elite units like the Russian-trained 25th Special Missions Division and the Republican Guard have been brought up. While Hezbollah's presence in northern Syria has diminished in recent weeks as fighters have been  recalled to Lebanon, Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and other Iran-backed militias are taking up vacated positions. Unlike the rebels, regime forces don’t have to worry about running out of ammunition.  

The biggest danger to the rebels is the regime’s aerial superiority. Russian air assets, albeit reduced to only between 12 and 20 jets, combined with the depleted but still functioning Syrian air force, enable Assad to assert dominance over the skies of northwest Syria. Russian drone warfare technology has also been transferred to the regime, with no less than 221 suicide drone attacks on Idlib this year alone. So far Turkey has refrained from contesting Syrian air space using its fighters and has settled for the use of Bayraktar drones only. 

The Turkish-Kurdish factor
Turkey’s stance on a possible offensive remains pivotal. Officially, Ankara is reluctant, and has sent warnings to SNA factions that an offensive could threaten the Astana agreements with Russia and strain Turkey’s relations with Iran. 

Behind this cautious facade, however, Turkey has not entirely dismissed the possibility of a military operation, however limited, and has encouraged rebel factions to prepare. For Ankara, a rebel win would mean more real estate with which to bargain, and greater leverage over Assad. It would also strengthen Ankara’s position in future talks over Syria’s future, further isolate the SDF, and open the door to serious discussions on a large-scale refugee return programme funded by the EU. What Turkey needs is a solid green light for the operation from the US; and that will require de-escalation with the Kurds. Reported US-brokered talks between Ankara and the PKK suggest that this may already be taking place. 

If an agreement is not reached, the SDF should worry. While it has traditionally maintained relative neutrality towards Idlib, and has held talks with HTS over economic and other forms of cooperation, a Turkish-backed advance on Aleppo would no doubt be of concern, especially if Ankara set its sights on Tal Rifat, Manbij, and Ayn al-Arab (Kobani.) An America distracted by presidential elections could force the SDF to draw closer to Russia and Israel.   

The wild card
A march on Aleppo while Iran’s proxies are getting battered by Israel is an attractive, logical, and entirely plausible option. Uncertainty within rebel ranks, Turkey’s ambiguous stance, and Assad’s not inconsiderable army in the field, however, all combine to temper expectations of a straightforward sweep.

Should Turkey and/or the rebels decide to launch an offensive, it will require not only a clever military strategy and a robust logistical plan, but also substantial diplomatic manoeuvring by Ankara. At stake is the future trajectory of Syria’s conflict, and quite possibly the shape of the new Middle East. 

The real wild card remains Assad. He may leverage an assault by Turkey to play the victim and accelerate the pace of Arab normalisation to unlock financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Alternatively, he might choose to open up to Turkey in an effort to temper its ambitions after having spent the summer rebuffing overtures from Erdogan. Any Israeli offensive into southern Syria to establish a buffer zone, however, could severely destabilise the Damascus regime, potentially leading to the downfall or exile of at least one of the Assad brothers. This  would shatter the regime's cohesion and leave Assad’s forces demoralised and vulnerable. In this scenario, a rebel push on Aleppo would almost certainly happen.