A revolt in need of a lifeline
Suwayda mulls its options 

Over the past six weeks the residents of Suwayda have been living their 2011 fantasy. Carnival-like anti-Assad protests of the kind that took place elsewhere in Syria twelve years ago are only now taking place in the Druze-majority southern province. “The people want the downfall of the regime” is being chanted once more, and not only by the usual pro-democracy activists. Now it’s also by ordinary Druze who will tell you they are sick of the regime’s endless war, its promotion of drugs, and its inability to provide a decent quality of life. Bread and butter issues are of course important; but so too are existential concerns that have intensified in recent years related to their very future in Syria. What has now dawned on a majority of Druze is that the secular Assadist state that was once their guarantee of safety when the “Sunni salafist” revolution was in full swing is now a hollowed-out shell, and has become little more than a Trojan Horse for a no less threatening form of religious fundamentalism: the Shia variety.  

Groups affiliated to Iran such as Hezbollah have for years been trying to infiltrate Druze society under the cover of the Syrian state. They have long suspected the Druze of being the opposition-from-within, not least because they have long-standing connections to co-religionists in Israel and Lebanon who are avowedly anti-Iran. The National Defence Forces (NDF) militia in Suwayda is under the control of Hezbollah, as are several other militias tied to the Captagon trade operating out of the Lajat region, north of the province. Repeated attempts by Iran to expand its influence in the area, including through Shia proselytising, greatly angered religious leaders. The Druze are fiercely tribal and proud, and do not tolerate outsiders meddling in their internal affairs. When the French attempted to implement land reform in Suwayda, they were met with the Great Syrian Revolt of 1925-27 led by Druze feudal lord Sultan Pasha al-Atrash. His venerated image now stands in place of Assad’s on Suwayda’s streets and public buildings.       

Like the Kurds, the Druze view the Syrian conflict as one primarily between Sunnis and Alawites, in which they have only minimal stakes. Since 2011, they've tried not to fight outside their province, and to restrict the Syrian army’s conscription of their young men, while remaining loyal to “the state.” That continued loyalty, however, has come with a price tag: profound enmity from the Sunni majority and a share of the burden of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the state’s Alawite-led military. 

The relationship between the two heterodox communities has historically been fraught and shaped by mutual suspicion. In his climb to the top, Hafiz Assad ruthlessly crushed the Druze factions in the army and the Ba’ath Party. The Druze were nevertheless still given a reasonably privileged place in the hierarchy of sects comprising Syria’s minoritarian ruling elite. With their open revolt against the regime, however, they are signalling that they no longer wish to be part of that elite. This is partly because the economic benefits are no longer worth it; but also  because being part of that elite in 2023 Syria means being subsumed into a much wider regional “project” run from Tehran where the Druze face being instrumentalised, and perhaps even sacrificed, Hamas-style, on the altar of the Axis of Resistance struggle with Israel and moderate Arab states. That is not the future that the Druze see for themselves. 

What now?
Suwayda’s residents are realising the limits of peaceful protest. Starting in August, both Druze and Alawite activists tried to rouse their respective streets but success was achieved only with the Druze. The emergence of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hajari as champion of the anti-Assad position has given the movement a much-needed focal point and legitimacy boost. The Druze spiritual leader in Israel, Sheikh Muwafak Tarif, has lent his not inconsiderable support. The solidarity of Druze celebrities like the Al-Jazeera presenter Faisal al-Kasim (6.3m followers on X) has also been useful. Despite this, there is now a palpable sense of nervousness and trepidation among the protest movement’s organisers as they look for ways to maintain a momentum that has noticeably declined in recent weeks. The regime in fact has been banking on the protesters tiring and losing confidence, and the leadership splintering and seeking what the activists describe as “individual solutions.” This is code for: everyone for himself. Regular visitors to Suwayda, from regime-friendly civil society activists to Russian generals, offered peace initiatives designed to peel away those who were wavering. Meanwhile, the regime has been rallying its Druze supporters in Syria and Lebanon. The more time passes, the more likely it is that internal splits will become apparent and regime-instigated Druze-on-Druze violence will commence. If that happens, expect a new refugee wave. 

So far, the protesters’ call is for an end to the regime through the implementation of UNSCR 2254. One can assume, however, that the demand has been carefully curated for maximum political impact abroad. Domestically, another call is resonating: autonomy. Activists describe this as the “backs to the wall option”; but the Druze already have their backs to the wall, and the call anyway does not contradict the UN resolution and may even make its implementation more likely. Two things are needed for autonomy to happen: a willingness by the Druze to raise arms and take their revolt beyond its 2011 moment; and “international protection.” This will involve more than the odd phone call to Al-Hajari from Western diplomats. It will require a border crossing with Jordan and the intervention of the US base in Tanf. As Syria scholar Fabrice Balanche noted in 2016, “If Washington and its partners want this strategic minority to play any role in ousting the regime or otherwise ending the war on favorable terms, they will need to demonstrably reassure local Druze that they have a safe future in Syria without Assad's patronage.”