Astana is dead, long live Astana
20th International Meeting

The room fell into silence as the Kazakh Deputy Foreign Minister took the floor during the plenary meeting of the 20th Astana summit on 21 June. After presenting the final statement draft, Kanat Tumysh announced that he had amendments to propose. He suggested adding a paragraph to announce that the trilateral talks in the Kazakh capital had definitively concluded, as the process had accomplished its initial objectives. After a brief pause during which everybody got on their phones, the Kazakh hosts changed their minds. The final statement remained untouched, which did not prevent Tumysh reiterating the thwarted amendments in front of reporters. Russia’s representative, Alexander Lavrentyev, meanwhile told the press that while it couldn’t be said that the Astana process had concluded, if the Kazakh side believed a change of location was necessary, the guarantors would discuss a new venue. 

The following day, the Kazakh Foreign Ministry back-pedalled, stating that it would be ready to consider resuming the process if there was a “collective request” from all participants. 

Speculation is rife, particularly with regards to Lavrentyev’s apparent surprise during the plenary meeting. Despite strained relations between Russia and Kazakhstan, it appears improbable that the Kazakh side would suggest an end of the Astana process without Russian consent. Rumours were fueled by the absence of Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Sosan on the second day of the meeting, leading some to believe that he played a leading role in lobbying the Kazakh hosts. It remains unclear whether Lavrentyev’s surprise was staged to provide plausible deniability for a Russia bent on torpedoing the process; and whether Sosan was indeed lobbying the Kazakhs. 

Less shadowy is the net outcome of the meeting. When the Astana process was established in 2017, it had two primary objectives: undermining the UN-sponsored Geneva track and providing a framework for pragmatic conflict management between Russia, Turkey and Iran. Now that Turkey and the Assad regime are engaging in ministerial-level talks, there is a strategic rationale for a streamlined process without the UN and other observers that Russia considers to be unnecessary “ballast”. Crucially, the Syrian opposition has been left behind as Astana has evolved into the Moscow quad of Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria, reflecting the pro-Assad coalition’s goal of eliminating the opposition from all talks. The old Astana is likely to be maintained to some extent to preserve legitimacy, including clout over the Constitutional Committee; but the stage has been set for the rise of the quadrilateral Astana+ process in Moscow as the real show.