Colliding with Congress
UN Country Team vs. Anti-Normalisation Act

US lawmakers’ frustration with the UN’s operations in Syria is profound. Almost 20 percent of the 3,000-word Assad Regime Anti-Normalisation Act that passed the US House of Representatives in February is about the UN. The UN’s perceived inaction in addressing the decade-long systematic aid diversion and manipulation by Damascus has placed it squarely in the crosshairs of the powerful cross-party group in Congress that sponsored the Act, slated to pass the Senate later this year. For its part, the UN is adamant that its approach thus far has been correct, and that it should be left alone to get on with the task of providing aid to Syrian civilians unencumbered by political agendas. The UN humanitarian and development agencies are now on a collision course with major Western donors like the US. This should worry those who see closer coordination and trust as essential for an adequate response to the worsening humanitarian crisis in Syria. 

Eye on the UN
The Anti-Normalisation Act explicitly states that the UN is being manipulated by the Assad regime. Consequently, Congress obligates any US administration to furnish an annual report that:

• Details access restrictions imposed by the regime and the UN’s response to these constraints.

• Identifies UN officials with ties to the regime or sanctioned individuals.

• Examines how UN aid improperly benefits the regime and what the UN is doing to change that.

• Scrutinises partnerships with regime-affiliated entities such as Asma Assad’s Syria Trust for Development (STD) or the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC.) 

Based on these reports, the US administration is obligated to devise strategies to curb the regime’s ability to exploit the UN. In short, Congress is imposing unprecedented monitoring and reporting mechanisms on UN operations and pushing for full accountability. As this will be enshrined in US law, the executive arm will no longer have the luxury of looking the other way, as it has so far done with the Caesar Act.   

Parameters and Principles 
Central to Western donor frustration with the UN is the perception that it has disregarded its own guidelines. In 2015 UN headquarters in New York recognised the troubled state of their operations in Syria and initiated a consultative process involving UN political, development, and humanitarian arms. This process culminated in 2017 with the “Parameters and Principles of UN Assistance in Syria“ (P&Ps.) This document emphasised the need for human rights due diligence, the conditional nature of reconstruction (i.e. full implementation of UNSCR 2254), the imperative of cross-border deliveries, equitable assistance across all areas of control, and zero tolerance for aid diversion. It also called for a strict focus on the most critical humanitarian needs. Adherence to the P&Ps was meant to be ensured by a multi-agency monitoring group reporting directly to the Secretary General; but the monitoring group was never set up. The P&Ps’ implementation was undermined by the UN Country Team, headed at the time by Resident and Humanitarian Coordinators (RC/HC) Ali al-Zaatari (2016-2019) and Imran Riza (2019-2022.) One of Riza’s gambits to stave off more independent monitoring and risk assessment mechanisms as set out in the P&P was the creation of the Regional Hub Dialogue in 2019. This is a UN Country Team-hosted roundtable to engage with donors that allows for dialogue but not oversight.

The P&Ps served as a benchmark for good practice, and Western donors regularly referred to it during the debate over the UN Strategic Framework 2022-24 and related UN agency programmes. Donors criticised the Framework for its bias, and urged the UN Country Team and agencies to adhere to a Whole-of-Syria approach. They demanded action to mitigate the risks of co-option and aid diversion, as well as clarity on the scale and scope of early recovery programming. The UN Country Team and agencies like UNDP responded to donor criticisms, however, by pointing to their participation in the Regional Hub Dialogue and claiming that activities like early recovery were implemented in line with the P&P guidelines.

Lessons not learned
The persistent expansion of the scope and scale of early recovery assistance pushed by the UN Country Team and UNDP on terms favourable to the regime hit the headlines with the recent announcement of the Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF.) As advertised, the ERTF will be a huge quantitative and qualitative upgrade to the UN’s development work in Syria, and with it will come heightened risks. Western donors have so far reacted cooly, with multiple well-placed diplomatic sources saying that it was unlikely that any Western government would contribute to the Fund. That is no surprise considering that the ERTF and the Early Recovery Strategy 2024-28 foresee expanding  early recovery without adequately addressing questions of equitable distribution, aid diversion mitigation, avoidance of regime legitimisation and normalisation, and sanctions busting. The plan to place the ERTF and its Risk Management Unit under the leadership of the Damascus-based RC/HC, for example, contradicts the P&Ps, which mandate that funding modalities must be as independent as possible from the Assad regime. 

In response to critical inquiries, the UN Country Team has offered three main justifications. Firstly, it emphasises that the ERTF is for the whole of Syria. The reality, however, is that Damascus-run operations have performed poorly in reaching the whole of Syria - so much so that the UN had to set up a dedicated fund (SCHF) specifically for cross-border assistance. Secondly, the UN Country Team highlights that the ERTF’s governing board is supposed to include representation from donors and NGOs. It doesn’t note, however,  that their role will be limited to giving advice, while decision-making will be solely in the hands of the RC/HC. Thirdly, the UN Country Team notes that the ERTF’s secretariat will be located in Amman in order to insulate it from undue influence. This, however, is a feeble argument given that the secretariat falls under the RC/HC’s office in Damascus. Overall, none of these responses are likely to assuage donor concerns. Crucially, Congress is unlikely to be swayed. 

Race against time 
The accumulation of years of shortcomings has propelled the UN into a collision course with Congress, resulting in the bi-partisan support for the Anti-Normalisation Act. While it may be tempting to look to  the Gulf for alternative funding, the Gulf doesn’t want to – and alone cannot – sustain the ERTF. This is especially so after the recent floods in the UAE that caused billions of dollars of damage and will likely focus Abu Dhabi’s excess funds closer to home. It certainly won’t resolve the chronic deficiencies of the entire UN humanitarian response that Congress is now ranged against. 

The UN Country Team’s recent lobbying blitz in Geneva and Brussels to sell its Early Recovery Strategy 2024-2028 and the ERTF to Western donors stresses that there’s a race against time, and hints that the UN has secured a considerable pledge from at least one Gulf country. This, they hope, will persuade Congress and Western donors to drop their hesitations. The more likely scenario, however, is that no serious pledges are in prospect, and that the UN Country Team is conducting a major “fake it until you make it” operation aimed at getting the ERTF across the finish line before the Anti-Normalisation Act is passed into law and a less charitable Republican administration is obligated to play hard.