Correcting wrongdoings
What UNHCR needs to learn from its mistakes in Syria

Bashar Assad’s fall will prompt critical reappraisals of humanitarian and policy approaches to Syria since 2011. One such was UNHCR’s strategy of publicly distancing itself from politics while simultaneously presenting the Assad regime as a relatively benevolent actor. The aim was to secure political and financial support from donors, thereby strengthening UNHCR’s institutional standing and enabling comprehensive early recovery efforts. “They’ve been manipulating their surveys and reports to that end,” a UN source told Syria in Transition. The voices of Syrians who urged the UN to put their safety concerns on top of the agenda were ignored. 

This strategy proved to be dangerously misguided. It reinforced the false narrative that Assad had emerged as the war’s victor, thereby positioning gradual normalisation as the logical next step. It thus contributed to a broader regional and international discourse that fuelled pushbacks and refoulement. At the same time, the strategy ignored UNHCR’s own guidelines that emphasised the importance of addressing the root causes of conflict; and it marginalised non-regime areas, leading to a loss of trust in the UN by Syrians. 

Turning a blind eye
The sudden influx of an estimated 500,000 refugees from Lebanon in October 2024 — 70 per cent of whom are believed to have been  Syrian — was a gift for Assad. Syrians who had initially fled to Lebanon to escape his regime’s violence found themselves having to choose between plague and cholera. Yet for the regime it was an opportunity to assume the role of ‘host’. International humanitarian funds were swiftly mobilised to accommodate the new arrivals; and a prevailing narrative quickly took hold: relief aid, while important, was insufficient; what was needed was comprehensive early recovery assistance without too many inconvenient questions.

This narrative was pushed by both the Assad regime and UNHCR. The regime had long insisted that it was ready to welcome refugees back, but that the international community first needed to fund the creation of a conducive environment for returns, including adequate shelter and livelihood opportunities. Similarly, UNHCR boss Filippo Grandi had urged donors to fund early recovery to make areas of return viable, while suggesting — without evidence — that Assad had made concrete strides in addressing legal and security issues. The UNHCR/Assad narrative, however, did not change the reality that safety concerns remained the primary obstacle to returns. In reality, it was Israel’s heavy bombardment of Lebanon that changed the risk assessments of many refugees.

Given that these returns were neither voluntary nor dignified, monitoring the wellbeing of returnees should have been critical. UNHCR, however, lacked the capacity to do so. While it operates centres along the Syrian-Lebanese border where returnees can register to return, there was no effective oversight once they continued their perilous journeys into Syria. Although UNHCR maintains centers and mobile units throughout the country, these were managed by the regime-affiliated Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC), Asma Assad’s Syria Trust for Development (STD) and pro-regime NGOs such as the Al-Nada Society. Distrusted by returnees, these organisations were at best unreliable and at worst complicit in passing information to the mukhabarat. As a result, many Syrians avoided contact with them. Private groups and NGOs documented numerous instances of returnees being detained, abused, and killed; but, with an eye to maximising resources, UNHCR was keen to avoid alarming donors with such information. 

Despite the glaring lack of monitoring capacity, UNHCR’s head in Syria, Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, told the Danish Jyllands-Posten on 24 November that while it was too early to draw firm conclusions, “we are seeing some first positive indications from the Syrian government, and it is certainly something that the whole world is watching.” UNHCR continued to echo this contradictory line to donors, acknowledging that proper monitoring was not possible yet claiming that things appeared positive, and that the priority now should be providing aid and early recovery assistance. In conversations with Syria in Transition, several donors expressed concern over UNHCR’s selective approach, pointing out the organisation’s tendency to overlook the Assad regime’s blatant and persistent violations of human rights.

Critical appraisal needed
At least on paper, UNHCR has in fact committed to the holistic approach that is needed. In November 2023 UN agencies, including UNHCR and UNDP, together with various governments and other partners, adopted a Common Position on addressing forced displacement within the framework of the humanitarian-development-peace Nexus (HDP Nexus.) The Position Paper clearly states that peace actors must be engaged and peacebuilding needs must be supported to facilitate solutions to conflict. This commitment aligns with a 2023 multi-stakeholder pledge co-led by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA) which called for all relevant actors to address the root causes of forced displacement. 

An OECD study released in November 2024, entitled “The Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus and Forced Displacement” and co-authored by UNHCR itself, found, however, that the HDP Nexus remained insufficiently implemented, although the institutional and operational framework were already in place. Peace activities, it noted, had largely focused on social cohesion and had primarily been implemented by humanitarian or development organisations. The study recommends investment in areas of origin to address the drivers of forced displacement, particularly through peace negotiations, transitional justice, reconciliation and institutional and security sector reform.  

While the fighting since 27 November has caused some new displacement, Assad’s fall has facilitated significant returns despite the lack of livelihood opportunities, thus confirming that safety was always the primary concern. Reports emerging from the notorious Sednaya prison further validate this perspective, even for those who may have missed the shocking abuse revealed in the 2014 Caesar files.   

UNHCR’s role in providing protection and addressing legal issues remains crucial, but it must avoid repeating the mistakes of the past decade that have caused UNHCR and other agencies to lose the trust of Syrians. This moment calls for introspection and a reimagining of how the UN engages with Syria. The country still needs the UN, but not the one of 2011-2024.