Disaster diplomacy
Griffiths reports setbacks to Security Council

One of the curious aftermaths of the earthquake that struck Turkey and Syria this time last year was a misplaced confidence in the power of persuasion. “Disaster diplomacy” saw diplomats and officials flock to Damascus to negotiate deliveries of urgently-needed aid, which quickly developed into an attempt to translate humanitarian agreements with Bashar Assad into political ones. “If not now, when?” was the natural instinct. One of those officials was the head of UN OCHA, Martin Griffiths, who met Assad three times in 2023 to convince him to engage in a give-and-take with the West. The deal was simple: sanctions and red lines would be loosened and more UN aid and development funds extended if the regime would accept UN-negotiated reforms. Griffiths was a former diplomat and Track II pioneer and was perhaps the UN official best suited for the job. He had in fact presented himself to the Secretary General and donor governments as the one who could deliver on Assad if only they would let him.

Several months after Griffiths’ last visit to Damascus nothing had changed, and suspicions were growing that his line with Damascus had gone cold. At a closed session of the Security Council on 30 January 2024, Griffiths confirmed these suspicions. “We need a genuine political process or at least the potential for it, not mere promises from the Presidential Palace in Damascus,” was how he put it, according to diplomatic sources with knowledge of the briefing. He said that initially he had appreciated Assad’s authorisation of UN use of the Al-Rai and Bab al-Salameh crossings shortly after the earthquake, because “it meant that he understood the need to start behaving like a president.” When Griffiths attempted to engage the Syrian leader on issues like the future of the northwest, crucial for humanitarian planning, however, he was simply ignored. Griffiths also said that there had been hope that the readmission of Syria to the Arab League would carry a cost, “but unfortunately it did not.” According to Griffiths, Assad considered it “good news” that there was no political pressure on him. The OCHA chief responded by saying that this was not at all good news, and that there needed to be political pressure on Assad to release detainees, engage in the Constitutional Committee, and take other steps towards a political process. “Without progress on political issues, we cannot make headway on humanitarian matters,“ Griffiths told Assad. 

Griffiths’ high-profile visits to Damascus and the goodwill he extended did trigger some developments on political issues — but only on Assad’s terms. It helped torpedo the already battered position of UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen, whose access in Damascus is restricted to occasional meetings at foreign minister level. Why would Assad take the Envoy seriously if he had the head of OCHA, door-keeper to billions of dollars, eager to meet him and offering money and low-cost political recognition? 

The Arab normalisation, which Griffiths implicitly endorsed at the time, has not prompted positive behavioural changes in Damascus. The Arab Contact Group established in August 2023 is already falling apart because Assad won’t offer any meaningful concessions. The Jordanians, who pushed for its creation in a bid to demonstrate their diplomatic prowess, have reached rock-bottom in their relations with Damascus. Egypt, too, is annoyed and disillusioned. The two major issues on which progress was thought feasible – drug smuggling and refugee returns – have, if anything, worsened. Griffiths said that UNHCR had managed to make progress with Damascus on refugee returns but that it was “just ink on paper.” 

Griffiths’ briefing at the closed door Security Council session amounted to an admission of error. His eagerness to engage in good faith had not been reciprocated, and he now considers that progress requires more political confidence, assurances to donors that there is something worth investing in, and continued support for the UN Special Envoy’s mediation efforts. This is a significant change in tone from his 29 June 2023 briefing when he called for early recovery projects in Syria “with longer timelines and fewer donor red lines.” 

Coming clean at the Security Council is brave and refreshing, but the damage is already done. Griffiths’ “disaster diplomacy” aided the something-for-nothing normalisation deals with Assad, encouraged the misuse of refugees as political chips, contributed to the erroneous opinion that increased early recovery funding should be prioritised to incentivise refugee returns, and legitimised efforts to provide reconstruction funds camouflaged as humanitarian assistance. Perhaps by virtue of what OCHA represents, he ended up strengthening political and humanitarian/development voices who continuously lobby for more money, fewer donor red lines, and more of what they consider “pragmatic engagement” with Damascus irrespective of progress on UNSCR 2254. That may not have been the intention, but it is where we are today.