Dodging politics
OCHA finalises Early Recovery Strategy and Trust Fund

After multiple delays, on 23 October OCHA announced to the Security Council the finalisation of its Early Recovery Strategy (2024-28) and the accompanying Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF.) Since the start of their development in June 2023, both the Strategy and ERTF — a key mechanism for implementing the Strategy — have been a political flashpoint. While donors have largely taken a wait-and-see approach, the Syrian political opposition, humanitarian NGOs and broader civil society have become increasingly frustrated with what they see as a concerning step towards normalisation imposed by a Damascus-based UN Country Team that is regarded as unduly influenced by the Assad regime. 

The Early Recovery debate is charged because it connects to four major political issues that will shape not only the future of humanitarian efforts but also the broader dynamics of the Syrian conflict. First is the question of normalisation. Early Recovery requires increased levels of coordination — and in some cases, cooperation — with de facto authorities, an arena in which the Assad regime is especially adept. Second is the issue of the longstanding red line on reconstruction without progress in the political process. Boundaries of Early Recovery have increasingly been blurred by comprehensive projects planned by the UN. Third, sanctions relief is at play: the Western position tying reconstruction to political concessions from Damascus risks being eroded by the ERTF, which provides Gulf and other donors a channel to bypass sanctions. Finally comes the issue of parity: the Syrian opposition is concerned that operations administered from Damascus, reinforced by the UN’s reliance on the regime’s consent to access non-regime areas, will perpetuate the regime’s ability to weaponise aid and strengthen its carefully fabricated image as the legitimate representative of the Syrian state. 

Flaws remain
The finalised version of the UN Early Recovery Strategy and ERTF sidesteps political language, avoiding terms that might reflect its broader implications. Notably it makes no mention of  “conflict”, let alone of UNSCR 2254, using only the humanitarian term “crisis.” This marks a shift from previous norms: OCHA would routinely use “conflict” to characterise Syria’s situation. The intentional softening of language aligns with the Assad regime and Russia’s lobbying efforts and is evident throughout the documents, which refer to the regime as the “government” while mentioning the opposition only once as “non-state armed groups.” Proper conflict analysis has been substituted by superficial contextual analysis. The Strategy claims, for example, that the security concerns of returnees (enabling returns being a key selling point for the UN’s Strategy) will be addressed, but refers only to “concurrent efforts” to address these concerns without further detail or context.

Additionally, the ERTF’s governance body has been stripped of its potential as a forum for inclusive dialogue. In a July interview with Syria in Transition, RC/HC Adam Abdelmoula suggested that the ERTF would have an inclusive governing body “fully vested with the power to make all funding allocation decisions,” with decisions determined by a simple majority or higher threshold. In the final version, however, there is no voting mechanism, and in cases of disagreement, the RC/HC and RHC retain ultimate decision-making power. The identity of the “partners” Abdelmoula cited as having introduced this governance change is still unknown. 

Syrians protest
The civil society collective Madaniya initiated a position paper in October opposing the UN’s Early Recovery Strategy and ERTF as a violation of the UN’s own core principles of Early Recovery, particularly the principles of Do-No-Harm and national ownership. The document attracted the support of more than 40 organisations, criticises the lack of inclusiveness in the drafting process, and alleges that OCHA disregards feedback from Syrian and international NGOs represented in the Strategic Steering Group (SSG) — a consultative group of seven (I)NGOs created by OCHA in 2013. The paper calls for a genuinely inclusive redrafting process aimed at ensuring that Early Recovery contributes to stabilisation and the emergence of a peaceful, unified Syria, rather than entrenching divisions and reinforcing de facto powers.

Without donor backing, however, Syrian protest alone may achieve little. Donors remain cautious about both criticising and supporting the ERTF. The UN claims that certain traditional donors are ready and willing to invest in the ERTF and that the outreach to Gulf donors is underway. If these “traditional donors” are the likes of Italy and Japan, the ERTF is likely to remain significantly underfunded, possibly to the extent of being unable to justify its operating costs. Major donors, including the US, the EU, Germany, France, and the UK acknowledge the need for expanded Early Recovery efforts; but they are also painfully aware of the disappointing results of over a decade of humanitarian aid in Syria. Facing shrinking budgets, they are wary of further setbacks — especially given the high stakes of Early Recovery. In short, these donors seek greater value and accountability for their investments and recognise that the success of Early Recovery hinges on a stable political and security environment. 

Gaza vs Syria
The resulting situation is paradoxical. Large segments of Syrian society are calling for rigorous political risk analysis and safeguards, while OCHA insists on the “humanitarian character” of Early Recovery and that it  must remain unpoliticised. This approach is unique to the UN Country Team in Syria. In September this year the Palestinian Territories UN Country Team published its Early Recovery Approach and Action Plan for Gaza, and politics was at its forefront. The document clearly states that “any viable early recovery must be firmly rooted in a broader political and security framework” that seeks to “re-establish a political horizon” and must be “designed and implemented with the objective of contributing to a political process.”

The UN’s approach in Gaza underlines that humanitarian assistance, including Early Recovery, should intersect with goodwill political engagement. This is nothing new to the UN or to donors: the UN’s Triple Nexus stresses the interconnection of humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding activities. The EU and its members support the Triple Nexus, and the Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2019) emphasises that humanitarian aid and development cooperation are instruments with which to address conflict. Germany’s recently updated Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance Abroad dedicates two pages to the Triple Nexus.

A serious political dialogue on Early Recovery is overdue, and with a new European Commission, the impending appointment of an EU Special Envoy to Syria, and a new US administration, there is a window for fresh approaches. It may be time for the UN Special Envoy to step forward, engage, and help guide this process.