Eastern approaches
Washington and Riyadh consider military options

Arab normalisation with Assad is not running smoothly. Despite the fanfare surrounding Syria’s readmission to the Arab League, little of substance has been achieved on any of the key issues for Arab states: return of refugees, combating drug trafficking, and limiting Iranian influence. The Syrian foreign minister’s visit to Tehran on 31 July and the new trade agreements signed caused discomfort regionally. So did the spats with Jordan on trade, and with the UAE on real estate investments, which suggest that the cash-strapped Assad wants money for nothing. Op-eds have recently appeared in the Saudi press criticising Assad’s complacency: “If you don’t help yourself, no one can help you” was the message from one Riyadh newspaper. 

Well-placed sources suggest that Riyadh may go beyond words to get what it wants in Syria. According to these sources, a plan to create a 20km “safe zone” along Syria’s border with Jordan is being actively pushed by Saudi Arabia and is the subject of discussions in Amman, Ankara, and Washington. The plan, which Saudi Arabia would bankroll and take a leading role in, would see thousands of Turkish-trained Syrian National Army (SNA) personnel deployed to the Syrian side of the border with Jordan, from Tanf in the east to Quneitra in the west, with the goal of putting an end to cross-border drug smuggling. The sources added that the spread of illegal drugs in Saudi society is a major concern for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and that he has demanded concrete actions on the ground should Assad persist in failing to deliver on his promises. A news report on 31 July disclosed active SNA recruitment in northern Syria for a so-far unspecified mission. 

The Saudi plan comes at a time of heightened speculation about US intentions in eastern Syria. Sources within US-backed rebel groups have said that there is a parallel American plan to put the squeeze on IRGC militias in Deir Ezzor by creating a so-called “Sunni belt” along the border with Iraq. This plan would see thousands of Sunni Arab fighters from eastern provinces deployed along the Bukamal-Hasakah axis, thus cutting off Iran’s only land route to Syria. The plan would involve Arab elements from the SDF such as the Deir Ezzor Military Council and the Sanadeed tribal militia, in addition to non-SDF elements such as the Tanf-based Free Syria Army. If put into action, the plan would be seen by Tehran as a major escalation and would likely result in a kinetic response. Whether the US and its local allies are ready for a prolonged war of attrition with the IRGC in “sand and death” Syria is yet to be seen. “The US is still testing the idea”, said one source. “It is linked to progress on the Iran nuclear talks.” 

The challenges to both the Saudi and American plans are considerable. It is unclear whether Jordan, whose cooperation would be essential to the Saudi plan, would be willing to support what would amount to a war against Assad and the IRGC. It is unclear if Sunni Arab groups in eastern Syria have the capacity to coalesce and cooperate effectively. Already, rivalries between these groups over the potential spoils have led to a spate of kidnappings and armed clashes. The position of the YPG-led SDF is also uncertain, given its longstanding reluctance to confront Iranian militias and the informal cooperation that the PKK mother organisation has with the Iran-backed Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) in Iraq. Whether any of the plans are implemented depends ultimately on whether a modicum of trust can be re-established between Arabs, Turkey, and the US. If it can, it might be a good day for Syria and a bad day for Assad and Iran. 

Groundhog Day 
Contrary to urban myth, Saudi Arabia was not particularly enthusiastic about unseating Assad. According to the former Saudi intelligence chief, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the kingdom tried hard in the first months of 2011 to get Assad to see sense. Prince Bandar’s recollections of what happened, broadcast in 2019, make instructive reading for Arab normalisers of today: 

King Abdullah sent an envoy to Bashar with a message stating that he must take urgent political measures to calm things down before they become excessive. Bashar promised him that, but unfortunately Bashar continued his repressive policy. King Abdullah sent an envoy for the second time to warn Bashar of the continued deterioration of the situation, and his response was that he was aware of what is happening and he will take urgent political reforms, but this requires economic reforms and raising the salaries of the army. So King Abdullah sent him 200 million US dollars as urgent assistance to calm the situation and deal with matters politically and economically. But Bashar, with his amazing intelligence, believes that he can deceive everyone including his own people, took the money without doing anything.

Saudi Arabia’s current ruler, King Salman, was intimately involved in this discreet diplomacy and is well-aware of Assad’s duplicity and betrayals. “I am not a fool, nor a fool deceives me,” goes the Arab saying. That’s a good organising principle when it comes to dealing with Assad.