Enemies with benefits
Convergence between northwest and northeast Syria

How to deal with the de-facto authorities of north east Syria has become an increasing obstacle to effective conflict management. It is common wisdom that any political process requires the participation of all relevant parties. However, the PYD, the political arm of the Peoples’ Protection Units (YPG) and leading party of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), has so far been excluded from political talks despite controlling a third of Syria’s territory. 

While Ankara is usually blamed for this exclusion, solely attributing it to Turkish objections overlooks important conflict dynamics. From the perspective of the mainstream Syrian political opposition, the PYD did not choose a neutral “third way” but sided with the Assad regime at an early stage. In the first months of 2012, when the regime began withdrawing from north east Syria to consolidate what it referred to as “useful Syria”, the mukhabarat arranged a discreet non-aggression pact with the PYD. The regime reduced its physical presence to urban strongholds in Qamishli and Hasakah and gave the PYD relatively free reign over Kurdish-majority areas in return for preventing the region from joining the popular uprising. Numerous efforts between 2012–14 to mend relations with Syrian Kurdish parties close to Barzani’s KDP failed. As a result, the Syrian branch of the KDP sided with the mainstream opposition. 

Relations between the mainstream opposition and the YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) ultimately deteriorated sharply in early 2016 when the SDF coordinated with the regime and its Russian and Iranian backers to seize territory in north west Syria that rebels had seized from the Islamic State. Particular outrage was caused by footage of dozens of dead Free Syrian Army fighters that the YPG paraded in Afrin city. Later that year, the SDF cut off vital rebel supply lines and helped facilitate the siege of rebel-held east Aleppo. 

Against the 2011–14 background, it is no surprise that the mainstream opposition rejected the inclusion of the PYD in the High Negotiations Committee that was established in December 2015 and later became the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC), the principle political umbrella of the mainstream opposition. Despite being the de facto authority of one of the three major zones of influence in Syria, the PYD had no representation in the UN-sponsored process. Including it as a third party was never considered, not only because of Turkey’s veto but also because ultimately no one wants to see the PYD, or whatever label an AANES-delegation would have, at the international negotiation table. UNSCR 2254 is designed for two negotiation sides only. The PYD is unpalatable because it is considered a local branch of the PKK with its terrorist designation; and because the PKK’s transnational secessionist agenda challenges the sacred idea of nation state sovereignty. 

Leverage existing ties 
Totally ignoring the PYD, however, is not a viable option. The US, the PYD’s guarantor, has provided the political and military backing for it to establish itself as the ruler of north east Syria. But despite a number of intra-Kurdish dialogues it initiated, Washington has not prioritised a political role for the PYD, instead focusing on military cooperation to secure its presence on the ground in the north east. Enhancing the PYD’s political profile is nonetheless necessary for effective conflict management and to create an environment conducive for a sustainable peace process. 

The key word is convergence. Areas controlled by the AANES in the north east and by the opposition in the north west are territorially separated; but their populations are deeply interconnected by family and tribal bonds. IDP movements are also a significant factor. While large numbers of Kurds have fled opposition areas, Arabs from the north and east have found refuge in opposition areas in the north west. Agreements are in place that allow civilian travel between the areas of control, which is particularly crucial for Kurds who want to visit relatives in Afrin or vice versa. Despite the hostilities, meanwhile, there is a bustling overland trade including in oil that travels westwards and goods from Turkey eastwards. 

Although already a reality, these exchanges are poorly organised and tend to occur in the shadows, without being politically leveraged. This offers scope for pragmatic diplomacy: trade agreements can be formalised to increase the volume of exchanges; advanced mechanisms for civilian travel can be established; and incentives could be created for better management of such frontline-transcending matters as supplies of electricity and water. If successful, such pragmatic steps could pave the way for more substantial talks. 

This could be of particular relevance for the north east, where Turkey shuns any accommodation with the AANES. But in the past – prior to 2015 – Turkey showed a willingness to adopt pragmatic policies. It was only when the US put its full weight behind the SDF, which subsequently gained control over large parts of northern and eastern Syria, that Ankara concluded that matters had got out of hand. Turkey might accept a contained presence of the PYD and its armed wing again, concluding that some form of PYD/YPG presence would anyway persist. Convergence facilitated by smart cross-line diplomacy could produce a stable ceasefire and improvement of conditions for civilians. 

In the longer term, such convergence could form the basis for comprehensive negotiations which, apart from any other considerations, could nullify the inherent fragility from which the AANES project suffers. In many respects, the PYD finds itself at an impasse. If it submits to Assad, the dream of autonomy is over. If it relies solely on US protection, the AANES remains a project built on repressive one-party rule and vulnerable to the vicissitudes of US administrations. Currently, the Kurdish representation in the political process is limited to KNC delegates in the SNC. Despite their differences and the mistakes that have been made, the mainstream opposition is the ally of Syria’s Kurds, and the fates of the north east and north west are intertwined. As one ex-diplomat put it, “actors in non-regime areas should disagree less in order to agree more.” To achieve a tacit understanding with Turkey, the PYD will need to demonstrate its commitment to a “radical experiment in democracy and self-rule” by sharing power in deeds rather than just rhetoric.