Escaping the rabbit hole
UN attempts to advance constitutional process

With an unusually firm choice of words, UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen criticised the “blockage“ of the Constitutional Committee in his December 2023 briefing to the Security Council. For over 18 months, the Committee has been in limbo over the made-up matter of venue. The bickering started after the last session of the Committee, held in May/June 2022, when Russia rejected Geneva in protest at Switzerland’s siding with Ukraine. Russia  is not an official party to the Committee and should have no say in its deliberations, which remain fully under the purview of the UN. Damascus however, which is a party to the process, unsurprisingly adopted the Russian position. After a year of inactivity, in June 2023 Egypt proposed hosting the Committee but that was also rejected by Damascus, which cited a prior commitment to Oman to hold the meeting in its capital. Muscat was endorsed by the Arab Contact Group in August 2023 as the venue, but Damascus then backtracked at the sidelines of the Arab League Council meeting in Cairo in September. The Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) nevertheless tried to resuscitate Muscat but the Omani government politely declined. Things were back at square one. 

Fabricated obstacle
Pedersen’s position is that the Committee should convene in Geneva as long as there is no consensus on an alternative location. That there is no consensus is very much Russia’s  fault - hinted at by Pedersen when he spoke of the “non-Syrian nature of the issue.” Albeit that this was a benevolent assessment that relieves the Assad regime of its responsibility,  the UN Envoy has a point. Despite arguing that Geneva is unacceptable because of  Switzerland’s “hostile position towards Russia”, as Russia’s envoy for Syria, Alexander Lavrentiev, put it, Moscow’s diplomats continue to work in the Swiss city. Locally-based envoys  participate  in the UN-chaired Syria Humanitarian Task Force (HTF) and Ceasefire Task Force (CTF), and officials are sent from Moscow to engage with non-Syria related formats such as the Geneva International Discussions (GID) on Georgia and the Ukraine grain track. Moscow’s decision to single out the Constitutional Committee to take a stand on Switzerland’s position on Ukraine is utterly cynical, and is compounded by a demonstrable lack of desire to find a workable alternative acceptable to all sides. 

For the Assad regime, the venue issue is a gift, allowing it to continue its charade of appearing to engage in a political process. The reality is that it never wanted to engage in the constitutional process, partly because it does not want to legitimise the opposition and civil society representatives who make up two-thirds of the committee. The regime considers itself the sole legitimate representative of Syria, state, people and all, and is only ever interested in talking to other governments. 

Make-or-break
Having reached something of a pain threshold, in late 2023 the UN Envoy urged international stakeholders, especially Russia and Turkey, to advance an understanding that would enable  the Committee to reconvene. The two powers consider the Committee their co-creation since it was born through a Russian initiative in 2018 in Sochi and developed under significant Turkish influence. Russia, however, would not budge. Several  alternatives to Geneva have since been floated,  including Algiers, Baghdad, Riyadh, Nairobi, and South Africa. Naturally, the OSE and the Syrian opposition prefer Geneva because of  its symbolic value. If  a serious constitutional process could be reinvigorated at another venue, however, sacrificing Geneva would be a small price to pay – provided that all parties were serious about making the process work, including by agreeing a clear work plan and timeline. Fulfilling that condition  would appear to be unlikely. Power to challenge the rules agreed on in the Committee’s Terms of Reference is being wielded by one of the conflict parties and its foreign backer: a disaster for any mediator and a blatant breach of the principle of the Committee being Syrian-led and -owned. 

At the 21st Astana summit held on 24-25 January, the venue for the next meeting of the Constitutional Committee was discussed both in formal sessions and private discussions. According to a European diplomatic source, the OSE did consider proactively sending invitations for the Committee’s 9th session to be held in Geneva, regardless of the Russian veto. A final decision on whether to go ahead with this commendable approach has not yet been made. This is make-or-break for the OSE. Should the UN Envoy bow to more external pressure, it will mean further delay, until at least after Ramadan – which finishes in April – and a downgrading of the format still further. Even if Damascus agreed to attend, the underlying problem of Assad’s bad faith would persist. 

The UN is under an obligation not to buckle under Russian pressure. Inviting the Syrian parties and representatives – regardless of their level – of observer countries to a Constitutional Committee meeting as early as March in Geneva is the right way to go. Apart from any other consideration, the UN badly needs to reassert its authority as the facilitator of the process, as mandated by the Security Council. The alternative is continued charade, which serves no one’s interest except Assad’s. If the Envoy’s last ditch efforts fail, it would be better to face reality and disband the committee. The silver lining could be that it might provoke the West to formulate innovative measures aimed at implementing UNSCR 2254, based on the key lesson learned: success requires clear and universally respected ground rules.