Fit for a king
The EU should worry about Syria’s interim constitution

If the signs that Syria’s transition was heading in the wrong direction were already apparent in recent weeks, they are now set in stone. Signed by Ahmad Sharaa on 13 March 2025, the interim constitution continues the pattern of recent weeks: rhetoric that reassures those hoping for a genuine political transition and simultaneous entrenching of power in the hands of the HTS leadership.

The 53-article interim constitution, drafted by a handpicked committee, speaks of equal citizenship, freedom of expression, transitional justice, and an independent judiciary. It enshrines commitment to international human rights conventions. Absent checks and balances, however, these outwardly commendable provisions are mere smokescreens for the monopolisation of  power in Ahmad Sharaa’s hands.

The interim constitution’s claim to enshrine the separation of powers is theoretical as anyone with decision-making authority during the transitional period – now set at a minimum of five years – will be directly or indirectly appointed by Sharaa. Parliament itself will be an extension of presidential control. Two-thirds of its members will be selected by a commission appointed by a committee that was itself appointed by the president, while the remaining third will be appointed by him directly.

Parliamentary decisions can, in theory, override a presidential veto with a two-thirds majority. As the parliament in effect will be assembled by the president, such defiance is unlikely. The interim constitution will further consolidate Sharaa’s rule by authorising him to propose laws, appoint ministers, serve as supreme commander of the armed forces, and to declare states of emergency with the approval of a National Security Council comprising his close confidants, which can then be extended indefinitely with the approval of the compliant parliament.

The interim constitution accords only limited attention to the judiciary, but it stipulates the formation of a Supreme Constitutional Court composed of seven members, all - of course - appointed by the president. 

In short, the entire system will revolve around Sharaa’s unchecked authority.

Several constitutional provisions are particularly concerning. The stipulation of Islamic jurisprudence as the primary source of law raises fundamental questions about personal rights and civic governance. The interim constitution allows for freedoms, including religious freedoms, to be restricted if deemed necessary to protect public order or public norms – concepts so vague as to  invite arbitrary enforcement. Political parties are suspended until new legislation is in place, the contents of which are still big question marks.

The interim constitution, therefore, formalises what has been looming for months: Syrians will remain at the mercy of a president with unchecked power for years to come. This document is not a blueprint for democratic transition; it is an exercise in power monopolisation and self-legitimation. It is profoundly reminiscent of the Assad regime’s strategy of constructing laws and institutions that, it was claimed, proffered state legitimacy but over which the regime actually retained absolute control.

Europe has based its Syria policy on a mixture of granting the new authorities considerable benefit of the doubt, and the principle of judging the transitional government by its actions. In December the EU’s foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that, "the first signals are good, but we are not rushing into any kind of arrangements yet, if we don't have certainty.” The interim constitution provides considerable certainty as to the new regime’s direction of travel.