Flat on arrival
UN’s steps-for-steps fails to impress

The record of Arab and UN diplomatic initiatives on Syria marketed as “steps-for-steps” has been dismal. The Arab Contact Group, the Arab League ministerial committee formed to oversee normalisation, recently suspended further meetings with the regime because of its failure to adhere to a pre-agreed roadmap. One might think that this latest setback would put an end to the idea that offering Assad political and economic benefits in return for seemingly non-strategic concessions is the way forward. But instead of eliciting a critical reappraisal of the assumptions underpinning the steps-for-steps approach that has been the UN’s negotiating strategy of the last four years, the UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen has instead doubled down on it. During the UN General Assembly meeting in New York, his office circulated an outline paper of steps-for-steps proposals among relevant countries. The contents do not differ from what the Envoy had already shared verbally in previous years; but ink on paper, combined with the most detailed account of steps-for-steps in a Security Council briefing the following week, underscores Pedersen’s continued commitment to his signature initiative. Unfortunately, its many fundamental flaws have not been addressed. Moreover, its contents are concerning for anyone even vaguely familiar with the ways of the Assad regime.  

Red flags and decoys  
In essence, steps-for-steps is an attempt to trade Western money and political recognition for regime concessions that make the lives of Syrians more tolerable. These concessions are listed in Pedersen’s outline paper, and can be divided into two groups. The first is what the regime would consider red flags because they hinder its systemic violence-based approach to controlling the population. They include detainee releases, due legal process, security guarantees for returning refugees and easing of military conscription. The second group are the decoys. These are concessions that look good in a list and are reasonable enough, such as easier access to civilian documentation and easing detainee communication with families; but they are so minor that were the regime to implement them – anyway decidedly a long-shot – they would not inspire any trust or confidence, let alone drive forward the political process

Western incentives designed to induce regime concessions as included in the outline paper comprise sanctions waivers and increased Early Recovery assistance. Worryingly, the principal carrot that the Envoy thinks will wet Western appetites is the same as that deployed by the Arabs: refugee return. Assad would of course readily accept any cash under that heading, and would likely undertake overdue infrastructure rehabilitation while diverting a share to his cronies. What is certain is that he would ultimately ignore the protection concerns that deter the vast majority of Syrians from returning, especially as any credible verification mechanism would require independent observers on the ground. The Envoy knows that the West will not foot Assad’s entire reconstruction bill, so he further suggests that sanctioning states “could make moves to facilitate” more support from regional states. In reality, however, it is highly doubtful that the Arab Gulf states, that are flooded with drugs from Syria, would be willing to play the role of financial deus ex machina; and it is anyway unclear how any of this might advance the Envoy’s mandate. 

Don’t take the bait 
Critics of the EU’s principled position often argue that to alleviate humanitarian suffering and break the diplomatic deadlock Europeans should get off their high horses and formulate demands that the Assad regime can realistically fulfil. This view, however, overlooks Russia and Iran’s determination not to yield an inch to their geopolitical foes, as well as Assad’s deep-rooted intransigence that views any concession as an existential threat. The door to  negotiations with the Europeans should open only if Assad shows interest in a way forward for Syria that is not synonymous with turning the clocks back to pre-2011. Europeans should certainly not feel compelled to respond to the Envoy’s flawed strategy with knee-jerk actionism, and should instead signal that they are in no hurry. This means that they should continue to provide humanitarian aid to all of Syria, including limited Early Recovery assistance dependent on stringent rules being met on countering aid diversion and profiteering. Generous support to neighbouring host countries should also continue and perhaps even be increased. Strategic patience continues to be the smart policy. 

More of the same will not restore relevance to the UN Envoy, whose office is not taken seriously anymore — including by the UN country team and UN aid and development agencies that are acting independently of his guidance. One well-placed ex-diplomat described Pedersen as “a messenger” for OCHA head Martin Griffiths, whose principal goal is to send Damascus as much aid and Early Recovery assistance as possible with little regard for political red-lines. Those in the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) who continue to champion steps-for-steps in its current form are complicit, moreover, in delegitimising the Syrian opposition as a negotiating partner by not granting it a role in crafting or negotiating these steps. Its  role remains  restricted to the dysfunctional Constitutional Committee. By sidelining the opposition, the OSE is also sidelining itself. 

This is evident in the Envoy’s acceptance of Arab states’ unilateral hijacking of steps-for-steps to frame their normalisation with Assad. His flawed policy, moreover, is discrediting the generic negotiation tactic of facilitating reciprocal concessions to generate political momentum, something that Syria diplomacy urgently needs. The problem is not the product but the recipient.  Steps-for-steps was conceived as a bilateral track between the regime and the West; but a more credible process could involve pragmatic concessions between the different areas of control in Syria, on matters concerning aid, trade, energy, education, and civilian travel. That at least would mirror the Syrian-owned and -led process stipulated by UNSCR 2254. That resolution’s requirements don’t seem to trouble the OSE’s political team, whose selective approach does not foresee a role for major players on the ground such as Turkey, Russia, and Iran, let alone local actors in the northwest and northeast. Steps-for-steps can thus be seen as a fast track to regime normalisation for little or no discernible progress at the political – or any other – level. 

Echo chambers
Despite the clear evidence that reciprocal diplomacy with Assad does not work, the next think tank policy paper on Syria will most likely advocate more of the same: aid and sanctions relief in exchange for refugee returns, detainee releases and Captagon. The steps-for-steps logic is presently the received wisdom. But why?  

The echo chamber effect is certainly one reason. Take for instance the November 2019 paper published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) entitled “Ways out of Europe’s Syria Reconstruction Conundrum.” It outlined an engagement strategy with Assad based on the long-standing EU “more-for-more” approach. In the paper, the then High Representative, Federica Mogherini, is quoted as being in support of such an approach and even advocating it in 2017. The paper says:

While European states continue to stick to the official line of no reconstruction assistance until a meaningful political transition is fully underway, most member states appear to agree that a more incremental approach would offer a more realistic way forward. High Representative Mogherini made the most detailed public proposal in this respect, in March 2017, when she suggested that the EU could adopt “a logic of more for more” by becoming gradually involved in certain areas, in cooperation with international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, but “only in response to concrete and measurable progress.”

The problem is that, according to the document cited to support the quote, she said no such thing. ICG interpreted (real) remarks by Mogherini on Europe’s role in a Syria reconstruction effort being done in an “incremental way” to mean that Europeans would support a step-for-step approach regardless of whether a political transition was underway. Mogherini actually refers to stabilisation efforts exclusively in the context of a “post-agreement phase”, i.e. a political transition period after a deal between the regime and the opposition had been agreed. This was overlooked in the ICG report, which went on to propose a set of reciprocal concessions amounting to a watered-down interpretation of UNSCR 2254: constitutional reform, refugee returns and free elections in return for sanctions relief, early recovery, reconstruction and diplomatic recognition. Also suggested were some ‘low-hanging’ confidence-building measures (CBMs) such as amnesties for deserters and access to detention centres. 

ICG’s report was picked up in another think tank paper entitled “Reconstruction in Syria,” published in July 2020 by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Citing the ICG report and the Mogherini document as references, it claimed that Mogherini, “had published a 'more for more’ approach that made European concessions dependent on changes in the regime’s behaviour.” The SWP report supported ICG’s recommendations for a set of reciprocal concessions but went further, arguing that political conditionality should be lifted for any European measures directed at “satisfying the basic needs of the population.” Earlier that year, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) had weighed in on the same theme with its report (“Society Max: How Europe can help Syrians survive Assad and Coronavirus”) that called on Europeans to adopt a more-for-more approach with clear and realistic benchmarks and reward structures. In November 2020, meanwhile, the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC) argued for stronger Russian-European coordination on Syria reconstruction in a paper entitled, “Russia and the EU in Syria: Need for New Approaches?” It was amid this chorus that Damascus and Moscow exploited the potential to champion Early Recovery assistance as a gateway to condition-free reconstruction funded by the Europeans; and that the Office of the UN Special Envoy formulated its vague steps-for-steps rationale with input from some European think-tankers. 

Back then, the reading was that Russia and Iran-backed Assad could continue to reject UNSCR 2254 and get away with it. The steps-for-steps logic was thus a last-ditch intellectual salvage effort by researchers in response to a situation deemed hopeless. It was waved along by a particular approach to political realism, in which making deals with certain dictators is deemed necessary and in the best interest of the people they rule over. It is seen as an antidote to “regime change,” the hypocritical Western meddling that many think tankers detest so much. In hindsight, the EU’s decision to reject the think tanks’ policy prescriptions and stick to its “three noes” was the right thing to do. But don’t expect to read about that in the next think tank report.