Gaza’s silver lining
Resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict

As the Gaza war continues into its second month, many are now asking if there is a silver lining to the unfolding tragedy. The civilians gunned down in cold blood or blown to bits by JDAMs, the rubble where a school or hospital once stood, the displacement, the tears, the heartbreak. Surely  something good will come out of all this. God cannot be that cruel. 

For Palestinian activists, the global outpouring of sympathy and support for Gaza was a gift from heaven. It forced younger audiences in the West in particular to choose sides based on the popular idea of a “matrix of oppression.” A previous generation found its cause celebre in opposing apartheid South Africa; today’s Millennials and Gen-Zs in Europe and America view Israel pretty much in the same way, with Hamas militants seen as freedom fighters much as the ANC guerillas had been thirty years ago. That is quite an achievement and one that will have serious implications for  future Western policy towards Israel. 

For Arabs in the region, the potential silver lining is a resolution of the 75-year-old Israel-Palestine conflict. Not resolution Oslo-style, i.e. kicked into the long grass with interim agreements, elastic deadlines, and endless prevarication. But agreed, settled, ended. The issue is not purely about Palestinian rights, including the right to self-determination and an independent state, important as that is; it’s also about denying Iran the use of the Palestinian card for its violent power plays, and allowing the kind of stability to take hold that would promote economic growth. These are real and pressing interests that require an internationally-negotiated and guaranteed solution based on international law and the democratic wills of Palestinians and Israelis.

If history is anything to go by, such a possible silver lining is not entirely hypothetical. In the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the US pushed for peace between Israel, its Arab neighbours, and the PLO partly because it felt a need to make a gesture to the Arab world after having destroyed an Arab state that was Israel’s main military adversary at the time. Today’s war on Gaza and Hamas, waged with the US’s unconditional support, may create a similar urge to re-balance the region in a manner that precludes the emergence of a Hamas 2.0. The Arab world is expecting such an approach, with Saudi Arabia ready to lead a unified Arab and Palestinian position based on King Abdallah’s 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. 

If a political solution is to be found, two things must happen. First must come a re-commitment to UN resolutions on the status of Israeli occupied territories, including on illegal settlements. This concerns especially the US whose loyalty is surely better placed with legitimate UN resolutions than a messianic and far right Israeli government. Second, a political investment must be made in the only Palestinian party that is ready and willing to negotiate peace: the PLO. Better known as the Palestinian Authority these days, the PLO has been weakened by successive Israeli governments as part of a strategy to avoid negotiating seriously. The PLO has also been talked down as “illegitimate”, “corrupt”, and “unpopular” by pro-Palestinian Western commentators who, in the same breath call for a Palestinian state and say that Hamas is “popular”. The latter two positions are irreconcilable: a Palestinian state requires a strong PLO, not a strong Hamas. The PLO leadership of today is undoubtedly deficient, but it would be a grave mistake to write off the PLO.  Its decline was a feature, not a bug, and Palestinian politicians are not corrupt by nature. Undermining the moderates as weak and feckless while bigging up the radicals only leads to political deadlock and more violence. It also contributes to disingenuous Israeli claims that there’s no partner for peace.  

The lesson for Syria is clear: successful negotiations require two sides. Assad and his allies have worked tirelessly to silence, discredit, and manipulate moderate voices. It is crucial for the West not to fall into the trap and to recalibrate its expectations of the political opposition in line with realities on the ground. Delegitimising the opposition by pointing to its dependence on Turkey, for example, is misguided. In an internationalised civil war, you are only as good as your patrons. Lose them, and you lose. Yasser Arafat understood this only too well. Given the West’s commitment to UNSCR 2254, robust support for Syria’s moderate opposition should be seen as a long-term investment. Should the Gaza war lead to a resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Syria could  be next in line. When the time comes, the West will need a strong Syrian political opposition.