Great Arab Revolt redux
Tribal power play in eastern Syria

One of the enduring effects of Britain’s historic involvement in the Middle East is a certain type of ambition among Arab tribal leaders. Having seen the rise to power and wealth of certain tribal families on the back of British arms throughout the Twentieth Century, a natural tendency among tribal leaders has been to attach themselves to a foreign power and make trouble. The game plan is straight out of the Great Arab Revolt playbook: receive external support, lead a tribal alliance, and stake a claim to autonomy, usually by means of violent revolt. The goal has not always been outright military victory. Rather, it was to “register a position” that won the tribal leader acclaim as a warrior with a virtuous cause; and “accreditation” by at least one major external power that he was “their man”, with all that that entailed in resources and political support. Over many years, and through a mixture of force and cunning, the tribal leader carved out his domain until he established a ruling dynasty like the Hashemites or the Al Sauds. This remains the essential ambition of most if not all Arab tribal leaders of the first rank. 

Decades of Assadist dictatorship thwarted the pursuit of such ambitions in Syria. In the 1970s, many tribal leaders emigrated to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf where they felt more welcome, while those that remained became little more than regime cheerleaders. Now, with power in the Middle East shifting once again, and regional and international interests converging, some Syrian tribal leaders are eyeing new opportunities. Enter the 34-year-old Ibrahim al-Hifel, brother of Musab, the Doha-based headman of the Bukamil clan and chief of the large Ugaydat tribal confederation in Deir Ezzor. The brothers are not short on lineage: their grandfather revolted against the French mandate and was elected to Syria’s first post-independence parliament. Ibrahim and Musab assumed leadership of the tribe after their father’s death in 2016, and they have tried to maintain a non-aligned position in the Syrian conflict given that members of the tribe fought on all sides. 

Recently, however, growing anger at aspects of the PYD’s ideology imposed on a largely conservative society, and the failure of genuine power- and resource-sharing with the Arab tribes, gifted the Hifels the virtuous cause they were looking for. Talk of a US-sponsored “Sunni belt” to keep IRGC militias out of Deir Ezzor further encouraged their ambitions, especially at a time when US forces were reengaging with the Sunni Arab tribes of Anbar and strengthening their presence in several military bases in Iraq. The Hifels may have figured that it was the right time to stake a claim to a prized piece of real estate. What may have really decided the timing, however, were the actions of a key rival within the Ugaydat tribe. Deir Ezzor Military Council chief Ahmad Al-Khubayl (aka Abu Khawla), in recent months attempted to usurp the Hifels and have himself declared the chief of the Ugaydat on account of the military force at his disposal. His botched coup against the SDF, and subsequent arrest on 28 August, raised the bar for the Hifels: if they hadn’t followed suit and rebelled against the SDF, they would have allowed the initiative to pass to Al-Khubayl and his Bukayr clan. On 31 August, Ibrahim al-Hifel – the field commander – erected a “war tent.” The revolt was on. 

The dust has settled somewhat since then. Predictably, the revolt failed militarily but succeeded politically. The Hifels’ position at the top of the Ugaydat pecking order was cemented by way of the acclaim they received from the people of Deir Ezzor, Syrian tribes more broadly, and Qatari and Turkish-backed media outlets. The Assad regime and Iran also encouraged the revolt in moral and material terms because they hoped to see a weakened US presence in eastern Syria – support that was gladly accepted by the tribes without too many questions asked. But the US, which did not directly intervene in over ten days of fighting, prefers a negotiated agreement, and it pressured the SDF into making conciliatory statements to that effect. 

Come the negotiation, speaking for Deir Ezzor will of course be the Hifels. They are expected to promote an all-Arab administration for the province underwritten by the US but remaining within an SDF zone. Little wonder then that pro-regime commentators that had so far praised the tribal revolt are now condemning it as a traitorous act. Far from weakening the US presence, an Arab entity tied to the US and not at war with the Kurds could help strengthen it. In the coming weeks, the Hifels’ political acumen and organisational abilities will be tested to the full. Either they prove themselves effective US clients, or they will have created the kind of fitna between Arabs and Kurds that Assad, Iran, and Turkey could only dream of. 

Tribals at war 
Viewing combat videos released by combatants has become an essential activity for Syria-watchers. The garments worn, weapons fielded, tactics employed, slogans shouted, and music played provide valuable insights into the protagonists, and how they themselves want the world to see them. 

Of the videos shot during the brief Arab revolt in Deir Ezzor, four distinct types can be discerned. First is the ‘threat video.’ These involve a commander reading out a pre-prepared statement and/or making a rousing speech flanked by notables in traditional clothing and armed men brandishing assault rifles. The aim is to establish seniority, display societal buy-in, and underscore combat readiness. A second type is the ‘convoy video.’ These feature an impressive fleet of pick-up trucks fitted with heavy machine guns and filled with exuberant-looking fighters flying flags as they head to battle. These videos usually come with tribal music; exhibition of identity akin to the MAGA convoys in support of Donald Trump. A third type is the ‘corner firefight video.’ These feature a group of up to a dozen lightly armed fighters who temporarily abandon cover behind a wall to empty their magazines in the general direction of the enemy. Hip-fire is frequently employed. Such videos can also feature an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a technical, usually firing in the evening hours to emphasise the dramatic muzzle flashes. The goal is to show that the rebels are giving it their best. The fourth and final type is the ‘storming video’. In these, a group of fighters fervently shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ charge towards an enemy position that has already been captured. The precise details of the enemy’s retreat remain obscure, and the absence of on-screen casualties on any side may raise doubts; but the message is clear: we are winning. 

Western observers often deride Syrians for what appears to be militarily unprofessional behaviour. Why squander precious ammunition? Why not maintain cover? Why not aim properly? Such questions may have merit if one assumes that the fighters’ goal is to kill. Most often, however, it is not. The ‘spray-and-pray’ tactics and showy videos constitute what Clausewitz famously referred to as “politics by other means.” The aim of the tribal way of war is primarily political, with a focus on marking territory and bolstering legitimacy and negotiating position. It is about performance over lethality, and dialogue over a fight to the death. It might look ridiculous, but it is arguably a relatively civilised form of warfare.