Highway to the danger zone
Italy’s Syria initiative carries risks for the EU

On 15 July the Foreign Ministers of Italy, Austria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Slovenia, and Slovakia sent a letter to High Representative Josep Borrell calling for a reassessment of the EU’s Syria strategy. The declared goals were to increase European political leverage, enhance the effectiveness of humanitarian efforts, and create conditions for refugee return. Alongside this letter, they presented a non-paper intended as input for an open discussion but clearly hinting at their real goals: higher-level diplomatic engagement with the Assad regime, comprehensive early recovery assistance shielded from political risk analysis, and sanctions relief. Conditionality was conspicuously absent. These demands, primarily aimed at a domestic audience, are not new. What is novel is the activation of formal EU channels to push for them. The issue was brought up in the EU Foreign Affairs Committee on 22 July under ‘any other business’, and the External Action Service is expected to prepare input for the next meeting on 12 September.

To leave no doubt on who is taking ownership of the initiative, the Italian and Austrian foreign ministers published a joint statement on 22 July setting a commendable benchmark for EU policy: “Any further action obviously cannot and must not imply any compromise on the basic principles of democracy, inclusiveness, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. To this end, however, it is urgent to relaunch a substantial and meaningful dialogue between the current rulers in Damascus and the opposition, within the framework of the political process led by UN Special Envoy Pedersen. We therefore urge Assad to show the necessary flexibility in a reconciliation process that is needed to get Syria back on track.” 

The Italian initiative’s suggested course of action, however, contradicts every one of the principles outlined in the Italian-Austrian statement. Urging Assad to show flexibility while granting him political legitimacy, small-scale reconstruction, and sanctions relief for free makes little sense. The non-paper contains numerous other anomalies. It suggests appointing a European Envoy and reciprocity in representation; but an EU Envoy at ambassador level would mean upgrading Syrian diplomatic representation in Brussels: another freebie for Assad for nothing gained. It calls for the abandonment of a key principle of EU strategy: that there ”can be no lasting peace in Syria under the current regime.” This is not a position that can be replaced by a “realistic” approach, as the initiative suggests. It is a  sober analysis that has withstood the test of time. Opinions may vary on the pros and cons of different levels of diplomatic engagement, but assuming that lasting peace with the Assad regime in place is somehow possible is either poor analysis or ideologically blinkered; or both. A fundamental flaw in the initiative is that the Syrian opposition is entirely sidelined. 

Another significant gap in the initiative is how it intends to square humanitarian and political goals. It says that it aims to translate the EU’s humanitarian efforts into a “correspondent political role,” while also arguing that both refugee return and early recovery assistance are humanitarian issues that shouldn’t be politicised. The reality is that refugee return will only be achieved through a political solution, and careless early recovery approaches will lift the enabling of the Assad regime – with Western aid – to a whole new level. What is needed – and what is ignored by the non-paper - are proper risk analysis and useful political frameworks for early recovery - which the UN has yet to present to Syrians and donor governments.

To justify the need for a changed approach, the Italian initiative repeatedly cites the normalisation of some Arab states. It doesn’t note, however, that this failed to achieve any  Arab goals, such as ending drug trafficking and progress on refugee returns; and that this  led the Arab Contact Group’s meetings to halt in May 2024.

With the Pope’s blessing
Interviewed by Austrian television on 28 July, Foreign Minister Schallenberg — who claims much credit for the initiative — struggled to explain how unconditional engagement with the Assad regime could work. Instead, he deflected the question by asserting that the initiative was only about an open discussion on how to “make things better.” The project’s real driver are the Italians, who promoted Special Envoy Stefano Ravagnan to Ambassador in late July. Ravagnan is a long-time advocate of a political opening towards Damascus and creating stability through cooperation with regime-controlled  state institutions.  

The Austrian-Italian position aligns neatly with the Vatican’s stance, which has significant influence on Italy’s political establishment. The Vatican, typically acting discreetly, has criticised Western interventionist policies and advocated against military action after the Ghouta chemical attacks of 2013. Cardinal Mario Zenari, the Apostolic Nuncio to Syria, has openly advocated against Western intervention and called for sanctions relief and reconstruction. While the Vatican warns against spiraling violence, it supports the Assad regime, seeing it as the best bet for a stable Syrian state that can protect the Christian minority. Catholic organisations such as Sant’Egidio that operate extensively in Syria share such policies. Multiple sources have confirmed that the Vatican played a strong role in lobbying for the Italian initiative in the US and in Europe.

No conditionality, no negotiations
The Italian initiative’s purported goal of supporting the UN Special Envoy in advancing UNSCR 2254 is ironic given that its suggestions would strip the EU of any leverage to support a Syrian-led process of reciprocal concessions. Without conditionality, there won’t be negotiations. Rather, the Assad regime would use its diplomatic upgrade further to exhaust regional and international governments and to crowd out the Syrian opposition from formal politics, effectively killing off UNSCR 2254.

A “strong-man deal” like those the EU pursues with autocrats in North Africa will not succeed in Syria. Assad is already incapable of effectively governing areas under his control. He would be even more impotent dealing with millions of opposition-aligned Syrians in other parts of the country and abroad – something that he anyway has no wish to attempt.

The Italian initiative’s core inconsistency lies in the misconception that a new approach can be justified by simply claiming that past efforts have failed and that anything new is better than what went before. It offers no rationale for why the new approach might work. Perhaps the project is merely a reflection of the right-wing Meloni government’s eagerness to pursue refugee return at any cost — or at least create the impression for  its domestic constituency that it is  doing something on that front. Given Arab normalisation, perhaps there is also a degree of FOMO by Italian diplomats who speculate that something interesting might be brewing in Damascus and that they could be the EU’s eyes and ears on the ground. Commercial interest may also be at play, as was suggested by several diplomatic sources.

Decision-makers in Brussels might not be able to tell Italy what to do, but they should be cognisant of the importance of a principled EU position. A re-think driven by populism would inflame divisions in the EU (and with the US) when Western unity is needed. The EU’s principled commitment to Syria has been a commendable hallmark of EU policy that has given it clout in international discussions on Syria. Lowering the bar now risks giving away what little leverage the EU has. That doesn’t mean that tweaking EU policy isn’t necessary, but for that the EU should instead direct its energies to promoting realistic confidence-building measures between the Syrian parties that makes life for Syrian civilians less intolerable. Positive engagement from Damascus on this type of CBMs would be a benchmark for the sort of good-faith engagement that could possibly justify reconsidering the ‘three noes’ policy. Anything else is blind actionism that Europeans should resist.