Holding the line
Brussels VII conference

At this year’s Brussels VII donor conference on 14-15 June, reaffirmation of the EU’s policy lines on Syria emerged as a main theme. Normalisation with Assad “is not the path that the European Union would have chosen”, said HR/VP Josep Borrell, speaking to gathered foreign ministers and senior officials including several from the Arab states that spearheaded normalisation. Frustration from European quarters has been brewing over the terms of Assad’s return to the Arab League and the credibility of the Amman track. “Very soon, we will see if these efforts have convinced the regime in Damascus to engage in a dialogue with Gulf and Arab states over various aspects of UN Security Council resolution 2254,” said the HR/VP, clearly expecting little progress to be made. 

Faced with a reaffirmation of the EU’s position, Assad and the Arab states that normalised with him found themselves on the defensive. Damascus’ response was petulant. SANA quoted a Syrian foreign ministry source as saying, “At the conference held at the EU HQ (..) the EU chose the absence of the Syrian state so that the reality of its bankrupt goals and policies will not be exposed.” It was the first time that the Syrian foreign ministry has felt the need to react to any of the Brussels conferences – a reflection of how well Borrell’s words went down in Damascus. It also reflected the regime’s frustration at the limited lobbying opportunities open to it this year, with only the Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) chief Khaled Hboubati present to represent its interests, and with the handful of participating Damascus-based civil society organisations merely repeating the usual talking points on sanctions. The absence of the UN co-host for the second year running – a result of Russia being excluded from the conference – has allowed the EU to be more “itself” in setting the agenda and use of language. 

As the most senior Arab diplomat at the conference, Jordan’s foreign minister Ayman Safadi also found himself in the firing line. He hit back: “Status quo politics will not work. Doubling down on old positions will not work, (..) At the end of the day, we, in the neighbourhood, are the most affected.” In private, Safadi was less sanguine, admitting to the difficulties of convincing Assad to change course and stressing the need for more time. But time is exactly what Assad is banking on, probably calculating that he can squeeze money out of his new friends in Abu Dhabi and Riyadh and dispense with Safadi’s good offices. Saudi Arabia is already going the way of the UAE in opening bilateral channels with Assad that go against official US and EU positions, with the prospect of a Saudi-Israeli peace deal shielding it from any blowback from Washington. 

For the non-GCC Arab states, two months of normalisation has produced only ill omens. An EU-Arab League ministerial meeting scheduled for late June was “postponed” by the EU because Syria’s foreign minister was part of the Arab delegation. The same minister has made successive statements in recent weeks that poured cold water on what was supposedly agreed in Amman. Cairo – seat of the Arab League – was meanwhile prevented from hosting the next round of Constitutional Committee talks after it was revealed that Assad had promised the event to Muscat. Arab states like Jordan feel compelled to press the EU for greater leniency with Assad; but the lack of a coherent framework and roadmap on deliverables, as well as Assad’s unhelpful messaging, is making their case weak. 

Equity is key 
Given its inherent political nature, it is no surprise that Early Recovery assistance dominated discussions at Brussels VII. Early Recovery sits between humanitarian relief and full-blown reconstruction and therefore challenges the Europeans’ commitment to minimising engagement with the Syrian authorities. More engagement with Damascus under humanitarian cover has been pushed through by some in the EU who believe in its merits, and by the aid industry that eyes growth potentials. Arabs in Brussels also lobbied the EU hard to loosen the purse strings, but it is not their taxpayers who are being asked to subsidise Assad’s rehabilitation. 

The EU now faces the challenge of aligning its reaffirmed policy lines with its humanitarian programme in Syria. The suggestion to establish a new international fund for Early Recovery assistance, advocated by OCHA and some regional countries, pits Western insistence on high standards on aid against a more “pragmatic” approach. While the West should remain steadfast in upholding (and improving) transparency and oversight standards at the UN, it should also prioritise equity in aid distribution. This requires the development of frameworks that ensure the equal distribution of Early Recovery programmes in all areas, both at a qualitative and quantitative level. If areas under the control of the regime gradually regain a certain level of self-sufficiency while non-regime areas (home to 40% of Syria’s population) remain in a state of relief aid limbo, well-intended assistance runs the risk of exacerbating poverty and fuelling further conflict.