Idlib rising
The irresistible return of politics to the northwest

The transformation of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) from a jihadi faction into the de facto governance authority for Idlib was for the group both a blessing and a curse. The creation of the Salvation Government in November 2017 aided in its transformation from Al-Qaida to a more mainstream Islamist identity concerned primarily not with conquering territory but with consolidating what it had through economic development and service delivery. On the other,  for the first time it lumbered HTS with a serious civilian opposition movement linking disaffected former members, marginalised groups, local notables and clerics, and idealistic young activists. They have come together to form the hirak, or movement, which has staged  protests in towns across the northwestern province for just over six months – so far with no recorded deaths. Their demands are nothing short of radical: the downfall of Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, the leader of HTS; the release of all detainees and an end to arbitrary arrest and torture; and a fair and independent judiciary able to hold the HTS security apparatus to account. They also want an end to unfair taxes and monopolies. A form of politics is emerging in Idlib.

Blowing the lid

The hirak emerged in a cohesive fashion after the arrest of some 300 HTS cadres and their  relatives in the so-called "spies case" last summer – described by Jolani as the most dangerous case of espionage in the Syrian revolution. Considerable effort was expended by HTS’ General Security to uncover conspirators in an investigation – believed to have been sparked by information from Turkey – that saw veteran military commanders with stellar records arrested for treason. The military wing of HTS felt that the security arm was over-extending itself and pushed back, with some military units threatening mutiny and even to storm prisons and release comrades by force. Sensing that he was losing his grip on his organisation, Jolani backed off and released some of those arrested. 

Those less fortunate were the likes of Abu Ubaida, a commander in the Jaysh al-Ahrar group, who had been forcibly disappeared for nine months. In February 2024 it emerged that he had died under torture 15 days into his arrest. The people of his hometown, Taftanaz – later a major centre for the hirak – managed to identify  his burial site. Despite HTS security attempts to prevent them, they forced their way to the site and managed to dig up his remains and those of 40 to 50 others, all of whom had been buried in shallow graves and with little consideration for Muslim rites. It was then that the scale of torture inside the dungeons of General Security came to light: a major factor in the growing anti-Jolani movement.  

Other factors were also at play. The overreach of General Security was keenly felt by the Salvation Government, which severely limited the powers of its ministers. Public freedoms were restricted, with people arrested for mere comments on social media or for criticising HTS in private meetings. High taxation was another gripe, with aid NGOs operating in Idlib being asked to direct 30 per cent of their budgets to HTS-affiliated entities. Public finances were nominally overseen by the Salvation Government; but in practice key economic sectors were controlled directly by Jolani despite the lack of a clear definition of his role within the public administration structure. Despite undoubted advances in governance compared to Turkish-controlled northern Aleppo, and the crime rates in Idlib being lower than anywhere else, the human rights violations by HTS's security arm were almost on a par with those in regime-controlled areas. Judicial recourse was not an option. Cleric Mazhar al-Wais, the head of HTS’s judicial authority, was accused of routinely subordinating the courts to Jolani's whims. 

All this led to a growing feeling that something had to be done to correct a system that was fast resembling that of the Assad regime, only with a distinct religious flavour. With a nod and a wink from some factions and brigades within the HTS military wing that felt aggrieved at the campaign of arrest, nascent protests by the families of those detained developed into something much more comprehensive. 

A movement of many hues

The hirak is composed of three distinct groups. The first comprises ordinary civilians with economic and livelihood demands, and accounts for roughly half of those participating in protests. This group is led by dozens of local revolutionary figures with clan or regional networks who played a crucial role in the revolution’s 2011-13 era but who have since fallen on hard times – while those better connected to the HTS hierarchy have seen their prospects take off. Idlib’s nouveau riche, usually spotted in high-end malls and cafes, have become a major object of jealousy and envy.  

The second group comprises members of Idlib-based Free Syrian Army factions that were defeated by Jolani in his 2017 take over of the province and who were then subjected to regular arrest and humiliation at the hands of HTS. Their continued connections to comrades-in-arms in the Syrian National Army – the Turkish-backed successor to the FSA based mainly in northern Aleppo – has made it easy for HTS to portray the entire hirak as animated by a Turkish desire to keep Idlib in a constant state of crisis and to avoid a re-run of the late-2022 attempted takeover of northern Aleppo by a self-assured Jolani. HTS social media accounts have accused  the Syrian Interim Government prime minister, Abdulrahman Mustafa, of giving quiet encouragement to the hirak and even of supporting it financially. While support from Turkish quarters is indeed a factor, it is far from the full picture. 

The third group are HTS dissidents, who account for about 25 per cent of the movement. They  include activists and public figures who were either part of HTS or the Salvation Government or had good relations with it: Bassam Sihyouni, Samher Sharifli, and Farouk Kashkash for example. These are what are informally called “the academics” who first proposed to Jolani in 2016 an entirely civilian government for Idlib and who played an important role in the Salvation Government’s creation, but who later grew disillusioned with the way that things turned out. Others like Abu Malik al-Tali, leader of the Damascus wing of HTS who was sidelined by Jolani, are behind-the-scenes players. Additionally, Abu Hashim al-Rifa'i, a former member of the HTS Shura Council, and Abu Hammam al-Halabi, a respected former judge, are active participants in the protests. Islamist groups like Hizb al-Tahrir, an erstwhile ally of HTS, and the Northern Syria Scholars Association, a clerical gathering, have also lent their not inconsiderable support. Given their social standing and deep ties to HTS insiders, this group is by far the most influential and can be considered the real force behind the hirak.    

Now or never
While the scale of anti-Jolani protests has declined in recent weeks – like those in Suwayda – they are not likely to stop anytime soon. Instances of violence by hirak-connected youths, as when police vehicles in the town of Binnish were attacked on 5 July, are rare and do not reflect the overwhelmingly peaceful nature of protests. Despite talk of “red lines” being crossed, and although arrests have been made, Jolani’s response has been measured – and wise, given the potentially incendiary reaction by an armed populace should blood be spilt. 

As the uneasy stand-off persists, the green shoots of politics are emerging in the northwest after decades of political desertification. Thanks to the activism of civil society, Idlib, like Suwayda, has developed an environment where public expression of opposition carries less risk of retribution. Jolani should now engage with the hirak and initiate meaningful reforms that would stabilise Idlib and address the underlying causes of discontent. Judicial reforms, curbing the excesses of General Security – including torture – and reducing taxation could pave the way for a generally more inclusive and legitimate governance. HTS must decide between further entrenchment through repression or genuine participatory politics.