Jump starting a process
How the Constitutional Committee can work

The constitutional process in Syria is still alive – just about. No progress has been made since its inception in 2019, of course, but formally putting it out of its misery would be inconvenient for too many players. The Constitutional Committee can therefore claim the title of being the most stalled political initiative in the Syrian conflict, the last meeting having taken place in May 2022. Afterwards, Russia, despite not being a party to the Committee, decided to boycott Geneva as a venue due to Swiss positioning on the Ukraine invasion, and no new meetings have been arranged since. The question, then, is whether maintaining a semblance of a process reflects a pragmatic cost-benefit calculation, or an unhealthy case of avoidance behaviour. 

Recent attempts to revive the Committee have been marked by disagreement over the venue. In June 2023, with Arab normalisation in full swing and keen to boost its diplomacy, Egypt proposed hosting the Committee. Russia voiced cautious support for the proposal, but it was quickly rejected by the Assad regime that argued it had already promised it to the Omanis. A suggestion by the opposition Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) to rotate between Oman und Kuwait was also rejected. Discussions between Turkey and Russia on hosting it in Astana were disrupted by Kazakhstan calling off the Astana process — a situation that is still unsettled. 

For the Assad regime, Muscat would be an attractive option. It would symbolically distance the Committee from the UN while avoiding subordinating it to Egypt and the Arab League. During the regime’s meeting with the Arab Contact Group in Cairo on 15 August 2023, the latter voiced support for Muscat and a meeting before the end of the year was proposed. For the UN, losing Geneva as a venue would be a major blow to its mediation process given both its symbolic value and the very real value of its being on one’s home turf. Concerningly, according to an Arab diplomatic source, the Arab Contact Group’s endorsement of Muscat occurred without prior consultations with the UN Envoy Geir Pedersen or the SNC, placing at grave risk the UN’s facilitator role and the principle of parity of negotiating parties. 

In a familiar pattern, however, the regime backtracked on Muscat at the sidelines of the Arab League Council in Cairo on 8 September, a source close to the League said. A few days later, meanwhile, the UN Envoy informed European and US diplomats in Beirut that the venue issue had been resolved. It remains unclear whether this news has reached the conflict parties. 

Inertial mass 
Creating deadlock over the venue is way more convenient for the Assad regime than deadlock over the real and persistent issues. Recognising the risk of more procrastination by Assad, Pedersen in 2021 acknowledged the need for a “work plan and genuine interaction on concrete proposals.” In January 2023 Pedersen told the Security Council that he was awaiting a response from the regime-nominated co-chair, Ahmad Kuzbari, to a letter on improvements to the Committee’s working methods. By that point, Kuzbari had left the letter unanswered for six months. 

Since the Committee’s creation in October 2019, the regime delegation has entangled the opposition and civil society counterparts in fruitless discussions. “General patriotic principles” and the colour of the Syrian flag helped waste two meetings. The other big problem is that Ahmad Kuzbari, who heads the “Government of Syria delegation” and co-chairs the committee, does not really represent the Syrian government at all. During the Committee’s inaugural meeting, Bashar al-Assad dismissed the Geneva process, adding that the regime delegation merely comprised individuals “supported by the Syrian government.” In the same manner, the so-called government delegation stated in November 2019 that it would not be bound by the agreed Terms of Procedure given that it did not represent the Syrian government. The implication is clear: the Assad regime will not respect the Committee’s decisions. Instead of demanding formal commitment from Damascus, the Office of the UN Special Envoy continued the constitutional process regardless. Apparently, it was unthinkable that progress – any progress – might be thwarted after almost two years of preparations. This has led to the absurd situation where Assad regime officials, when asked about the Constitutional Committee, would refer diplomats and journalists to Kuzbari while denying any responsibility for his decisions. 

The factors that have caused the Constitutional Committee’s prolonged stagnation have only grown more severe. Why, then, does it still enjoy the formal backing of most external stakeholders? Partly, it’s sheer inertia: once in motion, initiatives tend to persist regardless of actual merit. At the same time, there are no alternative pathways that are as low risk. Should the West pull the plug, the pro-regime camp would have ammunition to accuse the Syrian opposition and its Western backers of destroying the political process. For the opposition, struggling with low visibility and limited support, an end to the constitutional process would make its position worse. Furthermore, it would deprive the UN Envoy of the last iron he has in the fire. Supporting the Committee, therefore, is a convenience that spares external powers the need to invest more political capital and embrace a more creative diplomatic approach. 

Call the bluff 
This dilemma leaves the UN Envoy and his political advisors in a challenging position. They can persist with the established process at any cost, ensuring that if windows of opportunity should open there is no need to start from zero. Critics, however, assert that this approach does more harm than good by perpetuating the illusion of an extant political process while facts are being created on the ground. They argue that it would be better if the Envoy reported the “obstacles it is facing” in clear terms to the UN Security Council and awaited further instructions, as the opposition co-chair Hadi al-Bahra has suggested. Although such a move wouldn’t necessarily enhance the prospect of progress, it would end any misplaced hopes regarding the constitutional process and UN mediation more broadly. In turn, this might lead to a more creative diplomatic approach; or it could kill the political process entirely. 

There is, however, a third option: the UN could call Assad’s bluff. Given that the regime does not want a new constitution pursuant to which free and fair elections under UN supervision are supposed to take place and is only interested in the Constitutional Committee as a tool to delay and frustrate the peace process, perhaps the UN could simply start holding regular meetings of the Committee irrespective of regime participation. The meetings will be open to all members that are willing to make the trip to Geneva, and will serve as a useful platform for a comprehensive dialogue on the type of social contract that should govern a post-war Syria. If Committee members that take orders from Damascus stay away, too bad. Progress can only be made if the regime’s ability to manipulate the Committee is neutralised.