Kiss of death
Turkey’s calculated overtures to Assad

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has done it again. In widely publicised statements, he extended an olive branch to Bashar Assad, announcing plans to invite him to Ankara “to restore Turkey-Syria relations to the same level as in the past.” The announcement came  a day after racist mobs had attacked Syrian refugees and businesses in the city of Kayseri in the worst-ever anti-refugee violence. Angry rebels responded by attacking Turkey’s troops and defacing its flags. Meanwhile, regime media reported that Erdogan’s normalisation talk was well received by Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Iraq. Assad, however, has stubbornly refused to comment on the invitation, much less accept it.

Beyond the breathless analysis about Turkey betraying its local allies to team up with Assad against the Kurdish-controlled northeast, considerable caution is warranted. Erdogan knows that Assad cannot deliver on any of Turkey’s core demands, and Assad knows that rapprochement with Turkey would be far from cost-free.

Internal posturing
It is when viewed through the lens of Turkey’s internal politics that Erdogan’s peace feelers to Damascus make sense. The opposition's anti-refugee rhetoric - ramped up after talks with the AKP on constitutional amendments collapsed over the CHP’s demands for early elections forced Erdogan into a pre-emptive tactical move to diffuse opposition pressure and reassert control over the Syria narrative. By presenting a willingness to engage with Damascus on pathways for refugee repatriation, Erdogan sought to deprive the opposition of the Syria card – just as he successfully did in the run up to the general election last year.

Erdogan’s move also aims to placate his support base. In the AKP’s heartlands, the Islamist agenda is waning and is being overtaken by a nativist and nationalist discourse that prioritises economic stability and demographics over humanitarianism and Islamic solidarity. The rising anti-refugee sentiment in Turkey mirrors similar trends across Europe, whose  surge in right-wing politics is helping to feed Turkey’s nationalist wave and drive its leaders towards populist solutions that sound good on paper but do not stand up to close scrutiny.

That dealing with Assad is the solution to the refugee crisis has become received wisdom in many quarters. Rather than confronting it, Erdogan has chosen to ride the myth to score points against the opposition and set up another electoral victory in three years’ time. It’s bad news for Syrian refugees, who will likely double down on escaping to Europe. It is also bad news for Assad, who would much prefer dealing with a CHP government with its isolationist and anti-Islamist tendencies.

Preparing for Trump
Erdogan’s outreach to Assad is also designed to prepare for the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the US presidency. Conventional wisdom suggests that a Trump administration would draw down US troops from northeastern Syria, which would create a power vacuum that could be filled either by Turkey or Iran. Erdogan aims pre-emptively to secure Turkey’s interests by locking Assad into an anti-YPG/SDF coalition, which in essence would hand Turkey recognition by Damascus of its right to maintain troops in Syria on a par with Russia and Iran. This would likely result in Turkey (rather than Iran or Assad) becoming the primary interlocutor for the US during any future negotiations concerning an eventual withdrawal of its troops. In turn, this would set the stage for a repetition of the 2020 Sochi agreements that established Turkey’s protectorate in the northwest, and bring Turkey a step closer to realising its longstanding goal of a contiguous buffer zone 30-40 kms deep inside Syria.

This outcome would compel Assad to navigate a more complex web of alliances, balancing his commitments to Russia, Iran, and now Turkey. Juggling these relationships, Assad’s regime would be stretched thin, undermining his authority even further and strengthening Turkey’s strategic position.

The cost
Unlike the unconditional normalisation pursued by some Arab states, Turkey’s engagement with Assad is conditional and strategic. When Assad failed to deliver on Arab demands, there were no immediate consequences. In contrast, Turkey’s implicit condition for rapprochement is that Assad accepts Turkey’s military presence on Syrian soil for an unspecified period. The conditions for withdrawal are even more stringent: Safety and calm that allows refugee return, countering the YPG/SDF, finding compromise with the Syrian opposition, and a degree of permanent Turkish influence within Syrian territories. Assad is not willing or capable to deliver on any of these.

A rapprochement between Turkey and Syria, while seemingly bolstering Assad's legitimacy on the international stage, paradoxically could undermine his standing among his core supporters and gravely weaken his regime. Assad’s supporters have rallied around his resistance to “Ottomanism” and the armed opposition groups that Turkey backs. Any perceived leniency towards returning refugees or to repentant rebels would enrage those supporters and create security challenges that the regime would struggle to contain. Moreover, a closer alignment with Turkey – Iran’s main regional rival in Syria – could further strain Assad’s alliance with Tehran at a time when his regime is coming under pressure to do more in the Resistance Axis confrontation with Israel. It is no secret that the Alawite core of the regime wants nothing to do with Gaza or with fighting Israel, and views Iran as a necessary evil that should be dispensed with at the earliest opportunity. A reported discovery of an anti-Iran spy network within the Presidential Palace that included the late adviser Luna al-Shibl will have done nothing to allay Tehran’s displeasure at Assad playing both sides of the fence. A fate not dissimilar to that of Ali Abdullah Saleh could become a very real risk for Assad.

This makes Turkey the most dangerous enemy for the regime – more so if Erdogan’s olive branch is accepted.

Calling the bluff
Despite their vocal opposition to the Assad regime, the EU and the US have not withdrawn their recognition of him as Syria’s leader. By being open to normalisation, Turkey is not necessarily endorsing Assad but is instead positioning itself as a mediator and ensuring it can operate within established international legal frameworks to achieve its security goals. This is not at all different to what some EU member states are doing, Italy for instance.

EU and US disengagement and disinterest in Syria diplomacy, including their failure to push for a genuine implementation of UNSCR 2254, and their less than cordial attitude to Turkey’s role in Syria, have left Ankara with few options. The US’ last-minute rejection of local elections in the northeast administered by the AANES – a major bugbear for Turkey – is a case of too little too late. Absent a genuine political and security partnership, Ankara will continue to play its own game with Russia.

Assad will likely resist pressure to meet with the Turkish leader, who in turn will call Assad’s bluff by exaggerating his openness to a rapprochement. For now, the Turkish president can appease his electoral base, slow-cook prospects for an interim settlement that consolidates his country’s control over northern Syria and, at the same time, create enough wiggle room to achieve a convenient understanding with President Vladimir Putin should Trump pull another impulsive act next year.