Looking ahead
What to watch out for in 2024

The year began with a devastating earthquake, followed by months of failed Arab normalisation, and ends with two local uprisings (Suwayda and Deir Ezzor) and a famine alert. These developments still do not alter in any fundamental way the dynamics of an internationalised civil war, where conflict stalemate (“frozen conflict”) at the national level sits atop active conflict evolution at the local level. Externals naturally look for movement at the national level, whereas exploiting openings at the local level might deliver more promising entry points for interventions. This is the primary challenge for those engaged in conflict resolution and stabilisation efforts in Syria, whether at Track I or II, and will help define the success or failure of diplomatic efforts in the coming year. Keeping a close eye on the local picture is therefore key. 

Beyond the local picture, the Syria in Transition team has picked out five developments that are worth following. They are not listed in order of importance.    

Elections: Most impactful will be the US presidential elections in November. Regardless of who wins,  Syria is unlikely to be a priority. Domestic posturing might prompt calls for troop withdrawals from the northeast, but given ongoing tensions with Russia and Iran it would be contrary to Washington’s interests to relinquish a military presence in such a strategically vital region.

Across the Atlantic, Europeans will also be heading to the polls. The UK’s general election is expected to take place in late 2024 with the Labour Party leading in polls. Whoever wins, it is unlikely that the UK’s position on Syria will alter significantly given the consistent policy of the FCDO and the marginal role that foreign policy plays in British electoral campaigns.  

Elections are also scheduled in Finland, Portugal, Slovakia, Lithuania, Belgium, Croatia, and Austria. Alone, none of these races will have a significant impact on Syria. Should there be a collective shift to the far-right, however – echoing on a wider level what transpired recently in the Netherlands – change on Syria policy might become likely as more capitals look for ways to curb migration. In Brussels, the spotlight will be on the European Parliament elections in June, with personnel changes in the Commission and Council potentially affecting foreign policy agendas, including those on Syria. 

Syrian refugees might again take centre stage in Turkey’s 2024 local elections. Long-term integration of Syrians and refugee returns will likely feature prominently in campaigning, particularly by the opposition, and depending on the outcome will likely impact Turkey’s relationship with both the Syrian opposition and the regime.

Declining aid: Shrinking humanitarian aid budgets will hit Syrians hard. The recent round of WFP cuts might be a foretaste of what is coming. Unfortunately, the much-needed overhaul of the UN’s aid structure is not in sight,  and the lack of unified action among donors hampers effective multilateral responses. 

After years of evil tidings, there is growing shoulder-shrugging in capitals, as Ukraine, Gaza, and Europe’s migration crisis dominate headlines. It is true that more sustainable solutions are needed for chronic humanitarian crises like that in Syria; but rather like a game of Jenga, a collapse could come all of a sudden if too much structural support is withdrawn too quickly. 

Diplomatic tracks: Syria has no shortage of diplomatic tracks, but all are in various states of disrepair. The Moscow Quad (Russia, Turkey, Iran, Assad regime) is at an impasse over seemingly irreconcilable core demands. The Arab track, meanwhile, is dormant and unlikely to gain traction as long as Arab leverage remains weak. 

The UN-sponsored track faces multiple problems, not least of which is the regime’s continued rejection of UNSCR 2254. While having a hard time to fulfil his mandate, the Special Envoy has the means to promote fresh ideas for practical and realistic confidence building measures (CBMs) that are likely to resonate with war-weary Syrians. 2024 will show whether the Envoy’s office has what it takes to adopt new approaches.

Gaza crisis: Saudi Arabia’s recent offer of mediation between the Houthis and the US underscores just how topsy-turvy Middle East politics has become. De-escalation is the regional dictate of the hour, and except for hardliners in the Israeli government, there’s little appetite for further war in the region. The next year will likely see a surge in regional and international diplomacy to contain the fallout of the Gaza war. 

Along Syria’s southern border, Israel is expected to intensify measures against Iran and its proxies. This could involve establishing a buffer zone in coordination with Jordan and other partners, or it could simply be a reactivation of the 2018 agreement guaranteed by Russia. Iranian military logistics, however, are reportedly increasing their operations at the Basel al-Assad Airport in Latakia that shares a runway with Russia’s Hmeimim air base. Serious escalation with Iran and Russia could be in prospect. 

Black swans: Unexpected events are always on the cards. The Assad family’s increasing concentration of power and wealth may provoke a palace coup by disaffected army officers, leading to a sudden and unexpected peace agreement between the regime and the opposition. A man-made disaster such as a collapse of  one of Syria’s major dams could trigger a watershed moment that puts Syria on an unpredicted  trajectory.  The sudden death of a world leader – Putin, Biden or Khamenei, for example, could do the same. 

Uncertainty and instability have long been hallmarks of the Middle East and there’s no reason to think that that will change any time soon. What is predictable is that the team at Syria in Transition will continue to exert every effort to bring you the news behind the news, so that, whether negative or positive, developments at least will be understandable. We wish our readers all the very best for 2024.