Making hay as Gaza burns
Concern over neutrality rewards for Assad

Two earthquakes hit Syria in 2023. The first was an act of nature that brought misery to an already war-ravaged people but relief to the Assad regime. ‘Crisis diplomacy’ became an opportunity for Arab states to advance normalisation with Damascus and for international donors to reaffirm their self-imposed bias in favour of working with the official government, regardless of its deliberate mismanagement and atrocious record. The second earthquake was man-made: Hamas’ attack on Israel and the subsequent Israeli offensive on Gaza. This war shook a region that was considered by the US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan to be “quieter today than it has been in two decades.” Here too, the Assad regime appears to be making hay by leveraging its undeclared neutrality in the Gaza war for sanctions relief and economic assistance. A “reward for neutrality” scheme appears to be unfolding, and it worries diplomats in Europe and the region because it raises difficult questions about how the West should balance its commitment to a comprehensive political solution for Syria, as per UNSCR 2254, which requires maintaining pressure on Assad, with its desire to prevent further state collapse in regime areas.

Since the 7 October attack the Assad regime has maintained a position of “negative neutrality.” Despite its vocal hostility towards Israel, Damascus prohibited pro-Gaza protests and limited cross-border acts of solidarity to a few badly-aimed mortar rounds and rockets. The regime did not respond to the hundreds of Israeli air strikes on Iranian-affiliated groups and their infrastructure in Syria, while maintaining its shelling of Idlib. This has not merely been a passive reaction to Israel’s threats to ‘keep out of it’. Rather, it has been an active attempt by Damascus to present itself as a helpful asset in times of crisis. 

Other regional regimes have played a similar game. Gulf states that were on the path of normalisation with Israel, and who maintained a healthy distance from any step that could be construed as escalation, have already received rewards, a prime example being the dropping by Germany of its veto on Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia and an intensification of German and French diplomatic engagement with Riyadh on regional de-escalation measures. 

Those in the European foreign policy establishment who have been pushing for increased engagement with Damascus now appear to be seizing on this opportunity to reward Syria for its neutrality. Of course, Assad is desperate for this: so much so that he has started announcing cosmetic changes to his regime that could be used by advocates of engagement to justify concessions in his direction. This includes an aspirational goal of having an all-volunteer army; a potential merger of some security branches and the closing of others such as  the notorious Palestine Branch; and the creation of a “secretariat-general for the presidency” to replace the Ministry for Presidential Affairs. For the gullible, the logic of reciprocal concessions between Damascus and the West, advocated since 2019 by some think tanks and the UN Special Envoy, is finally reaping results. The regime’s reform-oriented announcements, coming at a time when Syria has stayed out of the Gaza fray, may be rewarded with easing of sanctions, more trips to Damascus by European diplomats, and more reconstruction-lite developmental assistance to a level that was regarded until quite recently as an EU red line. To placate the critics, Europeans may double down on their rhetoric on accountability and UNSCR 2254. European diplomatic sources have expressed concern that this year’s Brussels donor conference could be the stage for such public posturing, effectively masking more engagement with Assad.

Rewarding Assad in this way would be a win for those Europeans who regard him as the actor best placed to preserve the Syrian state and manage the refugee file. If tacit alliances with dictators are not a red line in North Africa, why should they be in the eastern Mediterranean? Additionally, some believe that keeping Assad in place maintains a bulwark against Iranian escalation emanating from Syrian territory, despite the deployment of tens of thousands of IRGC-affiliated militiamen there. The neutrality rewards scenario aligns with a series of other developments: appointment of regime-leaning personnel in several European development ministries; UN aid chief Martin Griffiths’ proposal to establish a new UN fund for early recovery assistance tailored to regime and GCC specifications; repeated visits by Syria’s State Security chief Husam Luka to Riyadh; and recent armed incursions into Jordan orchestrated by Maher Assad who is reportedly unhappy that discussions between Damascus and Riyadh included the fate of his 4th Division. 

Whether and to what extent “rewards for neutrality” materialises depends on the assertiveness of seasoned and more principled forces in the European foreign policy establishment. It also hinges on whether more credible ideas emerge to address the European dilemma of how to help civilians in need without bolstering a regime that is the root cause of civilian suffering. Presently, the discussion about badly-needed early recovery assistance is between the West and Damascus. What is needed is a shift to a whole-of-Syria approach that regards all areas of control as equally deserving of humanitarian assistance and the required engagement with authorities to implement it effectively. After all, none of the de facto authorities are any less legitimate than the Assad regime – and support to some may even strengthen Europe’s hands rather than weaken it.