Brussels VII: More than an aid conference
Brussels VII

The Brussels conference traditionally serves both as the primary humanitarian pledging event for Syria and the region, and as a platform for Europeans to assert their political roles in the Syrian file. A key theme of discussions at this year’s conference is expected to be the momentum of normalisation that the Assad regime has lately enjoyed. 

Arab normalisation and Turkish outreach plainly highlight the consequences of Europe’s decision to refrain from active political involvement. The crucial question now is how Europeans can effectively blend their essential humanitarian role, their engagement in the peace process, and their vested interests, particularly in managing and mitigating further refugee flows. 

A something for nothing deal
Recent Arab initiatives to reengage with the Assad regime have created the false impression that the civil war and the de facto division of the country are over, and that the conflict now revolves around establishing a working relationship between the regime and its Arab neighbours. This dangerously overlooks the realities. 

The desired outcomes that Arab leaders claim they expect from the regime, such as putting an end to the Captagon trade, facilitating refugee returns, stimulating commerce, fostering stability, and generally promoting a ‘pan-Arab spirit’, cannot be achieved without tackling the conflict for what it is: a highly internationalised civil war. Lacking boots on the ground, the Arabs’ potential for direct influence remains limited.

Despite attempts to showcase initiative and ownership, Arab states have little appetite to get involved in a conflict that could not be controlled and from which they had consequently disengaged. The situation on the ground, and the overall balance of power, are therefore likely to remain unaffected by the media-effective displays of normalisation. 

Nevertheless, the Amman meeting and the return of Syria to the Arab League have managed to shift attention towards three central issues: normalisation, Captagon, and refugee return. Some commentators argue that the Arabs are taking matters into their own hands to mitigate a destabilising spillover of the Syrian war; that, unlike the West, they at least have a dynamic Syria policy. While this policy is neither coherent nor appears properly conceptualised, the recent intra-Arab fence-mending cannot be dismissed as merely symbolic – and anyway even symbolic steps hold a value in themselves. 

While Assad is likely to engage cynically on the refugee and Captagon files, he will surely leverage his new Arab friends for material gains. He would want them to lobby the West to ease sanctions, increase Early Recovery assistance on favourable terms, and he would want direct aid and investment from GCC states. Considering the UN’s track record and fractures in Western adherence to agreed policy lines, there is a real risk that these efforts might actually succeed. 

While Assad’s slow-motion normalisation may bring relief to certain communities in Syria in terms of infrastructure rehabilitation, however, there is a clear risk that, overall, it could do more harm than good. As long as the Damascus regime maintains significant influence in the aid industry, deepening regional and international engagement could sharpen its predatory instincts and vindicate its intransigent strategy, thus perpetuating the Syrian crisis. 

To uphold humanitarian principles and advance a political settlement in line with UNSCR 2254, the European Union and its partners should take a firm stance on normalisation. This not only means maintaining and establishing necessary policy lines but also pushing for accountability, including at the UN. 

Balancing out bad normalisation 
The 3–4 June Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) “reunification” meeting in Geneva highlighted a potential means of countering the Arab states’ normalisation drive with the Assad regime. Given that the West has limited practical means to stop regionals re-establishing relations with Damascus, a reasonable response would be to balance it by strengthening the Syrian opposition. 

Cultivating an alternative political point of reference is not only crucial for the identities and social cohesion of millions of Syrians who oppose the Assad regime; it is also vital to keep the political process alive given that negotiations require at least two sides. Like all opposition bodies, the SNC has suffered from internal fissures and external meddling; but it continues to be recognised by the UN as the representative of the Syrian opposition and includes a broad spectrum of actors from all three areas of control (regime/opposition/SDF) 

UN Special Envoy for Syria, Geir Pedersen, has highlighted the need for confidence-building measures that can be achieved through reciprocal concessions. Until now, this step-for-step diplomacy has been approached as a track between the Assad regime and the international community, almost entirely by-passing the opposition. This has put the SNC in a difficult position. Strengthening the SNC by pushing for intra-Syrian talks on step-for-step confidence-building measures between the areas of control could create low threshold entry points for stabilisation and political progress alike. 

The imperative for conflict management 

Political progress in line with UNSCR 2254, which stipulates a comprehensive solution to the conflict, remains blocked due to the Assad regime’s unwillingness to make any compromises. It is also paralysed by the geopolitical standoff between the United States and Russia. As long as constructive engagement is seen as a weakness, and as long as Turkey feels comfortable playing both sides, substantial political progress will be difficult. 

Limited progress can nevertheless still be expected, given ongoing challenges on the ground and stakeholders’ political necessities. Europe’s priorities include managing refugee flows/returns, an issue that will likely dominate at Brussels VII. Engaging Turkey on Early Recovery efforts in northern Syria to deal with IDPs there, and the possibility of a deal on NE Syria that meets Turkey’s security requirements, might therefore be on the cards. President Erdogan’s re-election is likely to narrow policy options available both to Europeans and the SDF; but it also ends the uncertainty over Turkey’s future leadership that has curbed engagement with Ankara thus far. Now, smart conflict management appears as one of the few credible courses of action available to the Europeans. 

The Astana+ process, which has morphed into the Moscow quad (Russia, Iran, Turkey, Syria), remains the only multilateral format for conflict management that has shaped developments on the ground. Although it has lost some thunder in the aftermath of the Turkish elections because of Ankara ruling out any meeting with Assad in the foreseeable future, and despite it posing a challenge to the UN-sponsored Geneva track, it remains a model of sorts, albeit a flawed one. By endorsing the Astana process when it was established in 2017, the UN gave up its claim (as mandated in UNSCR 2254) to take a leading role in conflict management; but it is not too late to correct course. What is required is a new and enhanced model that takes cues from existing tracks but is owned by the UN. That is the key challenge that now confronts the UN Envoy. 

Honesty on UN accountability 
Over his more than four-year term, UN Special Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen has only once raised “accountability” before the UN Security Council – in March 2020, when he cited demands of Syrian civil society. This notable silence on what is a cornerstone of Western policy on Syria also prevails in other UN departments, most notably the office of the Secretary General himself. 

It was not always thus. In Ban Ki Moon’s day, official statements emphasised the need to refer the Syria file to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The silence since António Guterres took over the position in 2017 arises from fears that talk of accountability could alienate the conflict parties. Such fears lack substance. After all, the most credible negotiations – including face-to-face talks in Geneva – took place in 2014, despite the UN’s then urgent calls for accountability. 

In reality, this is not a matter of individual preferences. The UN’s “Call to Action for Human Rights” actually obliges senior officials to speak out against human rights violations. Introduced as the “Human Rights Up Front” initiative in 2013, the guideline pledges backing from UN headquarters for staff who speak out and are then declared persona non grata by a government or face other difficulties. Informed sources concerned with the matter, however, say that it is not implemented seriously. In sum, there is a lack of support for staff in terms of security and career protection, combined with a lack of any penalties for ignoring the guideline. 

This systematic disincentivisation of pursuing accountability results in the depoliticisation of accountability in the UN’s discourse on Syria. Given the UN’s discursive relevance and its significant de facto role in shaping relations between the international community and the Assad regime, calls for a principled and courageous position from the UN, including from the Secretary General and the Resident Coordinator in Damascus, should not be dismissed as high-minded moralising. They are about complying with the UN’s own guidelines.