Must try harder
How Syrian think tanks can up their game

For Arabs, the think tank has become familiar thanks to the TV news media. The sheer volume of televised punditry by “political analysts” and “strategic experts” introduced the markaz dirasat as the go-to for non-official commentary on the news. In Syria, the emergence of the homegrown think tank is one of few favourable outcomes of the conflict. Prior to 2011, there was only the Damascus-based Sharq Centre that was considered reputable. Now there are at least six: The Day After, Etana, Harmoon, Jusoor, Omran, and the Syrian Center for Policy Research. This growth has largely been the work of opposition-leaning Syrians who identified a Western need for information and “safe” interlocutors and catered for it by setting up NGOs that issue research on political, military, and economic matters, and hold regular workshops and seminars. 

Syrian think tanks, supported by Western donors as a branch of civil society, have developed in a manner similar to those in Iraq, modelling themselves on the likes of Brookings, Carnegie, and Chatham House. Aspirations to Western standards – and Western funding – can of course be a driver for improving quality; but whether this is happening is open to question. 

On the upside, a promising generation of Syrian researchers incubated in the think tank ecosystem is now emerging. They are generating much new data; some are finding their way into the media, politics, and academia. Commentary on TV channels provided by this new crop of think tankers tends to be calmer and more “scientific” than the usual TV demagoguery. Additionally, important conferences in Europe and the US are enriched by the presence of Syrian researchers. Indeed, think tank workshops are one of the very few safe spaces for rational debate between pro- and anti-regime Syrians. Syrian think tanks, moreover, have become knowledge generators in their own right, with an access advantage that has enticed Western think tanks to partner with them. These are all encouraging signs in a sector that is barely a decade old. 

On the downside, the quality of published reports is hit-and-miss. Too often, the approach is descriptive rather than analytical, and lacking in the unique insights sought by seasoned Syria watchers. The tendency is to repeat known facts and talking points rather than to develop original perspectives. Take for example this paragraph from a recently published Syrian think tank report:

The Syrian revolt has highlighted the complicated network of geopolitical variables that determine the actions of Arab governments. The Arab League’s fluctuating posture, the impact of Terrorism and migrants, and the worldwide implications all testify to the intricacies of this multilayered situation. Syria’s fate is entwined with the larger Middle Eastern landscape. Therefore, the route forward remains to be discovered. A comprehensive approach is required for any adequate settlement that tackles current obstacles while also digging into the fundamental causes of the conflict, regional rivalries, and more significant geopolitical issues. Only via such a comprehensive strategy will Syria be transformed from a source of instability to a source of stability and optimism in the Arab world.

Compounding this problem is the lack of recommendations in such reports – strange, given that the primary role of think tanks is to provide fresh policy ideas, or at least to challenge predominant approaches. There is a preoccupation with scenario-building exercises, which are only useful if they come with recommendations on how best to engineer particular outcomes and mitigate associated risks. In large part, such shortcomings reflect a lack of experience in commissioning and editing complex research of this type. 

Think tanks without a country
One of the key reasons why Syrian think tank research sometimes lacks “edge” may be ambiguity over the target audience. Traditionally, think tanks serve as adjuncts to foreign ministries and are anchored in the policy establishments of state actors. In addition to serving as a bridge between academia and policy, and as a place for recruitment of and retirement for diplomats and officials, they help shape government policy by generating evidence-based research and offering recommendations. In Syria, there is no legitimate government that can serve as a focal point. Syrian think tanks therefore find themselves unanchored to any specific state or quasi-state interest and instead attach themselves only to a broad commitment to “change.” Some have even attempted to become political actors in their own right, hosting conferences designed to overturn leadership dynamics within the opposition. All the reputable think tanks, meanwhile, are based outside Syria and are reliant on the goodwill of host governments. This enhances further the ambiguity regarding the core audience and the interests served.

The West is certainly one audience. Unfortunately, this has encouraged a tendency to avoid taking firm positions on the most contentious topics so as not to upset anyone and to appear to be “objective.” In the presence of Western officials, many Syrian think tankers become reticent and prefer to limit their comments to what they think they are expected to say. 

The domestic Syrian audience is arguably the most important; but so convoluted and jargon-ridden are most think tank reports that they fail to attract the public’s attention. Short, media-friendly reports geared towards public outreach and education would likely be a better way forward. Also needed are fluff-free policy papers that are easily digestible. Catering to the needs of the formal Syrian opposition bodies is another area that could usefully be developed, especially as these entities govern territory and engage in talks at the Track I level. Although there has been some recent movement in that direction, it has been donor-driven rather than organic, and the relationship between think tanks and the opposition remains undefined and awkward, notwithstanding the occasional joint workshop. 

On a more structural level, Syrian think tanks suffer from the same short funding cycles and lack of strategic vision as civil society NGOs. A pooled fund could be established to invest in long-term growth and mentoring, ideally supported by the Syrian private sector that already funds many excellent educational initiatives. Western think tanks could also play a role by developing their Syrian counterparts’ institutional and research capacities and not using them only to hoover up data.  

Another positive step towards improved quality of output and reaching audiences worldwide would be for the think tanks to become truly bilingual. This would not entail only the translation of reports from Arabic to English. It would also involve accessing English-language sources of knowledge and encouraging more sophisticated writing styles and presentation of ideas. 

Money alone will not resolve the challenges faced by Syrian think tanks. Above all, they need to move beyond a vague allegiance to “change” and anchor themselves to a real-world political project.