No more business as usual
The problem with the UN’s Transitional Action Plan for Syria

Ahead of the 9th Brussels Conference on 17 March 2025, the UN Country Team hastily drafted a "Transitional Action Plan" (TAP) for Syria, which has yet to be officially unveiled. Syria in Transition has obtained a copy. It envisions a sweeping UN role spanning technical assistance and political guidance across nearly all aspects of state activity during the country’s transition. Twelve areas of engagement are identified: financial sector reform, engagement with international financial institutions, reconstruction, socio-economic development, sanctions issues, refugee and IDP return, social protection, constitutional reform, elections, security sector reform, disarmament and reintegration, legal and judicial reform, transitional justice, and media reform. 

A UN-led and coordinated international effort to support Syria as it transitions away from war is preferable to a patchwork of bilateral tracks with a myriad of UN member states. The TAP, however, reflects a "business as usual" approach that not only overlooks recent UN failures but risks perpetuating them. 

To implement even a fraction of this agenda, full cooperation from the Syrian government is essential. Yet relations between the UN and interim President Ahmad Sharaa’s government are dismal. Sources in Damascus say that UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) Adam Abdelmoula has yet to meet with Sharaa or any of his ministers. At a UN donor meeting on 11 March 2025, Abdelmoula even left an empty chair next to him, hoping that someone – anyone – from the government would show up. “It was ominous,” one participant remarked. “Like a ghost was supposed to take the seat – or maybe it was reserved for the UN’s wishful thinking.” If that wasn’t message enough, on the very same day, interim Foreign Minister Shaibani met with EU and Arab diplomats in Syria, pointedly excluding the UN. This will hardly go unnoticed by Tom Fletcher, the head of OCHA.

Meanwhile, Special Envoy Geir Pedersen also has not met Sharaa since 20 January 2025, per his social media. According to a Western diplomat, the closest contact between him and the new regime was a phone call from Shaibani on 10 March 2025, as the Special Envoy told the UN Security Council in a closed session that day. It appears, however, that this call came in response to mounting pressure on Damascus following violence on the coast, rather than being a sign of structured engagement. It seems that Pederson’s strategy has been to build a working relationship with Damascus through restraint and supportive messaging. So far, however, it has not worked and a course correction is overdue. 

The transitional government lacks the means to navigate the transition, with all its local, regional, and international challenges, solely through bilateral engagements with governments and embedded foreign advisors. The massacres in coastal areas in March are testament to that. The TAP, however, with its thin conflict analysis and vague programmatic approach, fails to acknowledge that Syria remains in active conflict, with a fragile government whose legitimacy is contested by local and regional actors. 

16 of TAP’s 34 pages are accounted for by political affairs. Ordinarily, these would fall under the purview of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE). Under the current plan, however, leadership falls under the RC/HC. The document states that it was developed in consultation with the OSE; but this raises the question of why Pedersen did not assert the weight of his mandate to ensure OSE leadership in political affairs. A vague assurance that the TAP aims to "complement and support the lead role" of the OSE does little to change the reality: in its current form, the TAP cedes decision making authority over key political engagement areas, ranging from constitutional reform to transitional justice, to the RC/HC. This continues the troubling practice of recent years in which the OSE was sidelined while the RC/HC – who had access to Assad – led the UN’s engagement. This undermined UN principles and ultimately worked to the detriment of Syrians. With Abdelmoula struggling for access under the new government, there is talk that UN headquarters is considering replacing him. If Pedersen fails to adjust his approach, he may suffer a similar fate.

The TAP was formulated as a framework for UN-government cooperation; but it is also a fundraising pitch. Given the UN’s weak engagement with Damascus, however, it focuses on the "what" rather than the critical "how." The "what" is straightforward: Syria needs assistance across virtually all sectors. The "how" – the mechanisms through which such assistance might be forthcoming – is not addressed. As in the Assad era, the UN Country Team appears to be pushing the narrative that the conflict is sufficiently contained to allow larger-scale UN programming. If the Country Team raises funds based on the TAP, it may find itself hard-pressed to deliver on its ambitious agenda. It may then fall into its old habits of the Assad era, in which it compromised on principles to secure government cooperation. At a time when the UN’s credibility is seriously dented, such a scenario would further erode trust. 

A fundamental rethinking of the UN’s approach is needed. The organisation continues to treat internal fundraising ability as the primary measure of success. This fosters a "no matter what" attitude that is dangerous both for the UN and for Syrians. What Syria needs is a UN that can maintain structured and principled engagement with the government and other stakeholders, grounded in a realistic assessment of the conflict’s impact on the feasibility of its plans. For now, international attention on Syria remains considerable, but inevitably it will wane. As donor focus shifts to other crises, member states will increasingly look to the UN to manage humanitarian, development, and political affairs in Syria. To prepare for this, member states must exert the pressure necessary to ensure the UN will be able to meet the challenge.