Not wishful thinking
Reimagining the call for a safe, calm, and neutral environment

On 29 April 2024 the Stabilisation Support Unit (SSU) and Conflict Mediation Solutions (CMS) organised a Brussels VIII Conference side-event entitled “Safe, calm, and neutral environment in Syria: unpacking a key concept.“ The discussion revealed a tendency to view the concept as a wish list for a more favourable situation on the ground rather than as a realistic conflict management mechanism to achieve that situation. This is understandable, given that despite its origins in the Geneva Communiqué and UNSCR 2254, the notion of a safe, calm, and neutral environment (SCNE) was never conceptualised at the track I level to reflect conflict realities. The main reason for this is a reluctance to acknowledge an unpleasant truth: while the principles for a political transition outlined in UNSCR 2254 remain viable, the path thereto does not. The political process is thus stuck in a 2017 moment, with a rigid view of Staffan de Mistura’s’ ‘four baskets’ strategy continuing to serve as the principal paradigm.

A slippery slope?
International stakeholders and Syrian civil society tend to describe a SCNE similarly, calling for a nationwide ceasefire, improved humanitarian access, respect for human and housing, land and property rights (mainly by the Assad regime), and accountability. While these demands are reasonable, it is unclear how they might be fulfilled. This is a particular concern for the Syrian opposition because international stakeholders have traditionally viewed a political solution as involving incentives to persuade the Assad regime to make concessions. The UN Special Envoy’s step-for-step offered a framework for this approach that has failed miserably, in both its UN and Arab Contact Group iterations. It led only to a slow-motion drift to no-cost normalisation that Assad exploited to try to bury UNSCR 2254, and with it any and all calls for genuine power sharing. The opposition now fears that the call for a SCNE could lead to more of the same.

UNSCR 2254 stipulates that the establishment of a SCNE will be the work of a transitional governing body to be formed by agreement between the opposition and the regime, and to be responsible for implementing a political transition by the end of 2016. SCNE in this context meant ceasing fire until free and fair elections took place, with the hope that the conflict could then be solved through a democratic process. Shortly after the adoption of UNSCR 2254 in December 2015, however, the Assad regime and its backers started preparing for a major offensive against rebel-held East Aleppo, making clear that they had no intention of implementing the resolution. Consequently, no transitional governing body was formed to establish a SCNE. Eight years later, in 2024, such a body is still not in sight; and yet a SCNE is more urgently needed than ever.

If not now, when
With Syria being de facto divided, and absent international will to force the creation of a transitional governing body, establishing a SCNE in the spirit of UNSCR 2254 can be achieved only by negotiations between the opposition and the regime on pragmatic steps on cross-line issues including aid, trade, education, documentation, resources, and civilian travel. The overriding aim would be better to manage the conflict and improve the humanitarian situation.

Such an approach would correct the failed idea that a UN-mediated dialogue solely between the West and Assad would lead to serious confidence-building measures or concessions. It would also allow the Syrian opposition to become a true negotiation partner. The West never tires of declaring its support for the opposition because credible negotiations require two parties. After becoming frustrated by the chaos of the opposition landscape in the early days of the conflict, however, it was always chary of fully supporting the opposition’s legitimacy, not only at the UN but on the ground in Syria. That doesn’t mean that the Syrian conflict will stop being internationalised, but that the intra-Syrian dimension of the conflict — key to any progress — becomes the focus of diplomacy. 

In current conditions, the best case scenario for Syria is a window of geopolitical opportunity that allows a top-down, imposed solution by external stakeholders. Even then, a divided Syria would still need to be reunited, necessitating SCNE-like negotiations in a transition phase. Investing in a realistic version of SCNE therefore means investing in present conflict management and future conflict resolution alike.