No way out
Why Alawites don’t turn against Assad

Over the summer,  members of  the Alawite community in Syria spoke out against Assad – and his wife – more forcefully than ever before. In widely circulated videos on social media, Assad was described as a liar, thief, butcher, and foreign puppet. On the streets of Latakia, Jableh, and Tartus, however, the anger at rampant corruption, power shortages, and spiraling living costs has not led to the kind of anti-Assad street protests that rocked the southern province of Suwayda. Alawite and Druze activists had originally aimed to instigate a protest movement fuelled by resentment about bread-and-butter issues in both their communities at the same time. The failure of the “Alawite street” to be roused into open opposition has been portrayed as evidence of continued support for Assad. In reality, his support base has been collapsing fast, a process accelerated by his failure to seize on Arab normalisation to bring about economic relief. 

There may still be plenty of Alawites motivated by sectarianism who will stick with Assad to the bitter end; but for the majority, the decision not to take to the streets was driven by factors  drawn from their own lived experience. The first and most obvious is that the regime has an incredibly low tolerance threshold for dissent, especially among Alawites. In the 1980s and 90s the mostly Alawite cadres of the Communist Action Party were decimated, with bouts of imprisonment of up to 20 years. In 2002 Dr Aref Dalila, the dissident Syrian economist of Alawite descent, received a ten year prison sentence while oppositionists from other sects received sentences of only two to four years. More recently, Alawites like Ayman Fares, Ahmed Ibrahim Ismail, and Bashar Najla who made critical comments on social media have been swiftly arrested and not heard of again. Others, such as ex-shabiha member Lama Abbas, who spoke out against Fourth Division looting and corruption were intimidated into silence by online smear campaigns. 

The second factor that makes Alawite opposition particularly difficult is the near impossibility of organising clandestinely within a community that is more heavily penetrated by informants than any other in Syria. Known popularly as awaniya, these informants record the most intricate details of daily life, everything from who said what at a village elder’s meeting to the intimate goings on inside a school or courthouse. Any word of protest, let alone any inclining of a nascent opposition organisation, is quickly exposed and nipped in the bud. This is what happened to the network of Alawite activists known as the “10 August Movement”, which intended to organise protests parallel to those of Suwayda but failed because it was so thoroughly penetrated by awaniya. 

The third factor, which gets lost in the simplistic “Alawite vs Sunni” approach, is that Alawites are not a single, homogeneous bloc. Divisions among Alawite clans, for example, are said by one insider to be more vicious than those between rival Sunni Islamist groups. This sometimes leads to decades-long blood feuds and the prohibition of marriages between certain clans. Linked to this is the absence of an overall religious leadership or  hierarchy that can serve as a focal point. Each clan has its own religious authority that the Assads keep in competition with other clans for state patronage. This is in stark contrast to the Druze, whose religious leadership was not assiduously targeted by the regime. 

A fourth factor is the lack of a regional patron that can guarantee Alawites a soft landing should they turn against the regime. In large part this is the result of a stereotypical view of Alawites as regime stalwarts, which has greatly diminished their options in terms of local and regional alliance-building. Alawites don’t have a Turkey or an Iran that patronises them and gives them direction and legitimacy distinct from that of the regime. Alawite opposition politicians are therefore viewed with much suspicion by ordinary Alawites, who think that they are foolish and naïve to throw in their lot with the anti-Assad cause without sufficient “guarantees”. Unsurprisingly, disillusioned Alawites think twice before going public. The Alawites have been so type-cast that no one – including states that back the opposition – really believes that that there is any point in engaging with them with a view to peeling them away from Assad. Although a misunderstanding of the state of the Alawites, it has become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 

Fear of reprisals and collective punishment should Assad go is a fifth factor dissuading Alawites from joining the anti-Assad movement. During the past five decades, Alawite society has been heavily militarised with the army and the security forces as major employers. That has resulted in a heavy death toll in Alawite-majority provinces – and a linked heavy burden of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Alawites are deeply sensitive to  accusations of collective guilt, and regard the West’s pursuit of “accountability” as being directed against them specifically. They fear that a political transition away from Assad would leave them vulnerable to pursuit in local and international courts, and could open the door to individual or collective acts of revenge, particularly if Assad’s army crumbled and Sunnis assumed command of the military. Many Alawite families today have resorted to sending their precious surviving sons abroad to save them from military conscription and any massacres that may befall the sect. 

Finally, there is the not insignificant factor of drugs. Syria’s coastal region is rife with drug producers and smugglers connected to the Assad family, and they have caused a massive spike in drug addiction. “Twenty five per cent of Alawite youth is high on Captagon” said one knowledgeable source. That is not entirely surprising, nor an exaggeration. Partly it is linked to  long years of dreary military service and a lack of economic opportunities. The widespread addiction limits the extent to which “the street” can be galvanised; while the well-heeled drug gangs have become a new source of support for the regime and would punish any Alawite street protest movement that dared to emerge.   

Alawites want to escape the cage in which they have been placed by the Assad family; but this does not mean that they will rebel against their captors. It’s just too risky. Physical escape is an option; but Europe is increasingly difficult to reach, and in the region only Iraq is seen as at all welcoming of Alawite refugees. For lack of alternatives, a mental escape will have to suffice.