Pedersen’s Frankenstein
Step-for-step goes rogue

When in May 2023 a number of Arab states started embracing ‘step-for-step’ terminology to frame their re-engagement with Assad, Western governments concluded that even their lukewarm support for the UN Special Envoy’s initiative was over. The ill-fated story of step-for-step began in late 2019, when Geir Pedersen introduced it as a response to a ‘no-war-no-peace’ scenario that he saw unfolding. Tangible and reciprocal steps on the ground would be needed to build trust and confidence, the Envoy argued, and he called for concrete actions from Assad and the West in a step-for-step manner. So far, so good. But what Pedersen and his team tried to sell as a proactive initiative was in reality a moonwalk. Instead of approaching the conflict parties confidently — something that had actually proven to be fruitful in the context of negotiations over the Constitutional Committee’s terms of reference — the Envoy blinked first. 

Step-for-step is simply a label for the essence of any mediation. A mediator discreetly fathoms what conflict stakeholders are willing to put on the table, and what they want in return. The problem, of course, was that after seven years of diplomatic disaster, no one was willing to put anything on the table without knowing what they would get in return in terms of concessions or at least a concrete negotiation process with clear milestones. The milestones that UNSCR 2254 defined, namely free and fair elections and reformed governance, were deemed unrealistic. Instead, Pedersen introduced a bazaar for minor regime concessions on non-strategic issues that no one believed would bring about tangible change; in return for Western concessions on strategic issues such as sanctions and reconstruction-lite marketed as “humanitarian” Early Recovery assistance. 

Step to nowhere 
Given the inequity of the trade, the lack of traction was understandable; but it tempted Pedersen and his team to give their approach a new lease of life in ways politically expedient but ethically questionable. According to well-placed sources, in the first half of 2022 the Envoy advocated for a pilot project involving the return of a limited number of Syrian refugees from Lebanon. The rationale was that demonstrating the Assad regime’s willingness to compromise on refugee return would go down well in Western capitals and encourage them to offer goodies in return. Given the absurdity of politicising refugees by treating them as tradeable commodities, and the huge protection concerns, the United States and UNHCR intervened and put a stop to it. The initiative died after only three months, but it survives in the Arab discourse on refugee return: the Amman declaration suggesting an entirely similar project. In another step aimed at reinvigorating step-for-step, Pedersen tried to convince the regime to declare the April 2022 amnesty as a confidence-building measure, sources with direct knowledge of the matter said. This was even though more people were newly- and re-arrested after the amnesty than had been freed; and the Assad regime was so disinterested in working with the Envoy that it did not trouble to inform his office about the releases at all. 

Since the launch of the step-for-step initiative, Pedersen and his team have kept the Syrian opposition at arm’s length. The Syrian Negotiations Commission (SNC) initially rejected step-for-step, seeing it as a blank cheque for Assad and a route towards Western normalisation. Furthermore, it felt sidelined because step-for-step appeared to focus on the West’s relationship with Russia and Assad while ignoring the opposition. In late 2022, SNC representatives told Pedersen privately that they would be open to a reassessment of their position if the Envoy shared an outline paper with them that the UN had shared with the P3+1 and others. He has yet to do so. While secrecy is part of diplomacy, putting the SNC, which is mandated to negotiate on behalf of the Syrian opposition in Geneva, on the backfoot is incompatible with UNSCR 2254’s provision for a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned process. Effectively, the Office of the Special Envoy has been reducing the legitimacy of the opposition as a negotiating partner while strengthening that of the regime by implicitly treating the latter as the only viable Syrian interlocutor. 

Finders keepers 
By January 2023, the step-for-step initiative was in a state of suspended animation. It hadn’t produced any momentum; but given that it was too vague to be rejected out of hand and allowed stakeholders to frame their positions (including simple inaction) as aligned with the UN approach, it enjoyed cautious support. Its very vagueness proved to be its downfall. Step-for-step had become a container term that anyone could adopt for their diplomatic initiative, regardless of their merits or of the UN copyright. When Arab reengagement with Assad accelerated in the spring, it was chosen by Jordan and others as the ideal label to bestow international legitimacy. By failing to define in clear terms how it should work, what it hoped to achieve, and where it would lead, the UN lost control of step-for-step and stood idly by while others appropriated it for their vested interests. 

Pedersen continues to advocate for step-for-step, but the West doesn’t want to buy into an initiative that is now most famous for justifying unconditioned Arab normalisation with Assad. Russia, meanwhile, dismissed step-for-step bluntly in April 2022 when its UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia asked Pedersen to adhere to his mandate. “We have a growing number of questions about the Special Envoy’s attempts to advance his step-for-step initiative, whose specific content, participants and added value are still unclear. After all, both Damascus and the opposition reject his ideas.” Notably, Pedersen had himself observed in 2021 that a “concerted, sustained, and robust diplomatic dialogue (…) particularly between the US and Russia” was a “prerequisite” to his step-for-step approach — a prospect that has been buried with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 

Taking back control 
The Envoy now finds himself between the evolved Astana track (whose precursor was endorsed by his predecessor, Staffan de Mistura) and the Amman process, which verbally anchors itself in step-for-step/UNSCR 2254 without really involving the UN. The Envoy was not even invited to attend the Arab League committee on Syria meeting held in Cairo on 15 August. With the Constitutional Committee being terminally dysfunctional due to a Russian blockade, diplomacy under the step-for-step label now constitutes the main thrust of Pedersen’s efforts. But he has lost control of his creation, and it has already started stalking his mission, albeit that the mission was always going to be a challenge. 

Potentially, the Envoy still has cards to play. Exploiting the failure of the Arab normalisation drive, he could take back ownership of step-for-step by outlining a clear conflict management mechanism whose first goal was a “safe, calm, and neutral environment” as per UNSCR 2254. That would allow him to reinvent his office as a principled thought leader that made full use of the UN’s soft power in shaping diplomatic initiatives. Western governments might want to do their bit by throwing their weight behind such an approach, but only after parity between the regime and opposition has been re-established and the step-for-step approach has been put back in the lab and reconfigured.