Plan B for northwest Syria
An alternative to UN aid gains traction

More than a month has elapsed since Martin Griffiths, the UN’s aid chief, reached what humanitarians call a ‘consent agreement’ with the Assad regime to ensure the continuation of UN cross-border aid to northwest Syria. The agreement’s contents remain a well-kept secret. This lack of transparency is particularly concerning given the regime’s earlier, 14 July, offer to grant the UN access that was so deficient that it was dismissed by UN OCHA. In a letter to the Security Council, the regime’s UN ambassador, Bassam Sabbagh, conditioned cross-border operations on full cooperation with the Syrian government, boycott of non-regime authorities, and supervision of implementation by the SARC/ICRC - both of which are controlled by Damascus and absent in the northwest. The conditions were so at odds with humanitarian principles that they could only be understood as an attempt to set a high bar for the negotiations that would follow. 

After weeks of negotiations, the agreement was described by Griffiths as “consistent with the core principles and current structure and practice that comprise the UN’s humanitarian response in Syria.” Given the less-than-favourable state of the UN’s humanitarian response in Syria, this announcement had an ominous ring. OCHA has refrained from disclosing any details, and observers in northwest Syria note the absence of the trumpeting that would usually accompany such an agreement. Regardless of the agreement’s content, tangible outcomes on the ground have yet to materialise. Since mid-July, the cross-border operation via Bab al-Hawa and al-Rai has stalled, while only limited UN aid has entered the country through Bab al-Salameh. For humanitarians reliant on a minimum level of planning security, this situation is alarming. In late August, the Northwest Syria NGO Forum, a coordination platform of Syrian and international NGOs, sent the UN a list of questions to clarify the situation. To date there has been no response. 

What is clear is that the regime’s engagement with OCHA comes with a price tag. The collapse of the Security Council’s cross-border resolution has already favoured the Assad regime, transforming the mechanism into a bilateral affair between Damascus and the UN. The regime’s authorisation of Bab al-Salameh and al-Rai expires on 13 November, while the consent agreement on Bab al-Hawa is set to expire in January. Echoing Russia’s veto of the Security Council cross-border resolution, a series of further demands by the regime and its allies can be expected. 

Birth of the AFNS 
For years, Western donors have been devising contingency plans in case the UN cross-border mandate was not renewed. One such was the Aid Fund for Northern Syria (AFNS.) The notion of an independent fund that prioritised direct contracts with Syrian NGOs to deliver aid is not new. It was only in June 2022, however, that a consortium led by Adam Smith International (ASI), a private company, was commissioned by the United Kingdom’s FCDO to design a multi-donor pooled fund focused on northwest Syria. When in July 2022 the cross-border mandate was again extended for only six months, the FCDO activated its plan. 

The AFNS was formally established with its inaugural Steering Board meeting in December of that year. The board comprises three donors (FCDO, USAID, Germany/France), three INGOs (People in Need, IRC, SAMS), and three Syrian NGOs (Physicians across Continents, Mercy Without Limits, Violet.) Despite its relative youth, the AFNS so far has delivered two allocations amounting to approximately $60 million in this year alone; and it hopes to match the scale of the UN’s Syrian Cross-border Humanitarian Fund (SCHF), which donates about $150 million annually. Realising this ambition will necessitate securing additional donors and expanding the number of partner NGOs – presently around 40. In addition to the members of the Steering Board and the Channel Island of Jersey, fifteen donors have recently attended board meetings as observers. If some of them commit, the AFNS will emerge as northwest Syria’s financial heavyweight. 

Some critics are concerned that spending decisions and partner selections could be influenced by the UN, who have a representation in the AFNS’ Technical Review Committee that makes recommendations to the Steering Board. With the uncertain future of the UN’s Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) and lack of clarity on OCHA’s consent agreement with the Assad regime, it remains uncertain whether the cluster system can continue to rely on sufficient and impartial data to identify priorities. However, the AFNS is not at the UN’s mercy. Ideally, it can utilise the cluster linkage to ensure effective coordination and avoid overlaps while identifying needs through its local partners and own assessments. 

Ultimately, the AFNS is a work-in-progress. Presently, it positions itself as a complement to, rather than a replacement of, the UN’s humanitarian fund in northwest Syria. Nevertheless, its design allows for a transition if required. Should the UN’s cross-border operation eventually falter, the AFNS would depend on alternative mechanisms, including on access. In such a scenario, an NGO-led approach with a significant role for the Northwest Syria NGO Forum is the most probable outcome, particularly as 70% of cross-border assistance is already conducted by NGOs. 

The model next door 
Despite not being a pooled fund, an already established mechanism in northeast Syria serves as a useful example of how a donor/NGO-led humanitarian programme can evolve independently while maintaining engagement with the UN. After the Yarubiyah crossing was closed in January 2020 due to a Russian veto, northeast Syria became reliant on crossline deliveries from the Damascus-run UN operation. This gave Assad-appointed governors in the northeast veto power over UN activities in their provinces, despite the governors’ marginal or even non-existent presence. 

Parallel to this, donors and INGOs established the NES NGO Forum. This coordinates on behalf of its 40 members that are registered with the AANES. Beyond that, however, and unlike usual NGO forums, it fulfils OCHA-like functions of leading operational coordination for the wider humanitarian response in the northeast. These include the coordination of sector and sub-sector working groups, the equivalent of the UN’s humanitarian clusters such as WASH and Early Recovery assistance. Although the NES Forum operates in parallel to the UN, it integrates into the UN’s whole-of-Syria framework by sharing data and maintaining active communication with UN counterparts. Nevertheless, operating outside the UN’s framework and without access to the UN pooled funds, NGOs have little incentive to share comprehensive data, particularly when protection concerns arise. After all, trust in the UN’s Damascus operation is limited due to the pervasive influence of the Assad regime there. 

Despite the UN’s cross-line footprint in the northeast being larger than in the northwest, the NES Forum’s performance suggests that the UN’s services are not indispensable. The efficacy of such a model hinges on the relationship with local authorities, which seems viable in AANES areas, where profiteering and misconduct are considerably less prevalent than in regime territory. In northwest Syria, Western donors would need proactively to modify their stance towards both the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)- aligned Salvation Government and the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s Interim Government. This is essential as donor restrictions on Syrian NGO engagement with local authorities deemed unpalatable only empower malevolent actors. Red lines are crucial, but potential recipients should be afforded the opportunity to meet highest standards. The UN offers a positive example in this regard, having recently begun meetings with the Interim Government in northern Aleppo after years pretending that it doesn’t exist. 

The UN cannot be entirely superseded when it comes to aid. But with increased interest in linking relief aid, early recovery, and peace-building efforts (the Syria version of triple-nexus), donors are shifting away from putting their money in the UN’s pooled fund and are instead exploring creative solutions to achieve political as well as humanitarian goals. The AFNS, serving as a counterbalance to the UN’s dependence on Damascus, is a viable Plan B option. It achieves short-term goals while testing an alternative approach to meeting humanitarian challenges in complex environments like Syria that can be replicated elsewhere. That could only be a good thing.