Protecting the space
Syria’s civil society must do more to survive

The fall of the Assad regime was a pivotal moment for civil society: Trade unions, NGOs, political parties (depending on how one defines civil society), charities, and activist associations. They  strive to become key engines for the political, economic, and social reconstruction of Syria but they face formidable challenges. There is a legacy of societal mistrust resulting from decades of totalitarian rule. Even more important, however, is their uncertain relationship with the new HTS authorities. How civil society responds – and how effectively it can claim autonomy – will help shape Syria’s future.

Trade Unions
The Assad regime exerted tight control over trade unions, reshaping them to serve the ruling party's agenda and using them as tools to dominate society. Trade union life was suffocated following the strike of March 1980 which led  to the arrest of union leaders and the appointment of union councils and leaders by the Ba'ath Party’s regional leadership.  

In opposition areas and in the diaspora, chaotic and contested union dynamics unfolded, featuring  disputes over legitimacy and authority between Idlib and rural Aleppo. Various professional associations and unions emerged in the diaspora without legal standing due to overlapping jurisdictions and this limited their roles to policy advice and advocacy. The Salvation Government in Idlib faced criticism for appointing union councils without grassroots elections.

After the fall of the Assad regime, a new challenge emerged: a struggle between decentralised union structures in opposition areas and centralised structures in formerly regime-held areas. Issues included large membership from regime areas versus smaller numbers in opposition territories, and corrupt elements who had infiltrated unions and profited from the war economy. To rectify this, the new government dissolved all unions, and reconstituted a central union for each profession staffed by reputable unionists from both opposition and regime areas who had resisted collaboration with the former regime.

The new government so far has refrained from intervening in the formation of union branches, allowing central unions autonomy in appointing their branch councils. Temporary appointments were made to allow a transitional restructuring of unions without the risk of infiltration by Assad regime sympathisers. This should be followed by elections; but there are concerns about potential governmental delays in holding those elections.

Despite current governmental non-intervention, union members fear future encroachment, as the Constitutional Declaration of 13 March lacks explicit guarantees for union independence. The current transitional unions' effectiveness will remain uncertain until elections ensure legitimate representation. In the long run, the trade union movement faces the challenges of inherited mistrust in collective action, limited financial resources, the reintegration of dismissed or exiled members, and state institutions that are themselves undergoing significant transition, such as the Ministry of Justice, which impacts legal unions. Furthermore, the adoption of neo-liberal economic policies will require more robust trade unions to protect worker rights. The extent to which the new government will allow this (potentially a major disincentive for investors) is uncertain. 

Political parties
The former regime abolished genuine political life, creating the multi-party façade of  the National Progressive Front composed mainly of leftist groups lacking genuine popular support. Later, far-right elements such as  the Syrian Social Nationalist Party were permitted, ultimately transforming Front parties into regime-supporting militias that committed grave abuses against civilians.

During the war, political parties operated within regime parameters while  weak opposition groups such as  the National Coordination Body, maintained limited autonomy.

In opposition areas and the diaspora, revolutionary and activist communities developed various political groupings operating freely without formal regulation. The Salvation Government in Idlib prohibited official political parties but tolerated informal political activities, fluctuating between confrontation and cooperation with activists.

After the Assad regime’s fall, the HTS leadership remained wary of political activity, initially hinting at banning parties during the transitional period. Interim President Ahmad Sharaa prioritises religious leaders, community figures, media activists, and diaspora influencers over traditional political elites, often engaging  with political figures in their personal rather than political party capacities.

Political activities face bureaucratic hurdles, requiring approvals (sometimes arbitrarily denied) initially from the Media Ministry, and later from the HTS-aligned Political Affairs Directorate. Pressure from revolutionary groups and political parties at the National Dialogue Conference softened these restrictions, securing commitments to future party laws and political freedoms within the Constitutional Declaration, which itself offers the prospect of a party law at an unspecified future date. Whether this actually happens remains  to be seen. 

Charities and NGOs
Civil society under the old regime was limited largely to charity and humanitarian work, strictly monitored by state security. NGOs predominantly relied on local funding, with rare international grants attracting  stringent governmental oversight. Some organisations facilitated abuses, including forced disappearances of political detainees’ children, becoming fronts for regime-linked businessmen’s illicit activities.

In opposition areas and in the diaspora, NGOs enjoyed substantial freedom and actively engaged in humanitarian aid, advocacy, and human rights documentation, albeit often dependent on donor agendas. The absence of cohesive governance in areas outside regime control allowed corruption and reduced NGO accountability. Donors overly emphasised service delivery NGOs, neglecting other vital civil society segments such as trade unions and youth and rights groups.

After the regime’s fall, NGOs expressed growing concerns over increasing state-imposed restrictions, mandatory re-registration with the Ministry of Social Affairs, and opaque decision-making processes influenced by former regime-affiliated individuals who remain in the bureaucracy. Organisations fear potential limitations on external funding channels and governmental preferences for pliable NGOs staffed by HTS members or their kin.

Many NGOs in opposition areas developed a self-conception of being a substitute to the state, responsible for services, improved governance, and the monitoring of human rights violations. Yet civil activists feel marginalised because of the new government’s unease about civil society which is partly due to NGOs’ substantial donor funding, superior institutional experience and societal influence that the government would rather monopolise for itself.  

Media freedoms meanwhile remain vulnerable to political or ideological pressures, with activists advocating against restrictive media laws and governmental censorship, notably during the National Dialogue Conference. Again, promises were made about an “acceptable” level of media freedom. Whether that will be enshrined in law and in practice is another matter. 

Opportunity beckons
The Assad regime’s fall has opened a door for civil society. With the new government inclined towards familiar tactics of domination and co-option, civic groups should be proactive rather than reactive, articulating their role clearly and robustly. Trade unions, political parties, NGOs, and independent media organisations cannot afford complacency. They must vigorously assert their autonomy, fight for legal protections, and cement their positions as legitimate watchdogs over the nascent state.

Civil society should also demonstrate unity, pragmatism, and resilience. If it fails to do so, it risks being sidelined or subsumed by a government that, despite its rhetoric, has authoritarian instincts echoing those of the Assad regime. For Syria’s hope of democracy to survive, civil society must reclaim – and zealously guard – its space.