In: Issue 18, November 2024

Safe zone reloaded
Turkish plans would see Aleppo city encircled

Since Turkey’s last ground incursion into Syria in 2019 the threat of additional operations has become a major tool in Ankara’s policy kit. Recently, there’s been talk of a sweeping operation that could reset the strategic balance of power. With Trump’s election win, the conditions for such a step may now be more favourable.

Sources in Ankara say that Turkey is looking to cooperate with the US to establish an expansive “safe zone” spanning much of Syria’s north and east. The zone would ring Syria’s borders with Turkey and Iraq, stretching from the town of Al-Busayra in Deir Ezzor governorate, up the Khabour River to Al Hassakeh, then west along the M4 Highway to Manbij and Maskana and on to Ma’arat Misrin in Idlib governorate. “If you draw a straight line from Maskana to Ma’arat Misrin, you’ll understand the size of this safe zone,” one source explained. 

Importantly, it would include the city of Aleppo, although Turkey may not attempt to storm it, instead gaining control by securing key highways into the city. This could pave the way for deals with Russia and Assad on Aleppo’s future administration. Key goals for Ankara include facilitating safe and dignified refugee return to Aleppo and winning lucrative reconstruction contracts for Turkish companies.

An expanded safe zone would also address Ankara’s concerns over Syria’s oil: it is claimed that the SDF is using some of the estimated $500m a year of oil sales to fund the PKK. Placing the oil under a US-Turkish-Syrian administration, with proceeds funding humanitarian aid and stabilisation, might then be on the cards.

Grand bargains
Turkey’s vision for a broad safe zone has long been hampered by US and Russian opposition. Trump’s return, however, brings a potential for grand bargains. His administration’s “maximum pressure” policy on Iran suggests a continued low-cost US military presence in Syria that obstructs Iran’s logistics. With Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz holding top positions in the new administration, the SDF will have strong advocates for continued (albeit scaled back) US presence in Syria. Recent signalling from Israel, which will play a considerable role in determining US policy in the region, also suggests that it will support the Kurds as regional allies in its confrontation with Iran and its proxies. Israel may also wish to create its own “safe zone” in southern Syria.   

Given that Trump does not want to see US forces caught between Turkey and the SDF, it would be a natural move for him to support the peace talks that Turkey appears to be exploring with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. These could bring an understanding between Turkey and the Kurds on a safe zone in which the SDF would continue to exist as a military force under US tutelage, but not as the armed wing of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES). Informed sources say that US-brokered talks between Ankara and the SDF are at an advanced stage.

The Russian factor
Russia’s stance will be critical. To enable such a safe zone to take shape, Moscow would need to pull back its forces from north and northeastern Syria. While this would not be ideal for Russia, it might do so if it meant securing a favourable deal on Ukraine. Former Trump advisor Bryan Lanza recently noted that President Zelensky may need “realistic” visions for peace, indicating that the Trump administration will push for a cessation of hostilities even if it means accepting temporary territorial losses. While not official policy yet, this approach would offer a beleaguered Zelensky an off-ramp from maximalist demands. 

For Russia, a weakened NATO at its western flank is potentially worth more than keeping troops in Syria’s northeast. Nevertheless, a US/Turkey-backed safe zone would give Ankara and Washington significant leverage over its client Assad and would significantly weaken its ally Iran. It would also strengthen the opposition’s negotiating hand. Despite Moscow pressing for an Erdogan-Assad rapprochement, the two sides so far have not been able to meet on terms. “Turkey wants to see the [Syrian] regime and the opposition create a political framework on which they can agree,” said Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan recently. “It is very important that the regime provides a safe and stable environment for the people, including the opposition.” 

If Russia nudged Assad to drop his preconditions on negotiations with Turkey, pragmatic steps on establishing a durable ceasefire and a safe, calm, and neutral environment (SCNE) could follow. Cross-line trade, energy cooperation and civilian travel could begin in parallel. Progress towards implementing a political transition per the Geneva Communiqué and UNSCR 2254 would then become less of a pipedream.