Shadow wars
Daraa’s anti-trafficking vigilantes

Regime- and Hezbollah-enabled narco-trafficking gangs plying their trade along the Syrian-Jordanian border have become a menace to society. Drug addiction among almost all demographics has sky-rocketed as narcotics are promoted locally as well as cross-border, and associated ills such as robbery, kidnapping, and domestic violence have all risen as a result. Illicit drugs – mainly  hashish, Captagon, and crystal meth – are readily available at prices “cheaper than a headache pill”, according to a knowledgeable source. Promoters of these substances target young teenagers who, once addicted, become drug pushers and mules working for those further up the chain. The Syrian regime’s security forces not only turn a blind eye to all this, but provide security and legal cover for the drug dealers. The judicial police, whose job it is to execute arrest warrants, do not dare apprehend anyone linked to the major gangs, even if caught red-handed, because of the protection provided by Hezbollah and the security agencies (mainly Military Security and Air Force Intelligence). Where drug smugglers or promoters are apprehended by locals and handed over to the police, the courts routinely release them on bail, after which ‘higher ups’ ensure that  the charges against them are dropped. 

Apart from the breakdown in law-and-order, the drug trade has upset the balance of power between Daraa’s clans, with smaller clans involved in drugs accumulating money and political power at the expense of the larger clans who are not. Moreover, the regime is rebuilding its support networks in Daraa on the back of the billion-dollar trade, and this puts at risk rival networks of reconciled Free Syrian Army (FSA) commanders who are embedded within local communities, possess arms and know-how, and are still broadly aligned with the US and Jordan. Some of them have taken matters in their own hands. 

Enter the anti-drug trafficking vigilantes: ex-rebels like Abu Murshid al-Bardan, Abu Kinan Kassir, and Mahmoud al-Aqra, who are now community leaders in western districts of Daraa after reconciling with the regime in 2018. They have formed a covert organisation made up of informants and hit teams that operate to eliminate those involved in the drug trade. Individuals identified as drug dealers are closely monitored and then warned. Sometimes, their drug warehouses and financial assets are targeted to send a message, but if they persist, the response can be deadly. Last year, they assassinated Anas al-Nazal, a trafficker, which prompted  members of his gang to flee the area. Sometimes, the vigilantes find themselves taking on former comrades-in-arms, given that many reconciled FSA commanders were recruited into the drug trade by Hezbollah and the Syrian security forces. One such example was Anas al-Shalal, formerly of the FSA, who was shot dead in January 2021 in the town of Jilin. 

The vigilantes are organised geographically.  In the Tal Shihab-Kharab al-Shahm border region, west of Daraa city, former FSA commander Radi al-Hashish leads a group that eliminated Farfahina al-Homsi and Abu Shihab Umyan, two traffickers linked to Hezbollah. In Daraa city – the Tijuana of Syria – the key vigilante leaders are Abdulrashid Masalma and Mohamed Muhaimeid. The most highest-profile victim has been Mustafa al-Kasm Masalma (sanctioned by the US Treasury) who  fell to a vigilante IED in Daraa city in August 2023. The order to target him allegedly came from Amman, which maintains contacts with the vigilante groups and provides them with limited resources. Another sector is the town of Naseeb which since the nearby border crossing with Jordan re-opened in September 2021 has become a hub for contraband smuggling of every kind. There, a major gang leader named Fayez al-Radi was gunned down together with associate Musa al-Sharif in March 2023 by a hit squad from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which occasionally lends  support to the vigilantes. Abdulrazaq al-Masri heads  vigilante groups in the towns of Nawa, Jasim, and Sanamayn. In eastern parts of Daraa province, meanwhile,  Ali Bash and Abu Ali Mustafa, two commanders in the Russian-backed Eighth Brigade of the regime army’s Fifth Corps, lead coordination efforts with vigilante groups. 

The vigilantes’ work is complicated by clan protection. Successful traffickers become useful benefactors for their clans and receive their protection in return. “Whacking” someone who enjoys clan backing risks a blood feud with the whole clan, and so vigilantes often resort to apprehending their target, interrogating him, and releasing him with a stern warning. This is often enough to convince the trafficker to relocate. Avoidance of inter-clan blood-letting is especially important in Daraa where smaller clans like the Radis, the Ruwais, the Masalmas and the Abu Zureiks are increasingly challenging the dominance of the three larger clans that have shunned the drug trade: the Mikdads, the Hariris, and the Zo’bis. The latter depend largely on agriculture and view the drugs trade as a major disruptor that has lured young men away from working the land. Another complicating factor is the protection afforded by the regime. Maj-Gen Louay al-Ali, the Military Security chief in southern Syria, is known to intercede on behalf of traffickers for a price. One such example is Mohamad Suwaydan, released by the Eighth Brigade in May 2023 after spending two months in prison and paying a $100,000 fine.

A further complication are the internal complexities of the drugs trade itself. Some traffickers eliminate their rivals by occasionally cooperating with the vigilantes. Military Security and Air Force Intelligence compete over taxes imposed on the trade and are known to exploit the vigilantes to settle scores. Indeed, several vigilante groups are formally contracted to Military Security as part of the post-2018 reconciliation agreements, and these must tread a fine line between placating Maj-Gen Al-Ali and furthering their own agenda. Islamic State, which maintain a covert presence in Daraa, sometimes eliminates drug dealers but affords protection to others in return for a cut of the proceeds. The weakness of the regime’s security grip and the complex nature of power dynamics in southern Syria has allowed an eco-system of local armed groups to flourish, with the vigilantes being an element that checks the unrestricted growth of the narco-traffickers. Vigilante activity is not entirely welcomed by the regime, but neither is it seen as an existential threat.

The vigilantes like to portray their actions as being for the greater good; but wider agendas are at play. Combating the drug trade in Syria intersects neatly with the fight against Hezbollah and the IRGC, whose activities are funded in-part by drug money. Israel might now be targeting Hezbollah and the IRGC from the air more aggressively than ever before, but on the ground the vigilantes have for years been using the anti-drug crusade as cover to target Iranian-backed individuals and groups. In this they are supported by a Sunni Islamist and nationalist support base that, like the Druze next door, are fearful of the rapid spread of Shia influence within their communities. Jordan too is fearful of rising Iranian military influence on its border and regards the vigilantes as useful assets. Should the war expand from Gaza to southern Syria, they are likely to be called upon to do their duty.