Southern (dis)comfort
Daraa’s fragmented security points to Syria’s decentralised future

Maps of control in Syria show the southern province of Daraa as clearly controlled by the Assad regime, coloured in a solid red. That might be true of the overarching power in that region, but look beneath the red veneer and you will see shades of green. That’s because in 2018, when the regime recaptured the province in a succession of “reconciliation” deals, it had to decide what to do with all the Free Syrian Army rebel fighters who were willing to accommodate themselves with Damascus. What the regime (and Russia) did was allow surrendered rebels to keep their small arms, but on condition that they would operate under the aegis of the army or one of the main security agencies. Thousands took up the offer. 

This was not a show of beneficence but a pragmatic arrangement that papered over the regime’s structural weaknesses. In 2013-2018 the regime’s security agencies had been absent from vast swaths of the southern province, and in their place were new home-grown security actors affiliated to the opposition that had developed a local following. By co-opting these former rebels, the regime managed to pacify the region at relatively low cost; but the result was a mosaic of local control with former rebel commanders answerable to the regime but exercising significant autonomy. These ex-rebels are organised in a council called the Central Committee (al-lajna al-markaziya), and this has become the main conduit through which Damascus exercises power in Daraa. 

Security by committee 
Based in Daraa’s old city, the Central Committee is composed entirely of former rebel commanders who were affiliated with the Southern Front and supported by the CIA-backed Military Operations Center in Amman. In fact, it is dominated by ex-commanders of one FSA faction – the Moatez Billah Army – that controlled the western half of Daraa pre-2018. Recently, the Central Committee branched out and established mini clones known as Community Committees (al-lijan al-mujtama’iya) in the towns and villages of the western countryside of Daraa, which currently constitutes its most important power base. 

Central Committee members include Mahmoud al-Bardan, aka Abu Murshid, who is based in the city of Tafas and leads an armed group of 100 full-time fighters that can swell to 500 when his clan rallies behind him. He is backed by émigré organisations like the Horan People’s Gathering, which channels humanitarian aid to local people via his good offices, granting him financial clout and social heft in the process.    

Another member is Moayad Turki al-Akra, aka Abu Hayyan Heet, who is based in the strategic Yarmouk Basin area and commands 75 full-timers that can also swell to 500 with clan support. Al-Akra was formally part of the Ahrar al-Sham group, and despite the reconciliation deal he signed in 2018, still receives financial support from the Ahrar leadership in Idlib. Thanks to his Islamist background, Al-Akra often acts as a paid mediator and middleman in deals between the regime and jihadist groups.

A third member is Basil al-Jumlawy, aka Abu Kinan Al-Qusayr. In 2018 his group of 200 full-timers operated first under the Fourth Division. After refusing to deploy to northwest Syria, however, it joined Military Security. Al-Jumlawy is known to focus on suppressing jihadists and drug traffickers. 

In the town of Al-Ajmi, the Central Committee’s writ is enforced by ex-rebels Rami al-Hashish and Adham al-Zeinab. In Tal Shihab, it is Sheikh Yusuf al-Bakkar. In Muzayrib, it is Ayid al-Zu'bi, and in al-Yadudah it is Mohammad al-Khatib, aka Al-Mukhtar. In Zeizoun, Salah Muftah heads a group of 60 that operates under the Central Committee, and in Dael the Central Committee’s man is Bilal al-Hariri.  

To resolve local disputes, the “Central Committee factions”, as they are popularly known, have their own judicial body: the “Arbitration Committee,” led by Sheikh Abdul Razzaq al-Masri, aka Abu Ubada. The Central Committee also operates its own prison network.  

Special liaison
Despite continuing to see themselves as anti-regime revolutionaries, the Central Committee factions would not exist if they were not useful to the regime. Their stated goals of suppressing jihadist groups like Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (as HTS is still called in Daraa), combating drugs and maintaining law and order, align with the regime’s stated goals. Close coordination with Brigadier-General Louay al-Ali, the head of Military Security in southern Syria, is therefore critical.  

Mohammad Farid al-Bardan liaises between the Central Committee and Al-Ali, conveying Al-Ali’s instructions to the Central Committee and relaying to him their requests and needs. This minimises the need for public meetings between the Central Committee members and Military Security, which in turn helps preserve their revolutionary image. 

To maintain its finances, the Central Committee secured a valuable concession from Al-Ali: control of vast state-owned agricultural concerns, including a 1,000 hectare dairy farm, and the 2,000 hectare “Libyan farm” (so-called because it was granted to Muammar Gaddafi in lieu of unpaid loans.) Other state-owned lands in the town of Zeizoun and Muzayrib have also been placed under the custodianship of the Central Committee. An additional responsibility has been the management of irrigation dams in the Yarmouk Basin, with farmers wanting to use the water having to pay a fee. 

Eastside vs. Westside  
The Central Committee is not without enemies, including the regime, which is believed to have perpetrated several assassinations of wayward members. One such victim was Radi al-Hashish, killed in December 2023 as he drove back from an ill-tempered meeting with Al-Ali.  

Then there is the Eighth Brigade of the Russian-backed Fifth Corps, which dominates the eastern half of Daraa province and also operates under the aegis of Military Security. Composed largely of the Shabab al-Sunnah FSA faction native to the town of Busra al-Sham that defected en masse to the Russians in 2018, the Eighth Brigade has ambitions to dominate the whole province. Central Committee members rooted in the clans of the western countryside have understandably pushed back.

There are of course also the jihadists. In Tafas, for instance, Younis al-Bardan and Ubaida al-Jarad lead a Nusra group that is believed to be 80-strong. In the nearby town of Al-Yadudah, another Nusra group was formed under the leadership of Amjad al-Mazel. Active cells affiliated with IS operate in the western countryside of Daraa, led by Bar’a al-Zu'bi and Habis Kiwan, reportedly with the collusion of Air Force Intelligence. Tension between such groups and the Central Committee is endemic. Both IS and Nusra frequently accuse the Committee of treachery and “selling out”; and sometimes they resort to  deadly force. 

Things to come
Rank-and-file members of the Central Committee groups have no overarching ideological affiliation or common goal. After the “fall of the south” in 2018, most lost respect for their commanders because of their overt cooperation with the hated regime and their occasional dabbling in the drug trade. The fundamental rationale of the Central Committee is naked self-preservation, or in more revolutionary terms: salvaging what can be salvaged from the jaws of military defeat. This may be compelling, given the circumstances; but is also profoundly demoralising. Evolving into a glorified gendarmerie force is not the future that the rebels imagined or desired; but that is how they might end up if Daraa’s conflict dynamics are anything to go by. 

The Syrian National Army (SNA) that Turkey salvaged from what remained of the FSA in northern Syria has evolved in a similar fashion: ideologically-ambiguous warlords ruling over (and extracting revenue from) territory in exchange for security services. This may be seen as a negative development, but as many Syrians eagerly look to evade direct security control by the regime, a de facto decentralised security architecture may not be the worst-case scenario, and may in time pave the way for something more institutional and professional. A Gendarmerie Nationale for Syria with an anti-terror and -smuggling focus may perhaps be an outcome attractive to external stakeholders with boots on the ground who wish for a dignified exit.