Standing firm
How Europe’s Syria policy should respond to regional escalation

Amid the recent escalation in the region, cards are being reshuffled and Syria may well experience dramatic changes in the internal balance of power. While the situation is evolving constantly, it can be expected that Bashar Assad will struggle to maintain his longstanding strategy of laying low, hoping to be perceived as an agent of stability in turbulent times and receiving neutrality rewards in return from the West and the Gulf. As long as Assad keeps the Golan Heights front calm, Israel will continue to see his regime as a useful asset. But this is just a snapshot; the ending is still uncertain. Israel’s PM Netanyahu is on the warpath, and Israel may go after pro-Iranian regime elements such as Maher Assad, who is said to have been given an ultimatum by Israel, via the United Arab Emirates, to leave the country or turn decisively against Iran. Meanwhile, the Iranians may decide that Assad’s game of playing all sides is not acceptable anymore and take action to remove him.

Refugee returns and regime concessions
For now, the pressing issue is the influx of approximately 250,000 refugees from Lebanon, most of whom are Syrian. This raises alarms across European capitals, where the arrival of large numbers of refugees would come at a very bad time,  given inter- and intra-European tensions. Ethically and politically, aiding refugees and IDPs in both Lebanon and Syria is the right course of action. Europeans, however, should resist impulses and pressures, not least from elements in the EU and UN, to declare parts of Syria safe for returns and to engage prematurely with the Assad regime under the guise of early recovery and livelihood efforts aimed at absorbing returnees. 

Before any concrete decisions are made, it is critical to understand the situation. Both the Assad regime and, unfortunately, UNHCR have vested interests in inflating the number of returnees. Furthermore, a thorough assessment of who these returnees are, where they are headed, and their medium-term intentions is essential. Early reports suggest that many Syrian refugees transit regime-controlled areas en route to eastern Syria or the northwest — a number that could increase if hostilities in Lebanon continue and returnees seek long-term safety by fleeing to Europe. Many of those who remain in regime areas likely view this as a temporary solution, and plan to return to Lebanon as soon as possible. For most refugees, returning to regime-controlled Syria is seen as the least favourable option, not least because of military conscription and lack of jobs, and no aid  programme will change that. 

Until reliable data becomes available, humanitarian efforts should focus solely on life-saving aid rather than early recovery or development projects. Should Europe decide to engage with the authorities in Damascus to explore whether the current pressure on Assad’s allies (Iran and Hezbollah) creates an opening for serious negotiations, several short-term measures could serve as litmus tests. These include maintaining the suspension of the $100 entry fee at the Lebanese-Syrian border indefinitely, granting a full amnesty for returnees (including the suspension of military conscription and full UNHCR monitoring access), and ensuring transparent processes that protect Housing, Land, and Property (HLP) rights. The regime’s willingness to implement such measures should indicate whether deeper engagement was a worthwhile exercise. 

No one, however, should be swayed by minor regime concessions that would likely arise. As demonstrated with his “earthquake diplomacy“ of 2023, Assad is adept at exploiting humanitarian emergencies. Unsurprisingly, on 8 October he met with UNHCR head Filippo Grandi, who has previously made calculated but flawed statements about the regime’s alleged progress on security and legal issues that deterred refugees from returning. The bar on protection must not be lowered, and UNHCR should be encouraged to accurately reflect the situation in its statements to avoid the perception that it is making compromises simply to curry favour with Damascus and donors.

At the same time, Europeans shouldn’t lose sight of non-regime areas. There is wide scope in the northwest and northeast for more efficient humanitarian funding. These regions are major gateways for refugees fleeing to Europe, and engagement could prove far more effective in addressing the root causes of the conflict and supporting long-term stability. Practical measures that could be taken include the collection of data on IDP movements from regime to non-regime areas; pressuring authorities at internal crossings to guarantee smooth entry for IDPs; and serious planning for the types of intervention that will encourage those that make it to non-regime areas to stay there. 

Keep your eyes on the prize
The chief obstacle to engaging with the Assad regime on refugees, or other issues of interest to Europeans, is lack of leverage. Practical experience has shown that the only effective way to pressure Assad is by working with those opposed to him. The West attempted that in different ways throughout the conflict, albeit with mixed results Today, however, the situation is significantly different. Syria is de facto divided, with stable frontlines, and with non-regime areas hosting half the remaining population. By seriously engaging with these areas, the West could exploit the regime’s Achilles’ heel: the legitimisation and empowerment of its internal rivals and the consequent undermining of its own perceived legitimacy and sovereignty. Such an approach would be no more politically sensitive than working with a regime responsible for some of the worst war crimes and crimes against humanity of this century. A reasonable path would be to formulate a set of conditions concerning inclusiveness, access, transparency, oversight, and protection, and strictly focus engagement on those parties who are willing to meet them. 

European strategic patience has been one of the few principled constants in the Syrian conflict. The West’s commendable contributions — taking on almost the entire burden of humanitarian funding and maintaining vital diplomatic ties — have given it leverage that it sometimes underestimates. Especially in times of regional tumult, knee-jerk actionism should be avoided. While the Middle East is in a period of transition, the root causes of the Syrian conflict remain unchanged. Every crisis brings with it windows of opportunity, and Europeans will be best advised to take a deep breath, analyse the situation from all angles, and present joined-up solutions that combine humanitarian impulses with compelling and principled political considerations.