Staying the Course
What to expect from Brussels VIII

On 30 April and 27 May 2024 the European Union (EU) will host the eighth Brussels Conference on “Supporting the future of Syria and the region.” Close to 800 representatives of the UN, EU, EU Member States, regional governments, INGOs, and Syrian civil society organisations will participate. Syria in Transition unpacks what is in store.       

A conference in two parts 
Unlike previous years, this year’s Conference will have two parts. The Day of Dialogue (where everyone discusses relevant Syria issues) will be on 30 April, while the ministerial meeting (where the financial pledges are made by major donors) will take place on 27 May. Participants have raised concerns about declining political interest, with speculation that this split may hinder hallway talks and other useful engagements between humanitarians, civil society, and ministers. The EU has promised high level participation at the Day of Dialogue, with Commissioner Janez Lenarčič opening the event and many envoys and diplomats present. The EU’s Foreign Affairs Council meeting, also scheduled for 27 May, will likely boost the Syria file and therefore encourage more ministerial participation and greater financial commitment to the humanitarian response.   

European strategic patience remains intact
The EU will reaffirm its traditional ‘three noes’ stance on normalisation, reconstruction, and lifting of sanctions until significant political progress is made in line with UNSCR 2254. While the individual approaches of member states on engagement with the Assad regime may continue to stray from this broad position (Romanian security officials were reported to have visited Damascus this month), the fundamentals of EU policy on Syria are not being questioned in the way they were this time last year. Faltering Arab normalisation has served to silence the critics within the EU who had argued for an open and pragmatic engagement with Assad. Arab failure has given ammunition to principled European voices who argue that there is nothing to be gained by giving more freebies to the Syrian dictator. 

Greater emphasis on politics
This year, meanwhile, will be the first time that the implementation (or lack thereof) of UNSCR 2254 will  feature prominently in discussions at the Day of Dialogue. The opposition Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) president Dr Badr Jamous will speak at a panel about the lack of progress at the political level — a first for an opposition representative. Traditionally, the Brussels conferences tried to maintain neutrality, with neither regime nor opposition representatives invited. This time, the EU has chosen the conference to signal publicly and unequivocally its support for the opposition. 

This coincides with a recent call from the EU for a dedicated Security Council session to discuss the lack of implementation of UNSCR 2254. Doubling down on the UN resolution is good news for the political opposition, whose legitimacy is in part drawn from it; and also for Syrians in-country, who are increasingly coalescing around 2254 as the most acceptable solution.

The outcomes of the Brussels conference could be long-lived. After the European elections in June, there will be a new Commission and HR/VP who will inherit the agenda set by the current administration.

Three main themes 
This year’s discussions are likely to see the return of two recurring themes (refugees and migration; and missing persons and detainees) and emphasis on a relatively new theme: early recovery. 

Early recovery: With a decrease in funding despite growing needs, early recovery will likely take centre stage in discussions on humanitarian and development assistance. It promises more efficient use of resources and enhanced resilience of Syrian communities in-country. While the EU accepts that more early recovery assistance is needed, however, it is not wedded to any particular modality for delivering it. Early recovery has been part of development assistance from the EU’s humanitarian arm, ECHO, for years. The question now is how to scale it up while avoiding aid diversion and de facto legitimisation of the Assad regime. 

As it looks for ways to harmonise international efforts on early recovery, the EU is adopting a wait-and-see approach to the UN’s recently unveiled Early Recovery Strategy 2024-28. What the EU does not plan on doing is to put money into the UN’s proposed Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF), which it regards as an unnecessary intermediary with high overhead costs and insufficient safeguards. 

Refugees and migration: Traditionally this is a sensitive topic for European publics: 28 percent of Europeans believe it to be one of the two most important issues facing the EU. The refugee question is likely to feature prominently in the ministerial discussions, especially in light of European elections in June and recent European Council conclusions inviting the HR/VP and the Commission to review and enhance the effectiveness of EU assistance to Syrian IDPs and refugees. 

While past Brussels conferences have always pledged financial support to IDPs and states in the region hosting significant numbers of refugees, the elephant in the room was always whether EU funds should be used to encourage refugee return. Europeans have so far (and for sensible and legal reasons) resisted funding such programmes - much to the annoyance of major host countries like Lebanon, which wish to see the back of their refugee populations. Rhetorical escalation against Syrians and widely publicised security incidents fuelling anti-refugee sentiment in the run up to Brussels conferences has sadly become an annual occurrence. The EU should signal that such tactics will not work, and insist on a safe, dignified, and legal returns process under the auspices of the UNHCR.                     

Missing persons and detainees: The EU is expected to use the Brussels conference to drum up support for the Independent Institution on Missing Persons in Syria (IIMP), which was established by the UN General Assembly in June 2023 to clarify the fate of an estimated 100,000 people who have disappeared since 2011. This reflects the EU’s determination to raise awareness of a pressing issue that won’t solve itself - and which will fuel future conflicts if left unaddressed. Without the cooperation of Damascus, however, little progress will be possible.  

Not taking Brussels for granted
Organising this year’s Brussels Conference was not easy given the peak in donor fatigue and Syria being overshadowed by other, higher priority, conflicts. Despite the considerable administrative and political investment made and planned, success is not assured. Even Syrian civil society organisations (CSOs) - net beneficiaries of Brussels conference attention and funding - appear less engaged than before. A poll of CSOs held by the EU ahead of the conference revealed less interest; and a broad frustration with the perceived political deadlock. 

The EU nevertheless insisted on convening Brussels VIII, not least because regional stability has gained added importance with the Gaza war. The millions of Syrian refugees in the region are seen as potentially destabilising, and the EU accordingly sees a clear need for new support pledges for countries like Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, to encourage them to keep hosting them. The EU itself has agreed not to decrease funding for Syria in 2024/25; but how long Brussels will maintain this line, given the pressures closer to home (i.e. Ukraine), is uncertain. 

Brussels IX, meanwhile, is not a done deal. Future iterations of the conference will require a revamped format and a more optimistic goal than simply maintaining the status quo.