Swallowing the State
HTS is fashioning Syria in its own image

After over 14 years of struggle and sacrifice, the Syrian revolution triumphed on 8 December 2024. Almost immediately, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani – now officially resuming use of his birth name, Ahmed al-Sharaa – declared the revolution over and shifted swiftly from revolutionary objectives towards consolidating control of the state. 

One hundred days into Sharaa’s reign, over a third of Syria remains outside his grip with half the country lacking any meaningful military or security presence. But Syrian society has shown remarkable awareness and willingness to start afresh, enabling a relatively peaceful transition from Assad’s regime to the newly established administration, with – until 6 March – minimal violence and vengeance. Many towns and villages self-govern, largely free from Damascus’s intervention, even on security matters. 

Idlib model on steroids
At this 100-day milestone marking Sharaa’s ascent, it is also possible to evaluate current and future policies. To date, the much-praised state-building agenda primarily consolidates Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham’s (HTS) dominance at the state’s expense, essentially replicating Idlib’s Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) model in precise detail, including the mindset and operational strategies.

The trend is illustrated by the manner in which the caretaker government was formed. Established just two days after Assad’s fall, it initially retained all ministers and the prime minister of the SSG. Later, it was supplemented by additions such as Foreign Minister Assad al-Shaibani, formerly head of HTS external relations, a Jabhat al-Nusra co-founder, and ex-ISIS member; and Defence Minister Murhaf Abu Qasra, HTS's former military wing commander. Intelligence responsibilities fell to Anas Khattab, known as Abu Ahmad Hudud, who headed HTS’ General Security Service and was formerly an Al-Qaeda operative. Minor reshuffles placed Maher al-Sharaa – Ahmed al-Sharaa’s elder brother – as Health Minister, while numerous positions went to Sharaa’s family and relatives of his wife - appointments reminiscent of Assad’s nepotistic governance.

Political commissars 
HTS's systematic dominance is also evident in the governorates. HTS members occupy all  governorships except in Aleppo, Latakia, and Rural Damascus – these having governors from the pro-HTS wings of allied Islamist groups. 

‘Political Administration Officers’ have been appointed in each governorate, directly inheriting functions formerly undertaken by senior Ba’ath Party members. The results are overlapping jurisdictions and power struggles between governors and these political commissars, who have been drawn exclusively from HTS ranks. Security officers regularly oversee governors' interactions with local figures and NGOs, recalling the intrusive surveillance practices of Assad’s era.

To a large extent, all this was not unexpected: generally, state structures and apparatchiks are remarkably resilient to change and reform regardless of who holds ultimate power, especially in states such as Syria that have bloated structures. It will take significant expertise and skill for Sharaa to avoid being strong-armed into any further replication of historic structures: the source of significant public grievances.

Loyalists in power
Similarly, HTS favours its own members for leading municipal, port, airport, and civil service appointments, with occasional merit-based exceptions. Corruption remains pervasive, with HTS-linked companies frequently receiving government contracts, especially in sanitation, transport, telecommunications, and – imminently –  in fuel and construction.

At the time of writing, 20 army divisions had been announced but few exist in practice. From top to bottom in the armed forces HTS figures dominate, although some factions aligned with HTS, including Ahrar al-Sham, Zenki, and Ansar al-Tawhid, have secured limited command positions. Controversially, infamous  figures have received leadership roles. An example is Mohammad al-Jasim of the Amshat faction – both him personally and his group sanctioned by the US for human rights abuses – has been appointed as commander of the army’s yet to be formed Hama brigade. This limited integration of revolutionary armed groups not directly loyal to Sharaa (mainly the Syrian National Army), indicates deep-rooted mistrust.

HTS has focussed instead on developing new internal security forces. Following Sharaa’s 29 January announcement dissolving the previous security apparatus, HTS-affiliated security leaders immediately assumed control of all three key elements in the new system: the police, general security, and intelligence. Though police forces are broadly socially representative, HTS exclusively controls General Security and the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), whose leading lights include figures previously implicated in abuses in Idlib, including Anas Khattab, the GID’s head. 

On 6 March remnants of Assad's regime launched a violent insurrection in coastal towns and inflicted heavy casualties on security forces, prompting  armed groups nationwide to come to the aid of the HTS-dominated security forces. There followed  summary executions, looting, the killing of unarmed civilians and other abuses. Sharaa’s administration publicly condemned what they described as “excesses” by civilian volunteers but avoided implicating or arresting security personnel, despite clear video evidence implicating HTS members in the abuses. Sharaa himself undoubtedly authorised the use of helicopters to drop dumb bombs. He also likely turned a blind eye to the revenge killings, seeing them as a way of controllably releasing the pressure valve of anger and discontent while postponing steps to deal with their root-causes. 

Cult of personality
Unlike Assad and most regional leaders, Sharaa has avoided the urge to assert his power through posters and pictures of himself plastered all over the country. There is a personality cult but it manifests in social media – the new public square – and the highly personal way in which he has seized  control of the state.

Sharaa has always concentrated military decisions within a tight circle. Shortly before the November battle that toppled Assad, he took direct military command, aiming to monopolise the prestige of victory. 

The hastily-convened Victory Conference of 29 January failed to establish either an interim council or legislature, merely appointing Sharaa as Interim President. It was announced that revolutionary factions and civil-political groups would merge into state structures, undermining the decade-long tradition in Idlib of community-led revolutionary governance.

Similar authoritarian tendencies were clear  during the National Dialogue Conference, deliberately convened at the last-minute to minimise participation by critical voices from abroad. 

Ministries, particularly Foreign Affairs, suffer excessive centralisation, with ministers frequently needing explicit approval from Sharaa or Shaibani for even routine decisions. This conflates monopolisation with centralisation and will likely mire the state in bureaucracy, perpetuate Assad’s sub-par governance and, in time, turn goodwill into discontent. There is a limit to which Sharaa will be able to direct anger at the Alawite ancien régime. 

What is to be expected
In  the coming months, this monopolisation process will likely continue, with Sharaa making critical decisions about Syria’s future amidst lingering euphoria over Assad’s downfall that engenders limited scrutiny. The core of HTS will continue to dominate key  positions. 

With the constitutional declaration, the transitional period has already been extended to five years to enable revolutionary institutions – armed groups, local councils and civil society – gradually to fade, crucially preventing the emergence of robust political and civic alternatives within Sunni Arab communities capable of challenging Sharaa’s dominance. The anticipated new government, even if outwardly diverse and perhaps positively received, will mask ongoing behind-the-scenes control by HTS political commissars embedded at all levels of governance.

The revival of political life (parties, public debate, free media, elections) may well be delayed, and deliberately so. This would monopolise the representation of Sunni Arabs affiliated with HTS and ensure their political control for generations. If things don’t go well,  however, the position of Sunni Arabs could be severely compromised by their association with the personal competence, credibility and fate of Sharaa. Failure by Sharaa would set back the entire community.

If sanctions remain and international aid continues to be withheld, meanwhile, economic conditions will further deteriorate, inevitably deepening dissent.

It remains to be seen whether the massacres in coastal regions will prompt Sharaa to reassess his governing style, introduce greater inclusivity and take meaningful steps towards transitional justice. 

Sharaa and his regional backers must recognise the risk that Assad’s Syria is being perpetuated, with the only real change being the substitution of youthful beards for military uniforms. They must grasp that Sharaa’s project of entrenching Sunni rule can be successfully achieved only via meaningful state reforms that prioritise effective bureaucracy and governance, participatory politics and public life, and an open-minded attitude towards Syria’s minorities such that all constituencies have a stake in the country’s future. Time remains for course correction, though it is diminishing rapidly.