Tanks and cash
Israel’s hearts and minds campaign in southern Syria

Israel’s 1967 occupation of Syria’s Golan Heights has been a source of hostility felt towards the Jewish state by Syrians. Since the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024, Israel has occupied further Syrian territory in Quneitra governorate in what was until that date a de-militarised zone between the two countries per the US-brokered 1974 ceasefire agreement. Israel considers the new government in Damascus an extremist one, and has aimed to deprive it from rebuilding a strong army by targeting heavy weapons storage sites, naval assets, and military air bases, destroying much equipment in the process. Meanwhile, it has made in-roads into communities in the south of Syria in an attempt to win hearts and minds and cement its control there. This has not gone down well with ordinary Syrians who regard Israel’s actions as undermining of Syria’s territorial integrity and political transition. However, not everyone sees it that way.

Aid diplomacy
Immediately after the fall of the Assad regime, Israeli forces entered Syrian territory and seized control of the demilitarised zone and a number of strategic hills. They established military bases in the Al-Ahmar hills and the abandoned villages of Kodna, but more importantly, the Mount Hermon summit with its military observatory that overlooks the Syrian capital just 30kms away. Locals have been informed that the Al-Jabiya hill near Nawa in the western countryside of Daraa will also be seized by Israel.

Israel has not only used its military power to create new facts on the ground. It has resorted to a hearts and minds campaign to win local favour. Sources on the ground report that Israel military teams composed largely of Arabic speakers are active in Quneitra to build channels of communication with local communities and collect valuable intelligence. Targeted are the headmen (makhatir) and mayors of each village or town. They are asked to provide the Israelis with a population census that includes lists of the names of residents, the number of males and females, the age groups of the population, their political and organisational connections, and names of those who were permitted by the Assad regime to carry weapons. Promised in return is humanitarian aid. This has nurtured a competition between the headmen and mayors as the one would who would cooperate the most would receive the most aid, which often translates into a higher social status for the headman or mayor concerned. The Israeli army has also infiltrated local communities by offering cash payouts ($100 per month to each family) and offers of agricultural employment in the Golan Heights for a daily wage of 350 shekels per day ($95), which is significantly higher than the average monthly salary of a Syrian government employee.

Some aid organisations that operate in southern Syria have been linked by local sources to Israel. One such is Rahma (“Mercy”), that provides financial and in-kind support to locals. It is said to operate across the Jordanian-Syrian border and is run by a local man from Daraa who previously resided in Lebanon. Contrary to expectations, notables sent supportive messages to this organisation, encouraging it to expand its operations.

De-militarising the south
Notwithstanding the hearts and mind campaign, the Israeli military is adamant on de-militarising the south of Syria. Upon receiving intelligence that weapons were being stored in a specific location, specialised units surrounded the location and informed its residents via loudspeaker to hand over the weapons. This has happened dozens of times and so far the tactic has worked with no reported clashes.

Also on the Israeli target list are military headquarters belonging to the former Free Syrian Army (FSA) southern factions and the newly reconstituted Syrian Ministry of Defense. Targeted was the headquarters of Basil Al-Jamlawi (aka Abu Hayyan Hait), commander of Ahrar al-Sham in the south and a member of the military committee tasked by the Ministry of Defense to form the 40th Division. On the night of 8 March, Israeli forces entered the town of Jomla and immediately went to the house of Al-Jamlawi and surrounded it, after which they seized weapons kept in the house. They then proceeded to surround the headquarters of Ahrar al-Sham and HTS in the town (now affiliated with the Ministry of Defense) to confiscate the entire arsenal there, which included individual light and medium weapons and a number of tanks and armoured vehicles. They were loaded onto heavy transport vehicles and were taken to Israel without a shot being fired.

Despite the obvious chagrin, there is no serious talk of resistance by Daraa’s armed groups. The futility of resisting Israeli incursions is obvious, as is the desire by the new government in Damascus to avoid unnecessarily provoking a much wider Israeli military operation in the south.

Lack of trust
Despite the brazen Israeli interference, the government in Damascus has not quite given up on the south. It recently appointed Bunyan al-Hariri as overall military commander of Daraa. On 14 March he met with the leaders of the local FSA factions. He explained that although the Ministry of Defence had tasked him to establish the 40th Division, the Ministry did not trust him enough to send him heavy weapons, and that all that he received was fuel.

He further explained that the 8th Brigade, which was led by Ahmed Al-Awda, has not yet agreed to come under the purview of the Ministry of Defence and that it operated as an independent faction. Although the Ministry of Defence was organising training courses for those wishing to join the new Syrian army, the decision to join has been kept voluntary. Al-Hariri pushed back against the desire of some armed groups to initiate a war of resistance against Israel, citing that civilians will ultimately pay the price.

On 6 March, the western countryside of Daraa governorate witnessed a security incident that underscores the strained relationship between Damascus and the armed groups in the south. It began with the violent arrest of Adham Al-Zainab by a General Security checkpoint near the town of Jaleen. Al-Zainab was a former prominent leader of the Central Committee – a warlords’ council made up of anti-Islamic State FSA commanders. General Security personnel not only arrested Zainab, but also subjected two young men who were accompanying him to insults and threats, vowing a security campaign targeting the remaining FSA factions in the south, and accusing them of betrayal and collusion with Israel.

In response, local armed groups were mobilised to secure the release of Al-Zainab. The General Security HQ in the city of Muzayrib was stormed and 20 General Security personnel were detained in retaliation. Al-Zainab’s release was eventually secured through the mediation of several prominent figures including Bunyan Al-Hariri. This incident prompted Hariri to ask Damascus not to station General Security personnel from Idlib in Daraa and to limit recruitment to locals only.

Between a rock and a hard place
Israel’s land-grabbing strategy in southern Syria has so far proved tactically effective. Its mixture of military muscle and calculated generosity may temporarily buy it time as it cements its control, but this comes at the cost of fuelling resentment among Syrians wary of further territorial fragmentation and the risk of partition. Damascus remains too weak to confront Israel directly yet too suspicious to cooperate with local factions fully. Without a comprehensive settlement for the south that takes into consideration its decentralised security architecture, local tribal politics and sensitivities, and the machinations of neighbouring states, southern Syria risks drifting permanently into Israel’s sphere of influence.