The Assad whisperer
Griffiths in Damascus

Keen followers of Syria diplomacy will have noticed a certain type of Western visitor to Damascus. This is the distinguished gentleman of a certain age, usually an ex-diplomat, who believes in his innate ability to talk sense to dictators if only he could get enough face time with them. The latest iteration of this archetype is Martin Griffiths, the head of UN OCHA, who met Bashar al-Assad on 27 June for a “valuable exchange” on humanitarian assistance and “early recovery priorities.” It was the third such meeting this year, the first having taken place in the immediate aftermath of the February earthquake when the UN begged Assad to allow aid to pass to the most seriously affected areas in northwest Syria. 

Griffiths was not always the welcome visitor. In 2017, OCHA asked the British former diplomat to undertake a review of its work in Syria after many complaints were lodged alleging that humanitarian principles were being compromised for the sake of expediency. Griffiths undertook the task and produced a report that, among other things, recommended installing an independent ombudsman to deal with complaints and ethical dilemmas on “issues of core principles and values.” The authorities in Damascus were none too pleased and blocked further probes by Griffiths by denying him a visa. The report and its recommendations were then quietly shelved by the UN. 

Six years and three meetings with Assad later, Griffiths appears to have undergone a conversion and is now keen on throwing more money in Damascus’ direction with less accountability and oversight than ever before. Addressing the Security Council on 29 June, he declared: “It is clear that further expanding early recovery activities is the humanitarian community’s best chance to support the future of the Syrian people. Any move towards a more sustainable response will require a different approach, one with longer timelines and fewer donor redlines.” 

This is music to Assad’s ears. He has long sought a means to facilitate a less regulated inflow of donor money for reconstruction activities with the all-too-useful humanitarian label serving as an effective way to bypass Western red lines and sanctions regimes. Assad and his allies have long lobbied for increased Early Recovery assistance, with the definition of what falls under Early Recovery progressively expanded beyond what can justifiably be considered “humanitarian.” UN agencies like UNICEF and WFP that deliver relief aid but also want to win lucrative “development” contracts have pushed for a much looser definition of Early Recovery. UNDP too is jostling for position. 

Very much aware of Western scepticism regarding unconditioned reconstruction through the back door, Griffiths is now apparently courting Arab Gulf states. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have recently expressed an interest in opening their wallets to help out Assad under the guise of encouraging refugee return. These states have so far shied away from contributing to the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), given all its red lines. Despite downplaying it as a factor, US and EU sanctions prevent these states from making direct investments in Syria’s economy and they must therefore look for workarounds. This presumably is the opportunity upon which Griffiths wants to capitalise. 

According to diplomatic sources in New York, Griffiths is now proposing setting up an entirely new UN fund for Early Recovery using GCC money that will be run by the Damascus-based Resident Coordinator. At first glance, attracting donor money to rebuild schools might sound like a noble idea. However, questions arise as to why Griffiths is suggesting a new fund when the UN already has an Early Recovery fund. The HRP regulations are designed to ensure that donor money set aside for Early Recovery projects benefits Syrians rather than the regime — although so far the results have been mixed. Lowering the bar instead of pushing for higher standards on due diligence within UN operations is a recipe for programmes that fail to pass the Do No Harm test and contravene many of the UN’s own guidelines and parameters. It may also lead to collusion in sanctions busting. Difficult conversations must surely lie ahead between influential UN donors, including the EU and key Member States, and the OCHA chief on the “core principles and values” motivating his intervention in Syria.