The Jolani tax
International legitimacy comes at a price

It’s hard not to feel sorry for Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. The leader of HTS (real name: Ahmad Hussein al-Shar’a) and de facto governor of the rebel province of Idlib has expended much effort to revamp his image. He disavowed Al-Qaida, suppressed foreign fighters, and cooperated in the war against the Islamic State (IS). He also kept some distance from Turkey despite coming under its security umbrella; and he opened channels with the SDF, the UN, and Western intelligence agencies on trade, aid and security respectively. To boot, he has empowered a quasi-technocratic government in Idlib that collects taxes, maintains order, and invests in infrastructure. His hope appears to be that by doing all this he will be regarded not as a terrorist but as a pragmatic and responsible actor with a legitimate political role in Syria’s future. So far though, it hasn’t quite worked out that way. 

For a former ISIS emir, admission into the club of international respectability comes with a steep price tag. ‘Security cooperation’ (i.e. keeping one’s own radicals in line) is good but not good enough. Hamas is a serial cooperator and gets a stipend from Qatar for its efforts, but in Western eyes political legitimacy lies with the secular Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. Similarly, Western engagement with HTS has not extended to the political sphere where the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) is still considered the legitimate representative of the opposition. A big hurdle is the UN Security Council’s designation of Jolani as a terrorist leader. The West might be pragmatic enough to conduct deals with him, but only within limits. Perhaps he might consider alternative pathways to a future political role – ones that are less linear and more inclusive. 

No taxation without representation 
The redevelopment of the border crossing complex at Bab al-Hawa is an impressive showcase of the new HTS-run Idlib. A mountainside was sacrificed to make way for a Dubai-style highway complete with palm trees; and buildings that host foreign visitors are freshly decorated and scented with burning oudh. A sense of order and calm has replaced the former organised chaos. Drive less than a mile into Idlib proper, however, and the giant Atmeh camps come into view. Jolani’s fiefdom has 3.2 million residents, more than half of whom are IDPs living in tents. The money spent on sprucing up Idlib’s gateway to the world, and other large expenditures, including on an administrative bureaucracy and a security apparatus, was extracted from an already impoverished population through a complex system of direct and indirect taxation. The taxes range from charges that the Salvation Government imposes for services to import duties on all goods including fuel, building materials and foodstuffs. In Idlib, meanwhile, prices are expressed in US dollars while payments are made in Turkish lira. As the lira has depreciated sharply against the dollar, local prices have risen sharply. 

Heavy taxation and dollarisation mean that the cost of everyday items are noticeably higher in Idlib than in any other area of control. This has given rise to widespread smuggling, with goods bought more cheaply in neighbouring SIG-run Afrin being sold for a small profit in Idlib. As a result, all vehicles entering Idlib undergo rigorous inspection by HTS men looking not for bombs or drugs but for hidden fuel tanks and secret compartments for cigarettes. The growing imposition of taxes, tariffs, and fees has been the cause of much simmering resentment on the part of locals, who accuse the HTS government of monopolisation and profiteering. Generating local revenue to improve infrastructure is of course important; but taxing people until the pips squeak is risky and likely to backfire. 

Perhaps the problem is that Jolani has focused too much on impressing the West and not enough on giving back to his people. With taxation comes the question of representation, which in Idlib is conspicuously absent in any credible or democratic form. Offering the people of the province a stab at free-and-fair municipal elections would be an opportunity for Jolani to demonstrate his commitment to reform. Such a step would allow a new crop of elected politicians, untainted by terrorist affiliations, to emerge at a time when dialogue and coordination with the mainstream political opposition, as well as the rest of Syria (e.g. Suwayda), is needed more than ever. This should go hand in hand with lifting restrictions on civil society activism and the media. Should Jolani wish to signal his sensitivity not only to Western security concerns but also to Western political values, it would be the logical next step. 

Some might regard this type of ‘concession’ as a Western tax that unfairly targets Islamist groups at a time when the same is not asked of, say, the PKK’s Syrian arm. A more circumspect view is that such a step would represent a worthwhile investment in the political culture of the northwest and would likely strengthen the opposition’s overall position in the medium to long-term. It would not mean the end of Jolani, whose Godfather-like influence will likely persist. What it would mean is the re-orientation of his so-called “Sunni project” towards a more democratic and inclusive path consistent with the trends of localism and pluralism evolving elsewhere in Syria, and indeed greater Syria. From Gaza to Deir Ezzor, one-party rule and heavy-handed governance have failed. Jolani would be wise to take note.