The new deep state
How Al-Sharaa is consolidating power

The dramatic collapse of the Assad regime has introduced a new system of governance in Syria that observers are struggling to understand. Even the most optimistic did not anticipate that the military campaign that began on 27 November 2024 would involve more than the capture of Aleppo, which would have positioned the political opposition to negotiate from a position of strength within the framework of the UN-led political process.

The transition might then have echoed the Tunisia model: a transitional government, a new constitution, and free-and-fair elections within a state that largely resembled the previous one. The swift collapse of the regime, however, has thrust Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader Ahmad al-Sharaa into a sole leadership role. What kind of state will emerge will depend largely on his personal vision.

Those familiar with Al-Sharaa say that he is concerned with foiling a counter-revolution. He has specifically cited the example of Tunisia – where the old deep state resurfaced to seize power from the democratically-elected government. To avoid such an outcome he is laying the foundations of a new deep state in Syria resting on four key pillars: control of the army, the security forces, the economy, and international relations.   

New model army
The rebuilding of the armed forces is high on the new government’s priority list. With no significant external military threats and the support of key Arab states keen on stabilising Syria post-Iranian influence, the process has so far proceeded smoothly, albeit not without some snags. It has been  aided by the willingness of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions to integrate into the newly formed Ministry of Defence.  

One snag was the decision by the defence minister, Murhaf Abu Qasra, to promote non-Syrian fighters into the officer class. This provoked strong reactions from regional powers, particularly Egypt, which was incensed that Ahmad Mansour, a vocal critic of President Abdelfatah al-Sisi, is now a Colonel. Another has been the incorporation of the SDF and armed groups from Suwayda and Daraa into the new army. Whether these groups should dissolve into the new army (i.e. enter as individuals) or as groups that maintain their unique structure, might take months of negotiations to settle.

Creating a US-style National Guard might be a useful compromise as part of a wider deal on decentralisation. The centre (including the army’s officer class) will continue to be almost entirely dominated by Sunni Arabs that are either HTS members (and have undergone training at Idlib’s military academy) or are otherwise from the SNA but are palatable to the ex-jihadi group. This would represent a complete reversal of the situation under the Assad regime, where the officer class was dominated by Alawites loyal to the Assads.  

Security matters
The new government has abolished the old police force. Instead, it has expanded Idlib’s General Security apparatus, with recruitment proceeding at breakneck speed. Priority is being given to young men from the three northern provinces (Idlib, Hama, Aleppo) where HTS has its support base. In Damascus, Hyundai Santa Fe vehicles carrying Idlib number plates have become the new symbols of law and order.   

With some exceptions in Homs and the coastal region where vigilantes have targeted members of the shabiha, a remarkable degree of calm prevails in most areas. Travel has become safe throughout the country, even at night. Any remnants of the former regime attempting to disrupt stability have been neutralised with overwhelming force by General Security. The recent appointment of Ali Kiddah, former prime minister of HTS’ Salvation Government, as the new Interior Minister underlines  the importance being given to the creation of a new police force that is ideologically and organisationally committed to the preservation of the new order. 

The new chief of Syria’s General Intelligence Directorate (GID) is Anas Khatab, the former administrative chief of Jabhat al-Nusra. In recent years he has been credited with infiltrating and dismantling Islamic State (IS) and Hurras al-Deen (Al-Qaeda) cells in the northwest. As well as dealing with ongoing terror threats, the new GID is focused on surveilling and arresting suspected ex-regime loyalists and dissidents. Striking a balance between ensuring internal stability and preventing any  backlash from Alawites and other formerly pro-Assad constituencies very much relies on accurate intelligence. Unlike the ham-fisted, scatter-gun approach adopted by Assad’s myriad intelligence agencies, the new GID is gearing up to be professional, high-tech and shadowy – not unlike Turkey’s MIT.

Economic recovery
Economic recovery is key to the new government’s  survival. To encourage trade, the government has reduced customs tariffs in formerly regime-held areas. This, however, inadvertently led to discontent in Idlib, where traders previously enjoyed minimal tariffs and therefore a competitive advantage over the rest of Syria. Despite the tariff reductions, and despite a significant appreciation of the Syrian pound (from 15,000 to 11,000 to the US dollar), prices have continued to rise. Temporary subsidies on basic commodities such as bread and fuel have been put in place, but sustaining these measures in the long term will be financially unsustainable. 

Service delivery remains a key barometer of progress. Energy-generating ships have been leased from Turkey and Qatar to boost electricity production. Their impact remains limited, however, due to the dilapidated state of the national grid. Al-Sharaa has inherited a state that has not had any major infrastructure upgrade since the 1970s. Damascus’ sewage networks date back to the French mandate. Promises of Saudi, Qatari, and Turkish investment in major infrastructure projects have been made but  actual outlays will depend on political factors that might take months or even years to mature. Gulf and Turkish investors meanwhile will likely insist on concession agreements, often associated with high prices.  

Playing the patriotic card, the new government has reached out to expatriate Syrian businessmen, urging them to return and invest. The new leadership’s desire to retain state control over key sectors like oil and telecoms, however, conflicts with the hopes of investors, who prefer an open-market approach. Businessmen in Damascus and Aleppo meanwhile fear that they could be superseded by rivals more closely aligned with HTS. The monopolies enjoyed by the Watad oil company (the head of which is now the oil minister), and the SyriaPhone telecoms company (headed by a close associate of the new leadership), has done little to allay fears that the culture of mahsubiat (patronage) – key to controlling the economy under the Assads –  is likely to persist with the new regime.

A partnership on reconstruction between the government and UNDP is said to be on the cards. Without a lifting of US and EU sanctions, and a massive cash injection, however, Syria will likely be unable to do more than limp on in survival mode. Al-Sharaa will continue to bank small wins such as the recent slight drop in petrol prices; but in the long-run he will have to deliver on the reconstruction promises he’s made or face popular backlash. That could well result in a decision to retain key elements of the social safety net (free education and healthcare for instance) while reducing the state’s interference in the market. An economic and business advisory council comprising  independent economists and business figures might be useful to help guide policies, but that will require trust in Syrians who are not HTS stalwarts. 

Confluence of interests  
Key to legitimising and entrenching the new regime is regional and international recognition. Monopolising diplomatic contacts through the sole channel of Syria’s new foreign ministry has so far been a great success, with the Davos Economic Forum invitation of Syria’s top diplomat Asaad al-Shaybani being the latest foreign relations coup. The photo opportunities bode well for a government that is barely two months old. 

The goodwill extended by the West reflects the regional alliance that Al-Sharaa is keen to develop: the emergent Ankara-Damascus-Riyadh-Doha axis is to Al-Sharaa what the Cairo-Damascus-Riyadh axis was to Hafiz Assad in the 1990s: a guarantee of Syria’s centrality in the regional order. Having three powerful and/or well-endowed Sunni allies ensures that Syria will not be abandoned economically or militarily, and that Iran will be kept at bay. Saudi and Turkish support will be crucial to win over the Trump administration. It also ensures that Syria can become once again a confluence of regional and international interests rather than the battleground of interests it has been in the past decade. 

External challenges will persist. The first is the Egypt-Jordan-UAE axis that remains wary of Islamists in power. While engaging tentatively with Damascus, it may seek to interfere in Syria’s domestic affairs by supporting the Suwayda and Daraa armed groups, and by insisting that minorities should be  over-represented to out-balance the Islamists. The Europeans share some of this axis’ concerns and are calling for assurances on human rights, women's rights, and minority protections. Al-Sharaa will seek to divide this axis by offering Jordan and the UAE economic incentives, and the Europeans assurances on their pet concerns, while seeking to isolate Egypt. At any rate, as the deep state takes form, concessions to Arabs or the Europeans will not alter in any significant way the balance of power inside the country.

Israel is the other key source of external challenge. Keen not to antagonise the Israel lobby and President Trump, Al-Sharaa has so far demonstrated caution in not condemning Israel’s occupation of Syrian territory beyond the 1974 ceasefire line. He is likely aware that Israel might not be interested in annexing further Syrian territory but is keen to press for a comprehensive peace deal with Syria and Lebanon that would ensure long-term security on its northern border. Popular attitudes in Syria have shifted markedly towards an accommodation with the old enemy. Perhaps only a peace deal with Israel could ensure Al-Sharaa’s ultimate rehabilitation from designated terrorist to a new-age Mandela.

Circles of trust
The way that Syria is now governed is characterised by hyper-centralisation, with decision-making concentrated within a small circle around Al-Sharaa that does not exceed 5-6 individuals. Lower-ranking HTS leaders and apparatchiks lack the autonomy to act without direct orders from the top, a matter that insiders say has stifled initiative and innovation. It has also kept away those who are not HTS members who would otherwise support the new regime. The reason for this style of leadership lies in how Al-Sharaa approaches the delicate matter of loyalty.

Three concentric circles of trust exist: the inner circle is comprised of long-time HTS members and those involved in the Syrian Salvation Government. Military, security, and international relations remain under their exclusive control. The middle circle includes figures who are recognised for their opposition to the Assad regime but are not HTS members (and crucially not members of groups opposed to HTS). Their involvement is limited to either bureaucratic functions like staffing governorships and service ministries or as members of government-supported NGOs with specific remits. The outer circle consists of secularists, civil society activists, and members of political opposition groups with ties to the West. These are perceived as adversaries and the chances of their meaningful inclusion in the new government are minimal.

The exclusion of perceived adversaries from the Sunni community, and key social groups like the Christians and Druze, could result in long-term instability and a lack of legitimacy for the new regime. Already 300,000 civil servants – mostly Alawites accused of double-dipping into the public purse – have been sacked. Fostering national unity will nevertheless require a more inclusive governance model that accommodates a wider spectrum of political voices. That might still happen in due course, but while the deep state is being created an exclusionary attitude will likely persist.  

The much-anticipated national dialogue conference – initially scheduled for early January, then postponed to mid-February – has now been delayed indefinitely. It has become increasingly clear that organising such an event will be far more complex than Al-Sharaa had envisaged. The original plan was to establish a pliant preparatory committee, populate the conference with supporters of HTS and uninformed participants, and proclaim the revolution’s triumph. This would have been accompanied by a dissolution of  the Syrian People’s Assembly, dismantlement of all regime security agencies, a suspension of the constitution, and disbandment of  the Baath Party along with all armed factions, including HTS itself. The parliament was to be replaced by an advisory council composed of individuals closely aligned with the current leadership.

It has become apparent, however, that such a carefully stage-managed event would not pass muster, either domestically or internationally. The government now recognises that proceeding with the conference under those terms would do more harm than good.

The political void
Despite notable progress in military and security matters, and some success on the economic and diplomatic fronts, the new leadership remains conspicuously reluctant to engage with politics in its classical sense. Discussions around political structures, civil society organisations, free and fair elections, or constitutional reforms are notably absent. Equally, the state’s relationship with Islam remains shrouded in ambiguity. The leadership relies on vague references to the establishment of a "just national state" – a concept that remains stubbornly undefined.

This deliberate ambiguity is not without risk. In the absence of a coherent political narrative – however ideological – it creates a vacuum that competing factions with divergent visions for Syria's future could readily exploit. The reluctance to articulate a clear political identity appears to stem from a desire to avoid alienating key supporters or inviting unwelcome scrutiny from the West. Without a structured political roadmap to guide Syria’s transition, however, the new regime risks stalling its quest for international legitimacy and recognition, which are essential for securing sustained support from both domestic constituencies and Western capitals.

The government's preference for opacity, offering little more than superficial social media soundbites and generic slogans, leaves many Syrians—particularly the educated middle class—struggling to discern the regime's true direction. This may be intentional, fostering a climate of uncertainty to  keep the population in a state of perpetual anticipation. The result is a fragmented public, divided between those who prioritise economic and service-related concerns and those who, subscribing to the adage that "man shall not live by bread alone," fear the emergence of a new authoritarian order atop the ruins of the old dictatorship.

For these latter,  the spectre of a governance model akin to China's – offering economic opportunity but little in the way of political freedoms – is deeply troubling. Indeed, many Arab states have embraced such a model. However, Syria’s case is different. For a significant segment of the population, the downfall of the Assad regime was meant to herald a "second independence": a moment of genuine political renewal and democratisation.

Al-Sharaa may believe that maintaining a degree of ambiguity allows him to consolidate control over the state’s key institutions and construct a deep state that would ensure long-term political stability.  Certainly, Syria’s turbulent experiment with democracy in the late 1940s and 1950s serves as a cautionary tale of the perils of introducing democratic governance too swiftly, without an established supportive institutional framework. Furthermore, the experiences of Syria’s Sunni majority over the past 13 years bolster  the argument that minority rule enforced by coercion must not be repeated – a scenario that, in their view, can only be prevented by ensuring Sunni dominance within state institutions.

Yet, the emerging deep state, structured as it is, risks alienating even key Sunni constituencies. Many Syrians viewed the collapse of the Assad regime as an opportunity for a new era of political openness and accountability. Should the new leadership persist in avoiding substantive political engagement, it may erode the goodwill it now enjoys, reinforcing the growing perception that the sacrifices of recent years have yielded little more than rebadged authoritarianism.