The quasi-coup
Assad is gone but the deep state lives on

For the past 13 years Syria has endured what could best be described as an “internationalised civil war.” Winning and losing was not in the hands of local parties but their external backers whose competition over the Levant dealt the cards to the warring armies and militias on the ground. What transpired between 27 November and 8 December therefore was not only a victory by a people against a dictator, but also an “internationalised coup d’etat.” The speed of Assad’s deposition, and the apparent indifference of loyalists to his fate, suggest an understanding between local, regional, and international actors including, crucially, elements of Syria’s deep state. This could well explain certain peculiar events in Syria since Assad’s flight to Moscow, and why a legitimate, inclusive and credible transition to democracy might be harder to achieve than some might imagine. 

The sponsors 
In the 1950s Britain and the US worked with dissidents and rebels to organise coups against Communist-leaning regimes in the Third World. Those days are long gone, but the skillset to implement swift and decisive regime change persisted. Since 7 October all actions that would degrade and destroy Iran’s Axis of Resistance were contemplated, and the lynchpin of that Axis was also its weakest link: Syria. 

Reports that Russia and Iran had grown weary of Assad circulated for much of 2024. Over the summer Israel destroyed much of Iran’s military capacity in Lebanon and Syria, including IRGC senior and mid-level leadership. Iran had itself grown suspicious of Assad because of his neutrality on the Gaza and Lebanon wars, and it correctly suspected him of falling under UAE influence and colluding with Israel. Russia, meanwhile, had scaled back soft and hard power projection since mid-2023, and it did not have the bandwidth to micromanage the many troubles of Assad’s dysfunctional system. Circumstances were ripe for knocking Syria out of the Axis altogether; and best placed to deliver that blow was Turkey and its rebel allies. 

Turkey had long attempted to use the favourable regional climate since 7 October to drive a hard bargain with Assad to resolve its own Syria dilemmas: refugee return and elimination of the YPG/SDF threat. As Syria in Transition revealed back in October, Turkey had prepared a plan to increase the size of its ‘safe zone’ to include Aleppo city, and had ordered rebels to prepare for a limited military operation to grab territory in northern Syria. This came after Assad had rebuffed Ankara’s many offers of talks. Putin had wanted Assad to reconcile with Erdogan even at the cost of placing Aleppo under Turkey’s sphere of influence, but Assad had stubbornly refused. The 27 November offensive was greenlit by Ankara with Moscow’s tacit agreement. 

While the capture of Aleppo was on the cards, the push south towards Hama, Homs, and finally Damascus, was not initially part of the plan. Once Aleppo had been taken, rebel leader Ahmad al-Sharaa decided to test the limits of what he could achieve. Well aware of the US and Israeli desire to weaken Russia and evict Iran from Syria, and sensing that Ankara may be happy to claim Assad’s scalp, he ordered his troops to keep advancing well beyond what Russia and Turkey had agreed. It was an audacious move: a once in a lifetime opportunity to enter the history books.  

When the regime’s defensive line in Hama crumbled on 5 December, both Russia and Iran had already conveyed to Assad that they would not be coming to his rescue. Putin had refused to meet Assad during the latter’s visit to Moscow, under way when the rebel offensive started; and he refused to take his calls after he returned to Damascus. Rumours about a giant convoy of PMF fighters coming from Iraq proved just that. Assad’s desperate pleas to the UAE were rebuffed by its ruler Mohammad bin Zayed, who told him that there was nothing that he could do. Even Riyadh, which had sponsored Assad’s normalisation last year, turned its back on him by torpedoing an Arab League foreign minister’s meeting to discuss the situation in Syria. 

Assad had become the gambler who could no longer service his debts. Turkey, Qatar, and the US – the principal sponsors of the coup – met in Turkey on 5 December to draw up plans for his ouster. Two days later in Doha, Russia and Iran formally traded in Assad for military bases, religious shrines, preservation of state institutions and protection of minorities. Turkey gave assurances to all externals that their core interests in Syria would be respected, that HTS would be contained, and that a transition in line with UNSCR 2254 would occur. The stars had finally aligned. 

The contractor 
Coups tend to be carried out by generals, and Sharaa is nothing if not a general. He had proved his credentials in Idlib with his clampdown on Islamic State and Al-Qaida, and now had assembled an impressive array of combat-ready units, well-armed and trained in the latest Western military doctrines. He is also a shrewd politician. In Idlib his Salvation Government had established a neo-liberal economic model that had improved living standards and created investment opportunities. Overall, it had governed around 4.5m Syrians to a far higher standard than anything the regime could offer. 

Syria’s predominantly Sunni economic elite – a key constituent of the regime’s deep state – began seeing in Sharaa a pro-business saviour who could bring about an end to the war and with it Assad’s predation and crippling US and EU sanctions. More than anything else, Syria’s monied class wanted a return to normality and a chance to cash in on the likely reconstruction bonanza that would follow Assad’s departure. Sharaa actively courted this class, particularly those with connections to Turkey and the Gulf, because he correctly identified them as the key to unravelling the regime from the inside. What Sharaa could offer them was continuity and stability. 

Having turned against Al-Baghdadi and Zawahiri, Sharaa was no stranger to coups; and he had never hidden his ambition to conquer Damascus. Capturing power, however, carried a price: to the regionals and internationals who had contracted him to do the deed; and to elements of the deep state in Syria who would aid him in the controlled demolition of the dictatorship. These were businessmen, state bureaucrats, diplomats, tribal leaders, and army and security officers that HTS’s spy network had managed to communicate with and influence. 

Magnanimity was Sharaa’s key currency. He issued assurances of safety for army and security officers and pro-regime militiamen. In a testament to his credibility, thousands took up the offer and deserted their posts, while hundreds of others cooperated with the HTS-led Military Operations Directorate to sabotage their own side. The bureaucracy also received clemency: mass sackings and reprisals were forbidden, public and private property were strictly protected, and the Assad-appointed prime minister remained in post. 

Soon after the loss of Aleppo, the regime’s inner circle of perhaps several dozen high-ranking army and security officers saw the writing on the wall and began tying up loose ends before escaping to Lebanon and Libya. For second- and third-tier regime officers and apparatchiks, however, an overnight switch to the revolution sufficed to guarantee their safety and jobs. The passivity and apathy of loyalists to Assad’s fate amounted to collective complicity in the coup. 

The lightning blitzkrieg on Damascus may have been the coup de grace, but the underlying factor behind the collapse of the Assad regime was economic. Rebels were shocked to find legions of beggars on the streets of Damascus, and in Homs children showed signs of malnutrition. Assad’s Syria was utterly impoverished, broken, and hopeless, while HTS-run Idlib offered 24-hour electricity and free wi-fi at bus stops. Less than a week after Assad’s fall, Idlib’s shopping malls and car markets thronged with Syrians from previously regime-held areas keen to see how the other side lived. Courtesy of Islamists, neo-liberal economics triumphed in Syria.  

The hangover
The international media and the opposition portrayed what happened as an unmitigated victory for the revolution. If the target was the Assad family and the immediate inner circle, and if the goal was to free political prisoners, change Syria’s flag, and reform a corrupt administration, there can be no doubt that the revolution won. There is, however, growing unease among elements of the political and armed opposition who say that the price paid for a swift decapitation was high. No major war crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrators had been arrested. In the Alawite heartlands along the coast, statues of the Assads had been toppled but there had been minimal effort to arrest the shabiha. 

Regime stalwarts (including Maher Assad’s wife) signalled their loyalty to the new regime by using the revolutionary flag as their WhatsApp profile pictures. Diplomats like Bashar Jaafari, who for years had been Assad’s committed servants on the international stage, turned into vocal regime critics and warmly embraced the change. The Katerji Holding Group, which had held the monopoly on transportation and sale of crude oil and that operated a militia that had participated in the regime's 2016 Aleppo offensive, announced on 14 December that it was resuming operations. The press statement was adorned by two revolutionary flags. 

Senior and well-respected opposition figures have responded. Ex-prime minister Riyad Hijab wrote on X: “Caution, caution.. What the Syrians took by force must not be taken away from them through ‘soft’ arrangements.” Former Syrian Opposition Coalition president Moaz al-Khatib went further: “If the leaders of the security branches are not arrested.. then everything that is happening is a completely unclean play and a conspiracy against the Syrian people.” Survivors of Sednaya prison have taken to social media and called on the new authorities to implement mass arrests. Some rebels have taken matters into their own hands.  

In an attempt to calm the enraged revolutionary street, on 9 December Sharaa announced that the new government would pursue war criminals and anyone complicit in torture. This puts him in a difficult spot as his promises of clemency and continuity could end up as open-ended impunity. Genuine accountability can occur only once a credible transition is unfolding and with the establishment of a legitimate justice system. The nature of the internationalised coup, however, makes it doubtful that accountability will be high on the agenda for any future government.  

With emotions running high, postponing accountability to some unspecified point in the future risks undermining Sharaa’s credibility, and may trigger dangerous revenge cycles. To appease the revolutionary street, however, he would have to arrest his deep state cooperators, including bureaucrats who administered the violent state for decades. Should that happen, the deep state may turn against him, and that would mean an end to the carnival-like atmosphere and the loss of a key constituency that is ready to support Sharaa as the new strongman. 

What next?
Syria is at a fork in the road. The deal made with elements of the deep state that was blessed by the external powers is likely to deliver important elements of political and economic change; but it will not satisfy many on the opposition side who will use the issue to undermine Sharaa’s de facto leadership. They assert that the power and prestige of the “Syrian Che” is the product of media hype, note that the number of men he commands directly does not exceed 10,000, and claim that ultimately he will buckle under the combined weight of Turkish, Qatari, and US pressure to share power with the political opposition. It seems highly likely, meanwhile, that the experiences with the deep states of Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia following regime changes there will be deployed with energy by his detractors in the coming period. 

Unstable alliances
The main fear is that the military coalition that Sharaa had pieced together could unravel. The rebels of the Southern Operations Room, which were the first to enter Damascus and were under the direction of Jordan, could decide to establish their own authority in alliance with the Druze of Suwayda. 

Within Sharaa’s own alliance, the groups that had no option but to obey him when they were holed up in Idlib are now back in their home towns and cities where they are likely to grow in number and local support. In time they could develop sufficient confidence to challenge Sharaa’s authority. Jaish al-Islam – by far the best organised outfit within the Syrian National Army – is re-establishing itself in Duma. The presence of well armed and independently-minded rebels with connections to Saudi Arabia within 25 minutes’ striking distance of the capital poses a challenge for any future government. HTS’s base remains in Idlib and the north. Challenges could well emerge in southern Syria, the Damascus countryside, Homs, and Deir Ezzor.  

Minority issues
A military challenge to an HTS-led transition may also come from the Alawites and the Kurds. The former are presently much weakened and may bide their time, re-organise and await the right moment to stake a claim to a form of autonomy for which they may well receive Iranian, Russian, or Israeli support. Rebels who have returned to Homs report great unease at having to live side-by-side with thousands of shabiha members who are still heavily armed and whose intentions are as yet unclear. 

For the SDF and the Kurds, the regime’s fall was a strategic catastrophe. It unleashed Turkey and the SNA against them, with the result that Arab members of the SDF are defecting en mass to their Arab kin in the SNA and HTS. It is likely that a US-brokered agreement will confine what remains of the SDF to Kurdish-majority areas and strip them of control of Syria’s oil. The imposed end of the PYD’s political project will feed a sense of grievance that may lead to instability in the northeast for months to come. 

More than mercenaries
The SNA is likely to undergo significant restructuring now that it is no longer confined to the north. The group has often been dismissed as “Turkish mercenaries” because of their role in Turkish campaigns against Kurdish groups. Several SNA factions, however, played key roles in the November 27 offensive and will seek to be rewarded. 

SNA leaders will now further entrench in local communities. The most prominent and powerful SNA factions are in Aleppo governorate where they live within their own communities and significantly outnumber HTS. Their regions have been administered officially by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) over the past eight years, and they are poised to demand recognition, influence, and a piece of the Aleppo reconstruction cake. Their political and administrative structures have not disappeared, and the SIG intends to administer its areas independently of the HTS government until a legitimate transitional government has been formed.

The moderate opposition 
The SIG operates as a governance arm of the Syrian Opposition Coalition (SOC), which is also part of the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) platform of the UN-recognised opposition. The SNC is mandated to represent the Syrian opposition in international negotiations to implement UNSCR 2254, the internationally agreed framework for resolving the conflict. These opposition institutions are intertwined with SNA factions and collectively represent what is often referred to as the “moderate opposition.”

SOC president Hadi al-Bahra has already called for the creation of a Transitional Government Body (TGB) per UNSCR 2254 with full executive powers, and for Sharaa’s Interim Government only to oversee service provision. This will not please Sharaa, who currently enjoys the de facto powers of the president and appears to prefer a process without the UN. For any transition to succeed, however, Sharaa must bring the political opposition to the table. 

Having been the recognised body of the regional and international political process for over a decade, and being in competition with HTS over the representation of the revolution, the SIG/SOC/SNC bloc won’t buckle easily. It will likely act as the conveyers of the will of internationals to conduct the transition in line with UNSCR 2254. The commitment to 2254 was reaffirmed by statements by the US Secretary of State, the Germany foreign ministry, the G7, and the Aqaba Joint Contact Group ministerial meeting on 14 December. Central to the resolution is the principle of power-sharing and legitimate governance, which in effect will boil down to keeping a check on HTS.

Sharaa’s parallel path
Aware of the potential challenges to his authority, Sharaa has moved quickly to establish facts on the ground that sideline UNSCR 2254. By transferring power peacefully from the regime’s Prime Minister, Mohammad al-Jalali, to the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) — led by cadres loyal to him — he has sought to demonstrate that Syria does not require a UN-sponsored governance process. That resonates well with many Syrians who associate the internationally-backed political process with years of pointless diplomacy and endless suffering. It also pleases former loyalists who prefer that the matter of transitional justice is not internationalised. It has also garnered the interest of some think tankers and diplomats who are dismissive of what they consider as fig-leaf diplomacy and Western interventionalism, and are ready to grant Sharaa the carte blanche to consummate the popular revolution of 2011 in a “grassroots manner,” away from UNSCR 2254. 

The Interim Prime Minister, Mohammed al-Bashir, has announced that he will “serve as Prime Minister until March 2025, ensuring a peaceful transition and providing leadership during this crucial period.” That Sharaa has carefully avoided reference to UNSCR 2254 raises fears among many that this self-directed transition might be the prelude to an authoritarian style of leadership sustained through alliances with deep state interests and amenable rebels. 

UNSCR 2254 is often misunderstood as an attempt to impose a solution on Syrians. In reality, it is about guaranteeing a process between Syrians that delivers on legitimate governance, a new constitution, free-and-fair elections, and a country free of terrorism. These are the minimum requirements for any credible transition process. Any actor in Syria must be judged against that standard.