The Sunnis strike back
Capture of Damascus paves way for more regional shifts

Ever since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 Sunni Arabs have been having a hard time. That destabilising act allowed Iran to project power into Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen in ways that shocked and dismayed the moderate Sunni Arab states of the region. King Abdullah of Jordan was the first to issue a public cry of help when in 2005 he warned of an emerging “Shi’ite crescent.” On the whole, however, the Arabs proved ineffectual in confronting Iran. By 2023 they were resigned to their loss and mediated a modus vivendi with Tehran and its satrap Bashar Assad.

No viable alternative
Part of the problem was that moderate Arabs did not have the knowledge or the skills to take on the ideologically-motivated groups backed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC.) They had an inflated reliance on buying influence with cash and relied on weak secular politicians and groups with questionable support bases. They were also heavily reliant on US leadership and support at a time when the US was in de facto partnership with the self same IRGC-backed groups to defeat ISIS in Iraq, and with the Kurdish PYD/YPG in Syria – a group that had little ideological or even emotional connection to the Arabs. President Obama’s years were particularly difficult because his Middle East policy during the crucial 2008-2016 period was geared towards an accommodation with Iran. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) traded a pause on the nuclear programme in exchange for recognising “Iran’s equities.” The Sunnis of Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon suffered the consequences.

The lack of a Sunni regional power able and willing to stand up to Iran was not the only problem. Also, those four countries lacked any Sunni political or military group that had the organisational capability to win on the battlefield and the political nouse to be marketable to the West. ISIS and Al-Qaida were formidable Sunni militant groups; but they were also globally proscribed terror organisations. In Iraq and Syria many non-terrorist Sunni armed groups emerged in the past twenty years but they were divided, largely ineffective in lengthy,  attritional confrontations, and generally had a weak grasp of geopolitics and diplomacy. Moreover, they lacked charismatic leadership respected by the wider Sunni community. In short: the Sunnis had no answer to Hasan Nasrallah.

A hero comes along
On the eve of 7 October 2023 the Sunnis were at their nadir. Then Israel launched its war against the Axis of Resistance and everything changed. Two actors stepped up to seize the opportunity: Turkey, as the “Sunni” regional power (albeit a secular one), and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) as the local Sunni militant group. The combination proved highly effective.

Under the protection of the Turkish army and under the watchful eye of Turkish intelligence, HTS implemented a policy that allayed all the usual fears about Sunni disunity, disorganisation, and radicalism. A model was built on military professionalism, administrative efficiency, and political discipline. The 27 November blitzkrieg that swept Assad from power turned HTS into a household name. The HTS project, however, was years in the making, largely Turkish-incubated, discreetly encouraged by the US and other Western powers, and implemented by clever young Syrian Islamists. For Sunnis, it was a stunning turnaround.

The end of Sunni rule in Iraq will forever be associated with the toppling of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdos Square. In Syria, Assad’s statues have also been torn down and dragged through the streets in every city, symbolising an end to Alawite rule. The difference, of course, is that in Syria it happened at the hands of Syrians, not an invading army. That’s not to say that foreign powers were not intimately involved; but the job was done in a smarter way and at less cost than sending in 150,000 troops.

On 13 December Turkey’s National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) chief Ibrahim Kalin was driven around Damascus by none other than HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa. He prayed at the Umayyad mosque and strolled around the Old City of Damascus. Conspicuously absent were the Iranian militias that had once dominated the capital. The message is not subtle, and it is clear: Turkey is a Great Power willing and able to act decisively. 

Mission not yet accomplished
Syria’s stabilisation and transition to a form of representative democracy will require much political and financial investment. It will also be in part contingent on Sharaa’s readiness to move away from political Islam and share power. Ankara and its partner Qatar have taken it upon themselves to guide the process and guarantee desirable outcomes for regional and international stakeholders. That includes Europeans, who are already reaping the benefits of regime change in Damascus on the migration front. Voluntary refugee returns from Turkey are now running at 20,000 a day.

Syria comprises the four central squares on the Middle East chess board and its capture is a geopolitical triumph for Turkey. Iran continues to project significant, if weakening, influence in Iraq. As long as the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMFs) continue to exist, Syria faces the threat of destabilisation on its eastern border. Iraq is an oil-rich country run by Iran-backed elites, both Sunni and Shia, with poor services, weak governance, and eye-watering levels of corruption. It is ripe for “smart” regime change. There too the Sunnis will make a partial comeback, this time in partnership with secular and nationalist Shia politicians not tainted by twenty years of misrule.

The powers that are shaping the Middle East today have identified the agents of chaos: the PKK, the Resistance Axis, and political Islam. In the emerging order, Sunnis will be given a chance to lead; but it won’t work out well for them unless they become truly inclusive and responsible actors willing to embrace international law and multi-party political systems. If the lessons of the past twenty years are properly heeded, ex-jihadists and ex-Baathists might have a second chance.