The unyielding emirate
Understanding Qatar’s Syria policy

Qatar is unique in its resolute non-normalisation policy towards the Assad regime – which might sound counterintuitive given the emirate’s attempts to position itself as a major hub of mediation in the Arab world. Qatar is not alien to reconsidering foreign policy positions in general. Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, who succeeded his father Hamad in 2013, normalised with Egypt after years of strained relations, for example. The Saudi pressure that played a role in that decision did not, however, convince Tamim to normalise relations with Damascus. Qatar was not in a position to prevent Assad’s return to the Arab League in May 2023, but when Assad took the floor in Jeddah, Emir Tamim walked out. Even when Qatar’s most important ally, the United States, gave a tacit green light to Arab normalisation, or when its second most important ally, Turkey, opened dialogue with the regime in December 2022, Doha did not use the occasion to explore options for engagement with Damascus. Against this background, Qatar’s Sonderweg presents a riddle to many observers, who fall back on the lazy explanation that cites Doha’s support for Islamist groups. 

Regional sheikh
To understand Qatar’s policy towards Syria, it is essential to understand the broader underpinnings of its foreign policy. The key context is Qatar’s transformation from relative poverty to immense wealth, and the resultant threat of predation by powerful neighbours. Two key objectives have resulted: maintaining a regional balance of power; and a commitment to international law. The 2017-21 Arab blockade showed just how vulnerable the country was, and in response, Emir Tamim has diversified Qatar’s supply chains and strategic alliances. The United States is the lynchpin of Qatar’s security and in March 2022 designated it a “major non-NATO ally”– a title so far withheld from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. With a view to the regional balance of power, meanwhile, Qatar has cultivated ties with Iran, China, and notably Turkey. This has included an enhancement of the 2014 defence pact with Ankara involving the deployment of up to 5,000 troops at the emirate’s Tariq bin Ziyad base. Normalisation with Assad threatens to upset the regional balance of power by undermining the US and Turkish positions. 

International law acts as an important line of defence for small nations like Qatar. Assad is a serial abuser of international law and so are his principal allies Russia and Iran. Abiding by and upholding UN resolutions, conventions on human rights and prohibited weapons, accountability (Qatar had a key role in the establishment of the International, Impartial and Independent Mechanism [IIIM]), and the right to self-determination, form the basis of much of Qatar’s public diplomacy. A Qatari volte-face on Syria would undermine its own rhetoric on, and resort to, international law. 

Beyond mere survival, Qatar also wants to be a player in its own right, notably as a major centre of regional diplomacy – a role for which it receives Western support. This has led to inaccurate and – from Doha’s perspective – unflattering comparisons with Switzerland. The Qatari concept of mediation involves an activist role in which it presents innovative proposals steeped in the political culture and psychology of the region and puts cash on the table to lubricate peace deals. The 2008 Doha Agreement on Lebanon and the 2017 Four Towns deal in Syria are prime examples of its approach. In essence, Doha assumes the role of the tribal sheikh: a respected, beneficent, and shrewd arbiter who is the ultimate embodiment of soft power in Arab societies. When dealing with a feud, the sheikh may pay money out of his own pocket to secure peace. This also helps to explain Qatar’s rejection of normalisation with Assad. Emir Tamim, during efforts to de-escalate the conflict in 2011, extended generous payments to the regime in pursuit of peace. Assad, however, took the money but proved unwilling to compromise an inch. This led Qatar to perceive Assad as a disrespectful and untrustworthy actor unwilling to adhere to Arab political norms. Any something-for-nothing normalisation with Damascus, devoid of genuine negotiation, would mean siding with one party against another – a grave risk to a sheikh’s credibility and prestige.     

Untapped potential
Viewed from the perspectives of regional balance of power, international law, and its unique mediator role, Qatar’s policy of non-normalisation makes sense. Qatar’s stance is a useful reminder that effective diplomacy requires not only a willingness to engage with all parties, but also credibility. It intersects neatly, meanwhile, with the European policy of strategic patience on Syria (which is not without its challenges.) Qatar is broadly aligned with the European ‘three noes’ policy and has cooperated with the Europeans in advocating stronger push back on the Assad regime at the UN. Unsurprisingly, Doha views clandestine talks between some EU member states and Damascus with a mixture of irritation and concern.

Doha, it should be remembered, possesses an asset that is diminishing in the EU but remains essential for maintaining the EU’s policy of strategic patience: substantial financial resources for humanitarian aid. Qatar wants to deepen humanitarian cooperation with Europeans, underlined by its successful funding, with Europe and the US, of the White Helmets. While co-funding through UN agencies exists, there is significant untapped potential for Qatari involvement in politically-sensitive early recovery projects. Recent Qatari pledges of $2 million to the Aid Fund for Northern Syria (AFNS), an FCDO-initiated pooled fund independent of the UN, indicates that Doha is testing the waters for deeper collaboration on northwest Syria. To consolidate the non-normalisation camp, and strengthen European stakes in Syria, such cooperation is an opportunity worth seizing.