Timeless beauty
The case for UNSCR 2254

Almost eight years after its adoption in 2015, it appears that UNSCR 2254 is ageing more like milk than wine. The resolution remains the primary reference for Syria diplomacy, with official support from everyone except the Assad regime, mainly because it offers diplomatic bonus points without associated costs. Yet, there is a quiet sentiment that the changed political and military realities render the resolution unimplementable. Some suggest that it is an outdated tool for regime change in light of Assad’s reconquest of much of the country. Such notions coming from think tankers or retired diplomats are predictable. It’s different, though, coming from practitioners with political mandates who are supposed to work on the resolution’s implementation.

UNSCR 2254 was negotiated and passed after the tumultuous spring of 2015 when numerous Syrian armed opposition groups launched an offensive together with Jabhat al-Nusra, the predecessor to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. In April that year the provincial capital of Idlib fell, emboldening rebels in other parts of the country to double down on struggling regime forces. The momentum faded rapidly, however, as the US and its allies restrained tens of thousands of fighters from the Southern Front from marching on Damascus, Iran and Russia escalated their military support for the regime and Washington prioritised the nuclear deal with Tehran. Russia’s full blown military intervention in September, as the world was sitting in New York for the UN General Assembly, decisively turned the tide. It became clear that Assad’s reign had become much more  secure. Against this background, Assad showed no interest in implementing UNSCR 2254, echoing the disinterest of the Russians, whose strategic bombing of the opposition and of civilian areas was a clear statement of their disregard for Syrians’ legitimate political aspirations and human rights.

A timeless call
Contrary to what critics of UNSCR 2254 claim, the situation today isn’t vastly different from 2015. Assad and his key patrons weren’t inclined to implement the resolution then, nor are they now. The Kerry-Lavrov bilateral dialogue of 2015 may have looked promising in front of TV cameras, but in reality it was a castle in the air relying on goodwill from Russia that simply didn’t exist. Implementation demands external pressure to force the regime to the negotiation table and to compel the opposition to retract maximalist demands (which it has already done without compromising on UNSCR 2254’s principles). Those with the means of exerting such pressure,  particularly the US, however, weren’t as willing or able to act in 2015 as they are now. Of course, the US and wider Western relationship with Russia has reached a new low since the invasion of Ukraine; but it’s not like key players in 2015 were eager to sit together and have a constructive talk about Syria’s future. Importantly, if UNSCR 2254 is not implementable under prevailing circumstances, it doesn’t mean that it should be thrown out. Its beauty lies in its timeless call for a peaceful transition of power, granting Syrians their legitimate political aspirations, dignity and freedom. 

The four elements - ceasefire, governance, constitution, elections - of the political process that the resolution outlines are as simple as they are valid. A genuine political process cannot be initiated while fighting is raging, hence the need for a ceasefire. A legitimate (transitional) government is required to mandate constitutional reform. A reformed constitution is needed to pave the way for free and fair elections and guide the country towards a peaceful future. All of this stands distinct from the notion of regime change, an idea that Russia would never have supported anyway. Mandated officials are expected to engage in good conflict management and facilitate new opportunities for implementation. While this may take time, sacrificing Syrians’ legitimate aspiration on the altar of  alleged ‘pragmatism‘ would be both morally wrong and senseless in terms of advancing the political process and serving their own security and migration interests.

A question of realism
A 'pragmatism' that involves lifting sanctions and normalising relations with Assad would entail a delusional belief in a 'return to (a new) normal‘ with Assad. This is unviable: foreign cash injections won’t provide Assad sufficient resources to suppress the unrest stemming from decades of his clan’s dictatorship and a decade of civil war. The cards in Syria have been reshuffled permanently, and time is required to establish a new equilibrium reconcilable with regional and international power dynamics. Discussions about appropriate sanctions, the extent of Early Recovery assistance, and suitable economic and security arrangements must continue. Amidst these deliberations, however, the principles of UNSCR 2254 must never be overlooked. The situation in Israel/Palestine serves as a constant reminder of how UN resolutions can become utterly disconnected from real-world politics. Though a momentary power balance may suggest stability and therefore feel somehow natural, the reality is that every balance of power is created politically. The constant truth is that people will do whatever it takes to fulfil their natural urges to live in dignity. This lies at the heart of UNSCR 2254. Syrians have a lengthy path ahead, and fortunately UNSCR 2254 outlines  intermediate stages. What’s certain is that Syrians need allies on this path, not defeatists. Mandated officials don’t need to be morally-guided idealists to fulfil this role; they simply need to be realists.