Triple Nexus Syria version
Introducing “cross-area” stabilisation

In Syria, humanitarian aid has long been wielded as a tool of conflict. Contemplating its potential role in peacebuilding is therefore considered unorthodox. Humanitarians are wary of anything that could further complicate their access to those in need and compromise their apolitical identity, codified by the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Nonetheless, discussions abound on the intersection of humanitarian assistance, development and peacebuilding. Given the limitations of life-saving aid in enabling stabilising areas to embark on effective peacebuilding, attention was always likely to shift to developmental support. However, where aid ends and development assistance begins is never quite made clear, and the inherently political nature of aid and development assistance is never adequately addressed.

The situation is best understood in Robert Louis Stevenson’s novella Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. Dr Jekyll creates a potion to separate and suppress an undesirable part of his personality, but his rigid and ultimately unattainable rules led him to be consumed by his dark side, and he transformed permanently into the monstrous Mr Hyde. To continue the analogy, it might be wise for humanitarians and their donors to embrace the political nature of aid instead of attempting to contain it.

One attempt to acknowledge the intersection of humanitarian, development and peacebuilding activities was made by the UN in 2016, when António Guterres introduced the Triple Nexus framework. In Syria, the Triple Nexus was a bit of a non-starter given that major donors had ostracised the Assad regime and conditioned development assistance on an irreversible political transition. Despite this, the Triple Nexus principle gained some traction, albeit without explicit mention of “development”, leaning instead on less contentious concepts such as Early Recovery whose implementation did not require formal diplomatic relations with Damascus. This led to a progressive expansion of the grey zone between aid and development assistance, with UN agencies persistently lobbying for stretched donor principles to allow for bigger budgets and leeway in programming. 

Early Recovery and peacebuilding
The UN’s Agenda for Humanity initiative in 2016 empowered resident coordinators to become the highest-ranking development representatives of the UN system in their respective countries. The UN Syria country team includes individuals with certain sympathies for the regime, which is known to do its homework when it comes to ‘vetting‘ the UN staff to whom it grants visas. The resident coordinators’ newfound authority as development chiefs was illusory, however, as long as donors rejected development assistance. This is why the calls of some UN agencies for transcending established divisions between humanitarian and development activities grew louder. At the same time, increased humanitarian needs intensified demands for a more comprehensive and sustainable response; and lobbying of Western capitals on increasing Early Recovery assistance was done under that rubric. Yet there were no concerted efforts to design Early Recovery programming with a clear peacebuilding agenda. Instead, Early Recovery became merely a carrot in the UN’s flawed steps-for-steps initiative, and a Western concession in Russia’s annual Security Council blackmail on extending the cross-border mandate. 

The consequences of this failed approach are still evident today, with the regime demanding more Early Recovery assistance to facilitate refugee returns — a proposition some still believe might work. From the perspective of INGOs and their Syrian partners, the Triple Nexus appears promising on paper but is largely seen as just one of many en vogue concepts. Without donors attempting even to conceptualise what a strategic peacebuilding element of an Early Recovery programme could look like, “peacebuilding” has largely been interpreted by UN agencies and large humanitarian implementers as a low-risk element that aligns conveniently with established practices of empowering communities and marginalised groups. This naturally has meant an emphasis on increasing the “resilience” of communities — a noble objective, yet a reactive and passive interpretation of what peacebuilding is, insofar as it avoids the Track I level. To truly harness the power of the trinity that is the Triple Nexus, genuine peacebuilding components in Early Recovery programming that concern the Track I level need to be seriously considered and implemented. This not only would constitute a new and promising approach to peacebuilding; it would also mitigate the risk of increased Early Recovery funding becoming a slippery slope for normalisation with Assad and condition-free reconstruction. If peacebuilding is actually about building bridges between Syrians divided between “areas of control,” the Syria version of the Triple Nexus might best be termed “cross-area stabilisation.”

Cross-area stabilisation
The concept of cross-area stabilisation arises from the conflict realities of 2023. Syria is a de facto divided country where different areas are controlled by competing local actors but are nonetheless interconnected and mutually dependent in terms of economics and services. They also share common challenges such as high trade costs, limited markets, lack of reliable water and energy supplies, and skills shortages. Joined-up solutions are increasingly essential for survival.  

Cross-area stabilisation projects aim to create mutually beneficial outcomes for multiple conflict stakeholders by engaging local authorities across the frontlines on durable and sustainable solutions to everyday problems. For instance, the Alouk pumping station in Hasakah is the focus of persistent and unnecessary conflict over water and energy that engender tactical rather than strategic approaches to a resolution. Further possible such endeavours include water infrastructure and distribution agreements in the Idlib-Hama-Latakia triangle, and energy initiatives in northern Aleppo. This type of cross-area coordination posits peacebuilding as an essential goal of Early Recovery programming, rather than merely a desired secondary benefit. Such projects commence at a modest, technical level but harbour considerable potential as entry points for intra-Syrian discussions on safety and calm across the frontlines. Cross-area stabilisation — in practical terms the Syrian version of the Triple Nexus — therefore builds a bridge between conflict management (what the Astana process and the US-Russia deconfliction line are all about) and conflict resolution (what the UN is meant to be working on). This is why it defers large-scale development assistance until a political transition is in progress. It does, however, involve increasing investment in Early Recovery assistance for projects designed to meet humanitarian and peacebuilding objectives in equal measure. After a decade marked by the weaponisation of aid, exploring its potential as a tool for peace is surely worthwhile.