Unpacking the Early Recovery Trust Fund
A conversation with Adam Abdelmoula

The UN Country Team’s plans to set up a dedicated fund for early recovery (ER) have been met with reservations by donors and NGOs. To discuss concerns and learn more about the current status of the Early Recovery Trust Fund (ERTF), Syria in Transition spoke with Adam Abdelmoula, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Syria.

Can you provide a quick overview on where the ERTF stands in terms of its launch date and donor investment?
Abdelmoula: No date for the launch of the ERTF has been set yet. Consultations among our humanitarian partners are still ongoing. While I regularly brief the donors on progress made toward the launching of the Early Recovery Strategy (ERS) and its accompanying ERTF, their appetite to invest in the ERTF has not been tested yet. That said, between January 2022 and October 2023, the Syria humanitarian actors spent around $800 million on early recovery (ER) projects covering a wide range of sectors.

When do you expect all the documents to be finalised and shared with the donors?
Abdelmoula: I am hoping that we will finalise the documents by the end of July 2024 and share them soon thereafter with the donors. However, if our humanitarian partners need more time, we will accommodate that.

You visited Washington D.C. in May. Did you get the sense that the US will support the ERS/ERTF?
Abdelmoula: During my meetings in Washington I wasn’t seeking the US Government’s formal endorsement of the ERS or the ERTF. Rather, I wanted to explain those two documents and make myself available to answer any questions. In three recent forums (the Brussels Senior Officials Meeting, the Beirut Regional Dialogue Mechanism and the DC meeting) the US participants did not convey any reservations about the ERS or the ERTF. There will be an opportunity to get the US and other donors’ views once we share the final documents formally with them.

You have emphasised that the ERTF is strictly humanitarian. Where do you draw the line between humanitarian assistance and development or even reconstruction?
Abdelmoula: As clearly stated in the ERS, the idea is to upscale investment in four humanitarian sectors (health, education, WASH and livelihoods) with electricity added as an enabler. Our assumption is that a sustained medium term investment in those sectors would considerably reduce the ever-rising caseload of those in need of humanitarian assistance.

UN guidelines are clear: to meet the definition of ‘humanitarian’ ER has to be led by local communities and civil society actors based on needs, without enabling governments and their institutions involved in the conflict. The Government of Syria (GoS) is strictly hierarchical and controls local governance bodies. How do you plan to ensure that the ERTF won’t further enable the GoS?
Abdelmoula: The ERS clearly states that community-based organisations would play a central role. To honour the humanitarian essence of this ER initiative, all actors must faithfully adhere to the principle of Accountability to Affected Populations (AAP). This requires that the beneficiaries be fully consulted prior to the development of any intervention, their views should be integrated in the program document, they should be regularly apprised during the implementation phase, and should take part in the final evaluation of the intervention.

Community-ownership and adherence to humanitarian principles has been problematic in the past, with evidence of systematic aid diversion, manipulation, and even corruption, as seen in the case of the WHO in 2022. This is why UN guidelines require ER interventions to be based on thorough risk assessments informed by conflict analysis. We could not find any conflict analysis in the ERS. Why is that?
Abdelmoula: I disagree with the contention that there is systematic aid diversion in Syria. Aid diversion is a term of art and has a very specific technical definition. It should not be used so liberally simply because it resonates and raises eyebrows. 

The UN system has rules and regulations for addressing mismanagement and corruption allegations. In the case of WHO, it acted swiftly and addressed those allegations, leading to the removal of its country director.

We will incorporate conflict analysis in the final iteration of the ERS. Recently, a conflict analysis specialist joined my office (thanks to the Swiss Government). That specialist is now the focal point on ER. In addition, we circulated the concept note for the establishment of a stronger Risk Management Unit to the donors.

You highlighted that the ERTF’s secretariat will be located in Amman in order to insulate the ERTF from undue influence. How is that supposed to work given that the secretariat, including the Risk Management Unit (RMU), falls under your office in Damascus?
Abdelmoula: No decision has yet been taken to place the ERTF secretariat in Amman. We are considering both Amman and Beirut. And yes, administratively the ERTF secretariat and the RMU would be part of my office. The head of our small RMU is based in Beirut. Similarly, my human rights adviser and his team are based in Beirut. I am based in Damascus but I report to New York.

In a previous version of the ERTF concept note that we reviewed, the final decision-making authority was stipulated to be jointly held by you and the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC). This has been changed in recent concept notes to place decision-making solely in your hands. What is the rationale behind concentrating decision-making in one person?
Abdelmoula: I don’t know which version of the concept note you had access to. It is still being discussed internally and has not been finalised. The specific terms of reference of the governing body and its structure have not been articulated yet. However, there is a broad agreement that the governing body will include representatives of the UN, including the resident and humanitarian coordinator (RC/HC), the regional humanitarian coordinator (RHC), and one or two representatives of UN agencies, as well as donor representatives and representatives of national and international NGOs.

In our last whole-of-Syria meeting (the Syria Strategic Group, SSG), I suggested that, like the SSG, the governing body of the ERTF should be co-chaired by the RHC and the RC/HC. The ERTF’s governing body is meant to make funding allocation decisions. However, the senior UN staff sitting in that body would be solely accountable to the UN oversight bodies and to the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (MPTFO).

So you are saying that regardless of where the ERTF Secretariat is ultimately located, both the RMU and the final decision-making authority for the ERTF will rest with you, and possibly also with the RHC as co-chair. This leaves only an advisory role for donors in the governing body, and it would, of course, matter greatly which countries sit in the governing body. How will the composition be decided, and will the governing body have a mandate to monitor and oversee the implementation of the funded projects to ensure compliance?
Abdelmoula: That is not accurate. Unlike the management structures of the over 100 existing Multi-Partner Trust Funds (MPTF), I have suggested that the ERTF should have a governing body fully vested with the power to make all funding allocation decisions. Whether those decisions should be made by a simple majority of the governing body or a higher number is a question that has to await the finalisation of the governing body‘s ToR. As to which donors will participate in the governing body, the suggestion is that donors have to select who represents them.

Having an inclusive governing body that grants equal decision-making authority to donors and NGOs would be a welcome development. Thank you for clarifying this. But don’t you think that in order to reassure donors, the governing body needs a robust oversight mandate? It seems half-hearted to include donors and NGOs in decision-making but exclude them from oversight.
Abdelmoula: I already mentioned that the specific terms of reference of the governing body are still being articulated. I see no reason why the governing body shouldn’t have an oversight role.

In an interview with the Al-Watan newspaper, you mentioned supporting a clear roadmap for the lifting of Western sanctions and suggested that the ERTF provides non-traditional donors, such as Gulf states, with an opportunity to provide aid directly to the GoS that would otherwise be prevented by Western sanctions. Isn’t providing a vehicle to bypass sanctions undermining of that clear roadmap and the political process as a whole?
Abdelmoula: I think there is a misunderstanding here. The lifting of the sanctions roadmap and funding of ER activities by non-traditional donors through the ERTF were two distinct issues/questions during that interview. On the need for a roadmap for the lifting of sanctions, I expressed my personal views. I have been consistently saying that some clarity about the step-for-step process is needed: what step needs to be matched by what step.

On the non-traditional donors possible funding of ER activities in Syria through the ERTF, again, my position has been both consistent and public. Non-traditional donors such as the GCC countries typically prefer to channel resources bilaterally to recipient governments. Because of the sanctions system in place, they cannot do so for Syria. The ER initiative and its ERTF provide these non-traditional donors with the option of joining traditional donors who have been funding ER activities in Syria for years. Since the ERTF would be established under the multilateral system, it would allow them to channel resources directly to the Syrian people.

Allow us a moment to digress and ask for clarification on your stance regarding sanctions. You have attributed the economic collapse in Syria to Western sanctions, while other UN officials cite factors such as thirteen years of armed conflict, decades of entrenched corruption, and a thriving narco-economy. Could you elaborate?
Abdelmoula: I have never attributed the economic decline solely to the sanctions imposed on GoS. However, sanctions are a contributing factor. 

In the humanitarian context, the most serious problem facing Syria’s humanitarian community is over-compliance. Many vendors and banks avoid any kind of involvement for fear of breaking the sanctions system. We shared a detailed note on the impact of sanctions prepared by our NGO partners with our key donors a while back. To mitigate the impact of sanctions, we regularly discuss this matter with countries (especially the US) and institutions (EU). This past June we had a very positive meeting at the US Department of State with representatives from the departments of Commerce and State.

This means that the ERTF has fewer red lines than the Syria Humanitarian Fund (SHF) and includes activities that fall foul of Western sanctions. It appears clear that the ERTF has significant implications for the political process, which was confirmed to us by senior UN officials off the record. You mentioned that you’ve been demanding clarity from Geir Pedersen on the step-for-step process. But why should the GoS engage in a UN-facilitated political process if the humanitarian and development arms of the UN, through the ERTF, are seen to be undermining any political leverage the UN might have? 
Abdelmoula: On the contrary, the ERTF has more red lines that the SHF. For starters, NGOs not registered with the GoS cannot access SHF funding. By contrast, they would be able to access ERTF funding and even have their representatives take part in the deciding on allocations. Actors in each of the three operating hubs (North West Syria, North East Syria, and GoS-controlled area) would enjoy full autonomy to develop their context-specific programs and projects on the basis of the ERS and enjoy equal access to ERTF.

Clarity on the step-for-step process is needed precisely to avoid undermining the political process led by Special Envoy Pedersen, and also to help us identify non-politicised humanitarian areas of activity. Our humanitarian country team and I coordinate closely with the Special Envoy and his team. I am not going to comment on what UN “senior officials” had told you off-the-record except to say that a) ER for Syria has been mandated by three Security Council Resolutions; b) I received a written instruction from the Secretary General to develop an ER strategy and mobilise resources for it; and c) all drafts (ERS, ERTF and RMU) have been shared with UN Headquarters. Keeping ER strictly on the humanitarian lane is the only way to avoid crossing any red lines and sharpen our focus on helping the people.

To critical donors, the perception is that this is really about using humanitarian labels to carry out development and reconstruction projects while shielding them from sanctions and political conditions imposed on traditional development aid. This approach will allow the GoS to receive development benefits without committing to necessary political reforms. How do you respond to that?
Abdelmoula: On the contrary, in order to avoid crossing any red lines we are putting an ER label on humanitarian sectors that donors have been funding for years. In normal contexts, ER is meant to bridge the humanitarian and development spheres. Typically, it contains a strong reconstruction component. We realised from the start that that classical type of ER is inapplicable to Syria (at least for the time being). Therefore, to discharge the double duty of establishing an ER programme and using ever-dwindling resources more efficiently, I proposed that we focus on those four transformative sectors for a medium term of five years. If you read the ERS document closely, you will realise that it is wholly people centred. Meeting people’s basic human needs is the ultimate goal of the ERS and ERTF.

What's your message to key donors that might be hesitant about contributing money to the ERTF?
Abdelmoula: My message is simple: you have been funding ER in Syria for years. The needs continue to rise and the funds for humanitarian responses continue to decline. The ERS and its ERTF are strategic investments meant to cut the caseload, avoid the creation of unsustainable aid dependency and capitalise on the Syrian people’s agency.