With strings attached
Germany’s conditional aid to Syria requires more Fingerspitzengefühl

For years the European “three noes” doctrine defined EU and German policy on Syria. The “no normalisation, no sanctions relief, and no reconstruction without a credible and inclusive political transition” policy line was principled – and in hindsight well-advised. While some parts of the German system tried to explore the boundaries of ‘pragmatic’ development assistance, the overarching conditionality endured and the focus remained on life-saving assistance. With Assad’s ouster, however, the circumstances have changed and Berlin is now being asked to recalibrate its approach. 

Germany’s leverage in Syria largely rests on its influence within the European sanctions regime and its capacity for aid, ranging from relief to reconstruction. These tools are now at the centre of its policy rethink.   

The visit of Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) Svenja Schulze to Damascus on 15 January 2025 provided an early glimpse of how Berlin may approach the question of conditionality for removing sanctions on Syria and providing reconstruction aid. Schulze announced that German support for health and education sectors would not be unconditional: “When we support schools, all children need to be able to attend them, regardless of their religion or whether they are girls or boys,” she declared. 

While this message was tailored for a domestic audience still sensitive to the fallout from Afghanistan, it was perceived by former diplomats, humanitarians, and some Syrian stakeholders as condescending and counterproductive. “Instead of acknowledging that Syrians have commenced a journey which has the potential to lead to a Syria for all, the premise of the message is inevitably that Syria may rather be heading towards a Taleban-like rule,” a former Western diplomat said. 

There’s nothing wrong with conditionality; but it should be backed up by a coordinated and structured interdepartmental approach. Without this, such public comments risk undermining trust and closing doors, particularly as Germany’s leverage in Syria is limited. The caretaker government in Damascus is signalling that financial support will increasingly come from Gulf states, which would reduce Germany’s capacity to exert influence through aid alone.

Contrary to her rhetoric in Damascus, Schulze seems to be keenly aware of the need to go way beyond what recipients often perceive as virtue signalling. In a position paper published in January 2025 she proposed renaming the BMZ as the “Federal Ministry for International Cooperation”. Development cooperation, she suggested, helps to establish closer relationships with governments in the global south that were “also interested in a fair multilateralism and its international institutions;” and  it served German economic interests because it opened doors and built bridges. Germany should therefore embrace “development diplomacy”, Schulze argued. While no conclusive definition of this exists, its essence is the use of development cooperation as a strategic tool to achieve diplomatic, political, and economic objectives that, ideally, are shared by donor and recipient. 

But what if donor and recipient objectives fail to align?

During a panel at the Berlin Peace Dialogue on 5 November 2024, Schulze acknowledged that interests can diverge and emphasised the need for harmonisation. Soft power, however, has its limits. Take the example of Russia’s continued presence in Syria’s coastal areas. A number of EU foreign ministers in Brussels in December 2024 said that Syria should remove Russian military bases as a “condition”, without offering further details. Tobias Lindner, Germany’s Special Coordinator for Syria, reiterated this position in a January 2025 interview with Der Spiegel, saying that the German stance is that “the Russian bases in Syria must close and Russia must withdraw its troops”. He added that the decision would of course be up to the Syrians, but stressed that Russia’s presence in Syria affected German security and that Russia was the “biggest threat for European security for the foreseeable future”. If Syria decided to maintain the Russian bases, such as the naval facility in Tartous, however,  Germany’s development cooperation could act as a hard power tool aiming to coerce Damascus, as it partly has in the past decade.

The Federal Foreign Office’s Eight Point Plan for Syria envisions a peaceful transition led by an inclusive transitional government formed through comprehensive dialogue – a  process that must include all societal, ethnic, and religious groups, alongside a nationwide ceasefire and the integration of armed groups into a national army. The details remain undefined but may emerge, at least in part, through a new UN Security Council resolution. In any case, Germany, in collaboration with its partners, must clearly articulate its red lines and refine its approach to conditionality. The upcoming EU ministerial meeting on sanctions in late January could offer an opportunity to make these conditions more concrete – and  also more realistic.

Development and reconstruction activities in Syria are expected to expand dramatically at bilateral, multilateral, and international levels. The surrounding politics will be pivotal. Donors’ recognition of specific Syrian actors as local authorities or as suitable civil society partners will significantly impact power dynamics and perceptions of legitimacy in the new Syria.

Aware of such dynamics, Germany has promoted integrated approaches. The Foreign Office’s November 2024 strategy on humanitarian assistance abroad, referencing Germany’s National Security Strategy, advocates increased Vernetzung — integrated planning and coordination across humanitarian aid, development assistance, stabilisation, and peacebuilding. This aligns with the Humanitarian-Development-Peace Nexus (HDP Nexus), which Germany endorses but has struggled to implement effectively. It remains to be seen if Berlin can effectively implement  the integrated approaches it now advocates. Cooperation between the BMZ, responsible for development cooperation, and the Foreign Office, overseeing humanitarian aid, has historically been fraught. Sources in Berlin say that little has changed so far.

Germany’s renewed attention to Syria is nevertheless commendable, especially since last November’s collapse of the ruling coalition partly paralysed the government. The challenges of Syria’s transition offer an opportunity finally to breathe life into the HDP Nexus and create a model of “development diplomacy” that is transparent in its objectives and effective in achieving them.