Yes, you can
Making sense of European strategic patience

The European Syria policy of strategic patience has its fair share of critics but on the whole it has been correct. That does not mean that its ‘passive’ nature (the “three noes”, wait-and-see approach) is without its pitfalls. One is a tendency to over-rely on the negotiation strategy of the UN’s Office of the Special Envoy (OSE), which in recent months has encountered stiff push back from the Syrian opposition. Informed sources say that in mid-October the Syrian Negotiation Commission (SNC) sent a letter to American, European, and Arab diplomats setting out its many misgivings about the UN’s current steps-for-steps initiative and calling for its rejection. This shocked the Europeans, who, in the absence of pro-active US leadership, had conveniently fallen back on whatever guidance they were receiving from the UN. The opposition letter presented the Europeans with an awkward choice: continue to support the UN’s steps-for-steps initiative as it is now, or back the opposition and call for a re-think. Four years into steps-for-steps, some European officials are frustrated with what some describe as a “blind reliance” on the UN despite its lack of tangible achievements. With frustration with the UN mounting, and the risk of a second Trump term very real, Europeans should now be launching a re-think on how to advance the political process. 

A third way forward
The reliance on the UN became conspicuously problematic in the first half of 2023, when Russia launched a negotiation track between Turkey and the Assad regime, while several key Arab states moved towards normalisation and the re-admission of Syria into the Arab League. The flurry of regional diplomatic activity made the UK, France, Germany, and the US (known as the ‘Quad‘), plus the EU, feel somewhat isolated. To counter this, they lashed themselves to the UN mast and attempted to surf the steps-for-steps wave that Arab normalisation was meant to unleash. But the expected wave became barely a ripple. The regime’s commitment to the UN on steps-for-steps was cynical at best. In the main it sought to exploit any diplomatic opening to achieve long-term security goals, such as neutering the Syrian opposition. Syria’s reinstatement into the Arab League led to hesitation in Arab capitals in engaging publicly with the opposition, given the League’s rules on respecting members’ sovereignty. Meanwhile, the UN and the Quad were keen to gain seats at the Arab-Assad negotiating table and in that context viewed the opposition SNC as something of a liability. At a meeting of Western envoys in September, UN and Arab representatives were invited but the SNC was not. Perhaps the French hosts did not want to embarrass their Arab guests; but also they wanted to imagine a political process involving regional deals without any meaningful role for the opposition. 

The illusion did not last long. The suspension of the Arab Contact Group and the halt in talks between Turkey and the regime brought the normalisation bandwagon to a screeching halt. Turkey’s interests remain fundamentally at odds with those of Assad, and the goodies that the Arabs tried to sell did not address European concerns such as migration and security, let alone advance the political process in any meaningful way. In one year, steps-for-steps has gone from fashionable idea to conversation-killer. 

Any political process requires gradual and reciprocal concessions, regardless of how they are marketed. The UN might insist on sticking to the steps-for-steps ‘brand’, but the contents of steps-for-steps remain open for discussion. According to a close observer, in mid-November the SNC formally presented to the OSE four core principles that should guide a credible and legitimate steps-for-steps process: parity between Syrian sides, reciprocity of concessions, a snap-back mechanism in case of non-compliance, and a clear connection to UNSCR 2254. The SNC now waits to see if  the UN  is ready to discuss a re-configuration of steps-for-steps in line with these four principles. The failed Arab normalisation and the impasse reached by the UN’s approach have served as catalysts for new thinking. With a more pro-active SNC, the Europeans no longer must choose between the UN and the opposition. If the goal is to support UN diplomacy and uphold UNSCR 2254, having an opposition that engages constructively and in good faith with the UN must surely be welcome.  

Beware the Kissinger doctrine
Exchanging papers and holding meeting does not amount to a breakthrough. At a November meeting between the SNC and Syria envoys in Geneva, European representatives repeated the “three noes” policy but said little more, according to a source with direct knowledge of the meeting. On European policy in general, a US diplomatic source remarked: “The Europeans conveniently convinced themselves that they can’t do anything and then mastered the art of whining about it.” Doubtless, Europe’s policy of strategic patience on Syria is preferable to random actionism; but it cannot be effective without  positive application. Put simply, strategic patience doesn’t have to be merely passivity. 

This European passivity largely stems from decades of self-imposed dependence on Washington in world affairs. Even Europe’s united response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was largely the result of US leadership. The problem is that, unlike Ukraine, US leadership on Syria ranges from “non-existent“ to “deeply problematic”. 

In his book “Master of the Game”, Martin Indyk writes about the late Henry Kissinger:

He would prove mightily resistant to more ambitious efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict because he feared that pursuing peace as an idealistic end state would jeopardize the stability that his order was designed to generate. Peace for Kissinger was a problem, not a solution. The desire for it needed to be manipulated to produce something more reliable, a stable order in a highly volatile part of the world.

US policy on Syria is shaped by officials like Brett McGurk, who closely follow the Kissinger doctrine. They accept that a certain level of violence is acceptable as long as key allies are protected and US strategic depth, resource extraction, and international trade are preserved. McGurk’s prioritisation of an Israeli-Saudi peace deal over an Israeli-Palestinian accord underlines Washington’s preference for authoritarian stability over genuine conflict resolution. What this means for Syria is that maintaining a volatile situation is fine as long as it promises more stability than alternative scenarios – a  “Sunni takeover” for instance, which might challenge established power balances in the region favourable to US interests. Washington’s  approach  was evident in its August 2013 failure to enforce red lines on chemical weapons use; in its May 2015 prevention of a Syrian rebel march on Damascus; and, most recently, in its early 2023 discreet encouragement of Arab normalisation. Put simply, the US can afford to maintain the status quo in a way that the Europeans cannot.  

The present US position sacrifices the Syrian people on the altar of regional 'stability’ and leads to loss of hope and more migration. Europe’s strategic patience, with its accompanying dependence on US cues thus conflicts with its own interests. A constructive application of strategic patience demands an active policy that addresses European concerns such as migration and security while protecting Europe’s main leverage in the political process (the “three noes.”) Inevitably, that means greater engagement with Turkey and the SNC on governance and stability in non-regime areas, while insisting on full implementation of UNSCR 2254.