Decentralisation is Syria’s chance to rebuild trust

Since President Ahmad al-Sharaa assumed power in Damascus and began consolidating his authority, from the executive to the legislative branches, Syria has entered a new phase of debate over what kind of state it may yet become. At first glance, it appeared that the country was stepping into an inclusive transition. Yet the early signs quickly revealed a hard tilt towards intense centralisation.

Decision making is once again narrow: only those whose loyalty is trusted more than their competence have real power. The new machinery draws from a mix of Islamist cadres who emerged from the ranks of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and figures promoted with direct encouragement from regional powers. This contraction of political space calls to mind a long and familiar legacy of rule from above, where power sits in the hands of a few who view the country only through the lens of their interests.

Since independence and the first formation of the Syrian republic, the state has shown a clear tendency towards ever-growing centralisation. Decisions were made in Damascus while the rest of the country was left in the cold. Loyalty determined appointments, and proximity to the security services was the true path to power. Under such conditions, entire regions were side-lined, especially the peripheries. Their resources were siphoned off while their people were denied political representation in proportion to their demographic and economic weight.

It is therefore hardly surprising that fears of a resurgent central state have returned with al-Sharaa’s rise. The climate has been worsened by inflammatory rhetoric targeting the Kurdish community, violent incidents in the coastal region and Suwayda, and the reactivation of security agencies reshaping public life through intimidation. All this has rekindled a deep sense of grievance which, since 2011, has driven the demand for decentralisation. That demand has only been reinforced by local experiments in northeast Syria, Suwayda, and Idlib (ironically, under HTS rule), despite their imperfections and inherent challenges.

For Kurds, decentralisation is no longer merely a political bargaining chip. Based on their historical experience, it is a guarantee of survival. After decades of exclusion, prohibition of their language and denial of representation, first under the Ba’ath party and now under Sharaa, Kurds have concluded that any centralised model in Syria will likely come at their expense.

The latest constitutional declaration, issued after the 10 March agreement between the Damascus government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has only deepened these concerns. Many read it as a step towards restoring centralised control without offering any meaningful framework for partnership among communities. In response, Kurds have begun to re-evaluate their engagement with state institutions and raised the threshold of conditions required for participation in any national process.

This sentiment is not unique to the Kurds. Other communities in north-east Syria, including Assyrians, Syriacs, Armenians and tribal Arab groups, bear their own history of marginalisation. Despite the region being effectively Syria’s economic engine, this economic role has never translated into commensurate political or administrative influence. For these communities, decentralisation is a means to redistribute power and an instrument for managing security, services, education and culture in ways that reflect local identity and acknowledge their contribution.

Seen through this lens, decentralisation emerges as a unifying national framework rather than a dividing project. It offers a balance between regional identity and national unity, not a clash. Much as federalism helped Iraq navigate post-2003 sectarian and ethnic divisions, and as the United Arab Emirates used federal decentralisation to secure stability, Syria could find in decentralisation a path to inclusive statehood.

A country buckling under the weight of prolonged conflict does not need yet another centre that repeats the failures of those that came before. It needs a redefinition of the relationship between the centre and its regions. Decentralisation, whether administrative or more advanced political forms, may be the only available bridge to rebuild the shattered trust between state and society, and among Syria’s component communities.

In that sense, decentralisation should not be seen as a threat to Syria but as an opportunity to forge a new national compact that makes room for all. It can grant each community its due without compromising the country’s unity or its sovereignty. It represents a shift from the logic of dominance to one of partnership, from a legacy of supremacy to a future built on active participation.